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Abstract 
Boko Haram (BH) has transformed from a small group living in isolation to a large-
scale terrorist movement. Academics and policy makers suggest that BH seeks to 
substitute Nigeria’s secular state with a strict Islamic system, while BH’s violent 
campaign has spilled over to Nigeria’s neighbouring countries in the Lake Chad region. 
Existing studies have suggested that socioeconomic deprivation along with religion 
and counter terrorism (CT) sustain BH’s violence, with these studies having 
concentrated on the causes and consequences of BH terrorism. 
Terrorist behaviour is dynamic, and thus the ever-changing nature of terrorist 
behaviour requires groups such as BH to be studied over time both internally and 
externally in order to have an in-depth understanding of a terror group. 
This thesis is a case study on BH. It investigates how the behaviour of BH has 
influenced its evolution from a small isolationist movement to a large-scale violent 
group. The study provides a multi-level analysis on the role of internal and external 
factors on the evolution of BH. The multi-level analysis is used to examine the 
behaviour and evolution of BH through individual, group, state, sub-national and 
international levels of explanations. 
A mixed methods case study approach is applied in examining BH and their 
strategic choices. These methods include documents, statistics and a qualitative 
technique of semi-structured interviews with some senior Nigerian government 
officials and experts on BH. Additionally, it employs the Most Similar System Design 
(MSSD) comparative method to assess the variation in BH violence.  
The findings of this thesis extend beyond the conventional linkage of BH to 
poverty, religion and illiteracy. They instead provide explanations on the strategic 
choices, intensity of violence and changing tactics of BH. 
This thesis illustrates that different aspects of terrorist behaviour determine the 
evolution of a terrorist group. The behaviour of terrorist groups relates to their ability 
to function, and without one aspect of such behaviour, other explanations will be 
incomplete, therefore making any investigation through a single unit simplistic. The 
study suggests that multi-level analysis provides a strong methodological advantage 
in terrorism research. Its flexibility enables the application of more theories and 
empirical studies for a more systematic and critical debate in terrorism research. The 
study recommends areas for policy actions and future research on BH. 
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Chapter 1 
1.1 Introduction 
Boko Haram (BH) began as a small isolationist movement in 2002 (Maianguwa et al., 
2012; Agbiboa 2013a). It then gained prominence during its 2009 uprising and the 
subsequent killing of its founder by Nigerian forces. After 2009, BH expanded in size 
and strength and was classed in relative terms, as one of the deadliest violent 
movements by the Global Terrorism Index in 2015. Its campaign of violence has, since 
2009, focused on the targeting of state representatives, civilians and public places such 
as places of worship and business centres (Maianguwa et al., 2012; Agbiboa 2013a). 
In tandem with this transformation, the group has also changed its name several times. 
It started as the Yusufiyya movement, then became Jama’atul Ahlis Sunnah 
Lidda’wati wal-jihad (Association for Propagating the Prophet’s Teachings and Jihad), 
and then ISWAP (Islamic State in West African Province). In addition to the 
aforementioned names, the group is also popularly known as Boko Haram (‘Western 
education is forbidden’) because of its rejection of Western education. 
BH is a violent Salafist movement that propagates an ultra-orthodox Islamic 
ideology. Scholars and policy makers believe that BH seeks to replace Nigeria’s 
secular state with a strict Islamic system.  However, BH’s violent campaign has not 
been confined to Nigeria; it has also spilled over to neighbouring countries in the Lake 
Chad region. Studies suggest that poor socioeconomic situations sustain BH’s 
campaign of violence (Maianguwa et al, 2012; Hasen & Musa 2013), and that religion 
and counter terrorism (CT) further motivate their violence (Adesoji 2010; 2011), with 
these studies having focused on the causes and consequences of BH terrorism. 
Contextual information about Nigerian politics, religion and society especially, 
in Northern Nigeria (where BH exist) is important to understanding the emergence of 
BH. Nigeria was formed through the amalgamation in 1914 (Paden, 2008) of over 250 
ethnic groups and different religions, with Islam and Christianity as the two major 
religions (Paden, 2008; Falola & Heaton, 2008). As a result, Nigerian politics are 
characterised by a striving for ethnic and religious dominance (Angerbrandt, 2015). 
The majority of Nigerians in the Northern part of Nigeria pride themselves on 
being inheritors of the precursor of Islam in Nigeria. Islam came into Nigeria through 
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the North in two streams (Alao, 2013). First, it came through the Borno-Yobe axis in 
the 9th century during the reign of Kanem-Bornu Empire, and then the second stream 
was through the Usman dan Fodio jihad (ibid); with both streams through 
radicalisation in the form of battles (Alao, 2013). A substanial number of Muslims in 
the Northern part of Nigeria would prefer a theocratic state where they would be 
governed under Islamic laws (Levan, 2013), with some wanting to be governed under 
a mix of democracy and Islamic rule. This is evident in the popular support that 
accompanied the implementation of Sharia law across 12 states of Northern Nigeria 
in 2000 (Levan, 2013). Sharia law refers to the use of Islamic law in governance 
(Kendhammer, 2013). The debate about Sharia law came to prominence in 1999 in 
Zamfara state under the administration of Governor Sani Yeriman Bakura (ibid). 
A number of radical Islamic movements such as Uthman Danfodio Jihad of 
the Quadariyya (Sunni movement) sect of 1900 (Isa, 2010), the Maitasine uprising 
(1980-1985) (Adesoji, 2010, 2011; Isa, 2010; Maiangwa 2014), and the Islamic 
Movement of Nigeria (IMN) (1970s) have previously attempted to establish an Islamic 
government through radicalism. Their quests were to dislodge an un-Islamic 
government that they perceived as promoting apostasy and syncretism (Paden, 2008; 
Isa, 2010; Adesoji, 2010, 2011). 
Scholars argue that poor socio-economic situations within Nigeria create 
avenues for politicians to politicise religion in order to gain popular support (Levan, 
2013; Akinola, 2015) Moreover, Akinola suggests that BH was established because 
of Islamic fundamentalism, and that it was motivated by the politicisation of religion 
and poverty in Northern Nigeria. In fact, the majority of Nigerian scholars argue that 
the nature of religiosity in Northern Nigeria has provided a fertile ground for the 
emergence of BH (Adesoji, 2010 & 2011; Levan, 2013; Agbiboa, 2013c; Akinola, 
2015; Alozieuwa, 2015).  
This study takes a more comprehensive approach to studying BH by looking 
at its emergence and evolution over time. This has involved investigating the 
relationship between BH’s leadership and followers, its group structure, and variations 
in its recruitment strategies, goals and selection of targets. This study also investigates 
BH’s changing strategies and its spillover of violence from Nigeria to the Republics 
of Cameroon, Chad and Niger. Furthermore, this thesis critically evaluates changes 
within BH from 2009, i.e. beginning from when the group first became prominent 
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through its journey to becoming, in relative terms, one of the deadliest terrorist groups 
globally in 2015. urthermore, this study analysis BH from 2009 because, the year 
marks the period when BH emerged as a significant violent terrorist group (Adesoji, 
2011).  
This thesis seeks to contribute to the broader understanding of terrorism using 
multi-level analysis. In addition, this thesis adopts a mixed methods case study 
incorporating semi-structured interviews, with a small N comparative method. Multi-
level analysis entails the systematic compartmentalisation of the analytical process on 
the evolution and behaviour of BH into individual, group, state, sub-state and 
international levels of explanation. While the central arguments of some previous 
studies on BH might fit into one or possibly more of the levels of analysis utilised in 
this thesis, no study has yet used the model employed in this work to analyse BH. 
Additionally, the levels of analysis provide an in-depth understanding of the causes, 
actors, dynamics and factors that have influenced BH’s campaign of violence over 
time. This multi-level analysis offers wide-ranging implications that can inform future 
research in the field of terrorism and political violence. Terrorist group behaviour is 
complex and better understood through multi-level analysis. Furthermore, multi-level 
analysis  intellectual rigour and allows or encourages consideration of a range of 
possible explanations.  Moreover, each level of analysis incorporates different theories 
and empirical studies which helps to critically examine and explain the complexity of 
a terrorist group. This study also seeks to illustrate how one aspect of the behaviour of 
a terrorist group depends on another to function, and without an explanation for any 
one of these aspects, further explanation of another function will be incomplete. In 
examining the complex nature of BH, all of the used levels of analysis complement 
each other. 
This study is a longitudinal case study that investigates BH over time. This 
allows the incorporation of a number of theories and a range of empirical studies to 
the study in order to engage BH literature into the broader debate of terrorism data. 
Moreover, the flexibility of a case study allows for the use of mixed methods when 
examining each level of analysis. These methods give strength to all the levels of 
analysis used in this case study as they have enabled in-depth and rigorous 
investigation of BH. Interviews with Nigerian senior government officials, local 
negotiators and experts on BH have been used in order to study changes in BH’s 
behaviour over time. The interviews in this case study are not only unique, but are also 
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significant because they reveal not only the thinking of policy makers who have 
shaped Nigeria’s CT policy, but also offer information from contact with BH gathered 
from local negotiators. The use of these interviews is significant because the majority 
of studies on BH suggest that Nigeria’s CT policy triggered and then motivated BH, 
but this is often based on insufficient empirical evidence and a lack of direct sources 
of information about BH. This lack of empirical evidence is as a result of not 
rigorously assessing the effectiveness and counter-productiveness of Nigerian CT both 
from a violent and nonviolent CT perspective. Added to this, previous studies are 
limited in explaining the timing, application and effect of Nigeria’s CT policy on BH’s 
behaviour over time. This gap will be addressed by analysing the effectiveness and 
counter-productiveness of Nigeria’s CT (see chapter six). 
Another important feature of this research is the application of rational choice 
theory to the study of the activities and motivations of those involved in BH. This 
strategic model originates from classical economic theory (Simon, 1995; Van um, 
2015), and it focuses on how terrorist groups use violence against state forces and 
civilians to gain political concessions (Sandler et al., 1983; Van Um, 2015). In relation 
to terrorism, the contemporary strategic model suggests that terrorists are rational 
actors with relatively stable goals, and that they compare their options to then choose 
the ones with the most favourable utilities (ibid). This model helps to demonstrate how 
BH’s campaign of violence involves the strategic use of violence, and it has been 
applied in order to understand how BH has responded to Nigerian CT. Moreover, it 
helps examine changes in BH’s tactics over time, as well as helping explain the ever-
changing nature of its strategies. Finally, the strategic model highlights one of the 
major contributions of this thesis, this being insufficient appreciation of the rationality 
of BH by the Nigerian government. 
This thesis addresses BH as a terrorist group because of the group’s 
premeditated use of violence, especially against civilians. As with many studies of 
terrorist groups, this study raises important and difficult definitional questions about 
terrorism. Defining ‘terrorism’ is challenging both in practice (Weigend, 2006) and in 
academia (Schmid, 2004).  In practice, there is a debate about objectivity, particularly 
in attempting to distinguish between a freedom fighter and a terrorist. From an 
academic perspective, scholars have attempted to distinguish between terrorism and 
other forms of violence, particularly insurgency (Sambanis, 2008; Findley & Young, 
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2012). The literature review section of this thesis critically analyses the definitional 
problems of terrorism both in practice and academia. 
 This thesis has some acknowledged limitations. First, BH emerged in 2002 but 
the majority of sources about BH incorporated into this thesis date from 2009. To the 
researcher’s knowledge, there is a paucity of sources from 2002 to 2009 because the 
group was not then well-known, but from 2009 to date there are a great number of 
sources because of BH’s uprising in 2009 and its increasing lethality. 
Second, there are limitations with the interviews from both BH and Nigerian 
senior government officials. BH is an active and violent group at the time of this 
research, and its secretive nature made it impossible for the researcher to interview 
BH members or obtain information from the group directly. In order to address this 
challenge, the researcher incorporated public statements from BH members obtained 
from the media. Because of security risks involved with investigating BH, not all 
selected interview targets agreed to be interviewed. This could also be attributed to 
the interviewees’ unwillingness to talk about ‘sensitive or confidential’ issues related 
to the Nigerian authorities and BH. 
Third, the researcher had challenges in obtaining statistics about the frequency 
and variation of BH target selection at a sub-state level (border states; Adamawa, 
Borno and Yobe). The researcher was unable to obtain statistics about government 
deployments of security forces to border states in order to assess and quantify the 
influence of military action on the intensity of BH violence. As a result, the researcher 
relied on additional military outlets created by the Nigerian government in the fight 
against BH to make deductions about deployments. In addition, there were also 
challenges acquiring statistics for 2002 - 2016 about levels of deprivation in the border 
states as these statistics were incomplete. 
Finally, it was challenging to identify resource transfers (funds and arms) 
between BH and international jihadists such as Al Qaeda and Islamic State (IS), and 
there was found in fact to be more symbolic evidence that highlighted linkages 
between BH and international jihadists. The researcher would argue that because BH 
is more of a resource-wealthy group (robbery and ransom) (Zenn, 2014a), it may in 
fact require only a low level of resource transfer from international jihadists. Added 
to this, the porous borders between Nigeria and countries in the Lake Chad may be 
facilitating an inflow of resources to BH.   
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1.2 Research questions 
Given the gaps within the existing studies on BH, this thesis seeks to answer the 
following two questions: 
1) How has the behaviour of BH influenced its evolution from a small isolationist 
movement to a large-scale violent group? 
2)  How does multi-level analysis explain the role of internal and external factors 
on the evolution of BH? 
1.3 Summary of thesis 
This thesis comprises nine chapters. Chapter one is the introduction of the thesis. 
Chapter two reviews the literature about BH and the broader field of terrorism, while 
chapter three discusses methods applied in this study. Chapters four to eight address 
different levels of analysis, and the utility of these chapters is discussed below. 
Moreover, these focus on addressing the complexity of BH by examining the 
limitations of previous studies on the group, as well highlighting the dynamics and 
development of BH over time. The content of chapters two to nine is outlined below.  
Chapter two highlights gaps in existing literature on BH and the broader field 
of terrorism. The literature review focuses on the implications of the causes, 
motivations, behaviour and consequences of terrorist groups on counter terrorism 
policies. It identifies that researchers are interested in why individuals adopt and 
maintain terrorist violence. Moreover, the generalisation of theories and empirical 
facts in the field of terrorism is challenging because of the dynamic nature of terrorists 
and their organisational behaviour, and therefore further empirical studies are needed 
to reflect this. When discussing the behaviour of terrorist groups, a review of the 
literature on ‘old’ and ‘new’ terrorist groups has been carried out. The debate about 
‘old and new’ terrorism suggests that terrorist groups that existed before the terrorist 
attack in the USA on 11th September 2001 (9/11) are different to those that existed 
subsequently (Neuman, 2009). Such differences include group structure, transnational 
nature, motivation, goal, lethality, targeting and tactics. However, some scholars are 
sceptical about this argument (Crenshaw, 2008). When considering its organisational 
structure, BH appears to have the characteristics of both ‘old’ and ‘new’ terrorism, 
and so this study also seeks to identify why BH’s organisational structure possesses 
such characteristics. 
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Chapter three discusses how and why the chosen methods of data collection, 
analysis and presentation of research findings used in this study have been applied. 
This thesis is a mixed methods case study comprising semi-structured interviews with 
Nigerian senior government officials, local negotiators and experts on BH, Most 
Similar System Design (MSSD) and extensive analysis of documents relating to BH, 
including statistical data from the Global Terrorism Database (GTD). The chapter 
points out the pros and cons of each of these methods, and the drawbacks of each 
method are also addressed. These levels of analysis enable this study to draw upon 
multiple sources of data; in other words, one source of data gives strength to one unit 
of explanation, while at the same time corroborating another unit of analysis. An 
example of this is that the state level explanation of this thesis draws strength from the 
interview data, with the interview data then also being drawn upon in other chapters 
when discussing and explaining BH ideology.  
Chapter four is the individual level of explanation. This chapter examines the 
relationship between the leadership and followers of BH. It uses statistics from the 
GTD to examine variations in violence under five different leadership tenures of BH. 
It also highlights the implications of the leadership decapitation approach - the targeted 
killing of the leadership of BH - by the Nigerian government. This chapter is crucial 
in understanding how BH members are coordinated because without strong leadership 
and internal cohesion, BH would not be able to remain organised as a group. 
Leadership is an essential part of a terrorist group (Mitchell, 2004) as it coordinates, 
motivates and directs its followers. Thus, the individual level of analysis explored in 
chapter four lays the foundation for the group level analysis of chapter five. 
Chapter five provides a group level analysis of BH. It examines the 
organisational structure and recruitment processes of BH, as well as how the group 
coordinates its field operations. It outlines a broad range of factors affecting BH 
recruitment beyond those of poverty, illiteracy and religion, which have already been 
widely acknowledged in existing studies on BH. Using the rational choice theory, 
chapter five contributes to BH literature by investigating the internal dynamics of the 
group and how its organisational structure and operational capacity have changed over 
time. Additionally, the study unravels a mix of internal and external factors that have 
shaped the organisational structure of BH. In this context, external factors include 
counter terrorism and public support for BH. The outcomes of chapter five add to the 
debate on ‘old and new’ terrorism since BH appears to share attributes of both ‘old 
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and new’ terrorism in its organisational structure. Thus it is important to examine BH 
with regards to this argument, while chapters four and five also consider the impact of 
Nigerian CT policies on BH.  
Chapter six assesses Nigeria’s violent and nonviolent CT strategy, as well as 
the response of BH through their differing violent tactics. Violent approaches in CT 
encompass military actions such as the targeted killings of terrorists, attacks and the 
infiltration of terrorist groups. Nonviolent approaches are non-military defensive 
efforts that include the use of legislation, punishments or technology in order to make 
it difficult for terrorists to attack (Enders & Sandler, 1993). Accordingly, the strategic 
model of the rational choice theory has been applied in order to understand the 
reactions of BH to Nigerian CT. Moreover, statistics from the GTD were used when 
explaining the intensity of BH violence over time in relation to Nigerian CT. Secondly, 
this chapter analyses whether Nigerian CT has been effective or counter-productive. 
Previous studies on BH have acknowledged that Nigerian CT’s violent approach has 
facilitated BH violence, yet no studies have systematically assessed both the 
nonviolent and violent approaches of Nigerian CT. This chapter is therefore important 
because it critically presents explanations of the implications of Nigerian CT. It 
explains how and why BH is a strategic actor as this is important in highlighting BH’s 
changes in tactics, as well as its responses to Nigerian CT efforts. The chapter draws 
on a number of interviews with Nigerian senior government officials and local 
negotiators. The interviews make significant contributions to this study because the 
majority of studies on BH do not talk about the perceptions of policy makers towards 
BH, nor how these potentially inform CT efforts against BH. 
Chapter seven evaluates the determinants of BH target selection and examines 
variations in the frequency of violence at a sub-national level. The chapter employs 
Most Similar System Design (MSSD) to carry out a comparative analysis of the three 
most affected states in the Northeast region of Nigeria. The Northeast region is a 
hotbed of BH activities because of the intensity of BH violence in Adamawa, Borno 
and Yobe states. As a result of the frequency of violence in these states, the Nigerian 
government declared a state of emergency in 2012 and extended this in 2013. This 
state of emergency was aimed at sustaining a military campaign to decimate and 
ultimately end BH. Adamawa, Borno and Yobe states are similar in population size, 
ethnic and religious composition, and economies, and all three are also Nigerian states 
sharing borders with other countries in the Lake Chad region. Despite these 
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similarities however, there are disparities in the frequency of BH target types within 
these areas. This chapter seeks to highlight explanations of the determinants 
underpinning BH targeting. Chapter seven also connects with chapters five and six by 
illustrating how the spread of BH cells has been reduced in these three states as a result 
of Nigerian CT.   
Chapter eight focuses on the external spillover of radicalism into Nigeria. It 
highlights how international factors have motivated and increased the capability of 
BH, as well as the spillover of BH violence to Nigeria’s neighbouring countries within 
the Lake Chad region. These countries include the Republics of Cameroon, Chad and 
Niger.  
Existing studies on BH mostly focus on the linkages/allegiances between BH 
and international terrorist groups.  However, this chapter discusses the influx of radical 
Islam to Nigeria, and how events such as the Fula jihad of the 19th century influenced 
the dan Fodio jihad, which several scholars see as the beginning of the Islamic 
radicalisation of Nigeria (Loimeier, 2012). Secondly, the chapter outlines how 
international factors such as international terror groups (e.g. Al Qaeda and IS), the 
international war on terror, and events such as the killings of Saddam Hussein and 
Muammar Ghaddafi have motivated and increased the capabilities of BH. Thirdly, it 
outlines external influences that have facilitated a spillover of violence to the 
Republics of Cameroon, Chad and Nigeria. The chapter is important because it 
outlines the reasons why BH connects with international terror groups and the effect 
of the spread of the Al-Qaeda network on BH. It also highlights BH’s switch in 
allegiance from Al-Qaeda to Islamic State (IS), even though Al-Qaeda and IS share 
the same radical Salafist ideology. Moreover, chapter eight suggests that the spillover 
of BH violence to territories outside of Nigeria challenges the notion posited by some 
scholars, that BH’s main goal is to dislodge the Nigerian government. 
Through this case study of BH, this thesis highlights that different aspects of 
terrorist behaviour determine the evolution and development of terrorist groups. All 
aspects of terrorist group behaviour depend upon each other to work and without 
knowing one aspect of their behaviour, other aspects cannot be fully examined. 
Although these findings cannot be generalised, this BH case study indicates that multi-
level analysis gives a strong methodological advantage in terrorism research. Its 
flexibility enables the use of further theories and empirical studies for a more 
systematic and critical debate to issues within terrorism research. The findings of this 
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thesis extend beyond the conventional linkages of BH to poverty, religion and 
illiteracy; they instead provide a number of explanations about the strategic choices, 
intensity of violence and changing tactics of BH. Moreover, different aspects of 
terrorist behaviour give policy makers a greater in-depth perspective about areas 
where policy intervention is needed.    
Having presented the foundation of this thesis, the next chapter (chapter two), 
is a review of extant literature on BH and its place within the context of the broader 
field of terrorism. 
 
  
 24 
Chapter 2: Literature Review 
This chapter reviews existing literature on Boko Haram (BH) and the broader field of 
terrorism. In other words, the literature review is divided into two broad sections, the 
first dealing with conceptual debates about the nature of terrorism and the second 
focused specifically on the literature on BH. The threat of global terrorism has resulted 
in scholars striving to identify and examine the causes and motivations, state reactions 
(counter terrorism), behaviours and consequences of terrorists and terrorism both at 
an individual and group level. Thus, regardless of a terrorist group’s typologies - 
whether religious or ideological - researchers are keen to identify why individuals 
adopt violence. 
This chapter’s review of literature on the causes and consequences of terrorism 
is to give background to the trends in this discipline so that this thesis can then 
contribute to future studies about terrorist group behaviour. To that end, this chapter 
also reviews literature on ‘old versus new’ terrorism in order to better understand how 
terrorist group behaviour has evolved over time. The ‘old versus new’ notion of 
terrorism classifies terrorism as traditional or new (Neuman, 2009), with new terrorist 
groups or religious groups having been established post the 9/11 terrorist attack in the 
USA. This is pertinent to this thesis because some scholars argue that these two groups 
are distinctive in their structures, goals and methods of operation (Hoffman, 1998; 
Laquer, 1999; Neumann, 2009). Since BH appears to have a hybrid of ‘old’ and ‘new’ 
terrorism within its organisational structure, this study seeks to highlight why this is 
so and what its strategic importance is to BH.  
While the majority of studies on BH identify different factors for the cause and 
motivation of the group, they remain inadequate in their explanations as to why BH 
transformed from a small violent group to a full-blown terrorist one. Due to the 
complexity of terror groups and especially of BH, there is a need to look at this 
phenomenon from various perspectives. As such, different levels of analysis enable 
this phenomenon to be studied rigorously, and therefore this review categorises BH 
literature within individual, group, state, sub-national and national explanations. These 
classifications reflect the contribution of this thesis in introducing these units of 
analysis to the study of BH. For instance, in terms of individual influences on BH, 
there are no existing studies that examine the relationship between BH leadership and 
 25 
its followers. Moreover, existing studies on BH have not examined the influence of 
BH leadership on the group’s varying uses of violence. 
 This chapter is organised under the following sections: causes of terrorism, 
consequences of terrorism, counter-terrorism and ‘old versus new’ terrorism. 
2.1 Definition of Terrorism 
Achieving definitional clarity of the term ‘terrorism’ is a challenging task both 
academically and practically, with there being a protracted debate both in the literature 
and within policy communities and international organisations about its definition 
(Weigend, 2006; Stigall, 2013). Moreover, an understanding of what terrorism is and 
who terrorists are has also generated debate about objectivity, especially when trying 
to distinguish between a freedom fighter and a terrorist. The majority of studies on 
definitions of terrorism focus on group or sub-state types of terrorism that involve the 
use or threat of violence against civilians to achieve specific goals (Schmid, 2004; 
Saul, 2005; Goodwin, 2006); with some studies seeking to differentiate between 
terrorism and other forms of violence such as civil war or insurgency. (Kalyvas, 2004; 
Hoffman, 2006; Sambanis, 2008; Stepanova, 2008; Findley & Young 2012). 
Terrorism, like other forms of violence such as criminality or insurgence, involves the 
use of modus operandi such as bombing, kidnapping or shooting. As a result, most 
studies focus on distinguishing terrorism from other forms of violence, especially that 
of insurgency. In fact, the majority of points emphasised by scholars when examining 
terrorism are centred on three major factors: the perpetrators, the motives and the acts. 
 There have been attempts at an international level to arrive at a consensus so 
that a legal instrument can be applied that clearly stipulates what constitutes terrorism. 
These attempts remain insufficient despite the amount of time given to them. The UN 
has been criticised for not having a definition of terrorism accepted by all its member 
countries, with one of the problems encountered being that of perception with regards 
to freedom fighter versus terrorist (Weigend, 2006). This problem has its roots in the 
post-World War II world and decolonisation when freedom fighters adopted violence 
as resistance against colonial regimes (Weigend, 2006). During this era, which 
coincided with the Cold War of the 1950s and 1960s, many ‘freedom fighters’ gained 
political support from different world powers; thereby making it difficult to draw a 
line between terrorists and freedom fighters (ibid).  
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 Another issue that remains is that of giving a separate legal definition to 
terrorism as it consists of offences such as murder, assault and bombing which are 
already criminalised by local and international legal instruments (Weigend, 2006). 
Weigend (2006) poses some interesting questions about why it remains vital to have 
a worldwide legal sense of terrorism and what ‘extras’ should be added to re-label a 
criminal act as a terrorist act. The author suggests that for a criminal act to be labelled 
as terrorism at both national and international levels, three factors should be 
considered. First, that the act attributed to terrorism should lead to punishment; second, 
a suspicion of terrorism warrants and elicits a distinctive pattern of investigation 
including surveillance and limiting contact between a suspect and their lawyers; and 
third, strong mutual and international cooperation is needed. Because terrorism can 
spill into other countries, international cooperation is pertinent in order to combat 
terrorists and their spread to other borders, as well as to address impunity. This 
cooperation requires international legal assistance (ibid). In respect to such 
international legal assistance, the principle of aut dedere aut judicare (either 
extradition or trial) under international law obligates extradition of suspected terrorists 
to the country in which they committed the offence, or prosecution in the country to 
which they are exiled to (Stigall, 2013). The principle of aut dedere aut judicare is 
derived from multi-lateral conventions such as the Geneva Conventions of 1949, the 
1970 Hague Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft, the 1979 
International Convention Against the Taking of Hostages and the 1999 International 
Convention on the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism and (Kelly, 2003; 
Weigend, 2006; Stigall, 2013). The argument of who is a terrorist or legitimate 
political prisoner militates the principle of aut dedere aut judicare, with the invocation 
of the principle dependent on understanding between countries. An example of this is 
a South African court jailing Henry Okah for 13 terrorism-related charges over twin 
car bombings during Nigeria's Independence Day celebrations in 2010 (BBC, 2013a). 
On the other hand, aut dedere aut judicare could be described as ineffective, with an 
example from 2002 in which Denmark freed a Chechen accused of terrorism instead 
of extraditing him to Russia for legal prosecution (Kelly, 2003). 
 Despite these challenges there is, some international consensus about what 
constitutes terrorism. The 1994 UN General Assembly Resolution (A/RES/49/60) 
reaffirmed the total condemnation of all acts and methods of terrorism. Even though 
the International Criminal Court (ICC) lacks jurisdiction over terrorism cases, Article 
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Four of the statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTRSt.) 
extends the jurisdiction of the tribunal to cover acts of terrorism under the additional 
Protocol II to the Geneva Convention (Weigend, 2006). The 2001 Security Council 
Resolution 1373 calls for the suppression of the financing of terrorism (Weigend, 2006) 
and recommends that UN member states domesticate counter terrorism (CT) laws 
(Sampson & Onuoha, 2011: 38). The definition of terrorism under Article 2(1)(b) of 
the 1999 Convention on the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism is that it is; 
 Any other act intended to cause death or serious bodily injury to a civilian, or 
 to any other person not taking an active part in the hostilities in a situation of 
 armed conflict, when the purpose of such act, by its nature or context, is to 
 intimidate a population, or to compel a government or an international 
 organization to do or to abstain from doing any act (Weigend, 2006: 920) 
However, the 2001 Security Council Resolution 1373 does not distinguish 
between a freedom fighter and a terrorist.  In 2002, the notion of freedom fighter was 
jettisoned by member states because of the collective adoption of the 2001 Security 
Council Resolution 1373 (Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism). Member states 
agreed that the resolution should be legally binding, thereby making the definition of 
terrorism having no exceptions to any group or cause. Additionally, the Security 
Council Resolution 1566 of 2004, in support of the Financial Convention of 2001, 
further recommends that all states should fight terrorism irrespective of cause or 
motivation, and without exception to freedom fighters (Weigend, 2006: 920). 
Similarly in 2014, during the 69th UN General Assembly (UNGA), under the measures 
to eliminate international terrorism (RES/69/127) the UNGA reaffirmed its position 
on the 2001 definition of what constitutes terrorism. It further stressed the need for 
robust international collaboration between states and amongst “international 
organizations and agencies, regional and sub-regional organizations and arrangements 
and the United Nations in order to prevent, combat and eliminate terrorism”, 
regardless of the perpetrator of the act (UNGA, 2014). A major change in the UN’s 
conceptualisation of terrorism was highlighted in the 2002 adoption of the 
‘exceptionless’ definition of terrorism as legally binding by states. In practical terms, 
this does not address the ambiguity between a terrorist and a legitimate political 
agitator. In other words, it can be argued that revolution may require disregarding the 
laws of a state, which may be the antithesis of human rights.  
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 If disobeying a government or acting in a manner that stops a government 
acting is terrorism, then a number of civil society organisations or dissident groups 
could therefore be easily tagged as terrorist groups. However, based on the UN 
definition of terrorism, it can be deduced that what differentiates civil disobedience 
from terrorism is that terrorism must be an act that is calculated to cause death, serious 
bodily injury or intimidation of a population of non-combatant civilians. If this is the 
case, what differentiates terrorism from other forms of violence that are meted out on 
non-combatant civilians, and do terrorists only target civilians? To clarify these issues, 
it is important in order to understand the arguments by scholars related to who 
perpetrators of terrorism are, what their motives are and what constitutes an act of 
terrorism. 
 With regards to international concerns about the increasing threat of terrorism, 
it is important to note that there is a global response to what is perceived as ‘new 
terrorism’, which emanates in the wake of 9/11. New terrorism is religiously-oriented 
terrorism that is characterised by its lethal and indiscriminate use of violence 
(Juergensmeyer, 2000; Laqueur, 2003; Neuman 2009). The role of Al Qaeda in 9/11 
and the subsequent prominence of groups such as Islamic State (IS) could be turning 
points in the debate on new terrorism, with the majority of violent groups with 
elements of religious radicalism now being classified as new terrorist groups. 
Although BH has elements of Islamic radicalism, it has levels of disparity with the 
notion of new terrorism in both in its structure (see chapter five) and motivation; and 
over time, it has employed ethnic nationalism to motivate and mobilise people to 
violence (Barkindo, 2016).    
 From a scholarly perspective, the elements of terrorism agreed on by most 
scholars are the uses of violence, political motivation and intimidation (Schmid, 2004; 
Saul, 2005; Goodwin, 2006). With it being challenging to separate terrorism from 
other forms of violence such as criminality or insurgency when differentiating 
terrorism from other violence, Hoffman (2006) attempts to differentiate it from other 
forms of violence such as lunatic assassins and criminality. He argues that lunatic 
assassins are motivated by personal, idiosyncratic and egocentric needs. However, in 
contradiction to Hoffman (2006), a terrorist does not necessarily need to belong to an 
existing organisation and can be a ‘lone wolf,’ thereby implying that an individual can 
commit an act of violence as a result of personal, ideological or religious goals. While 
a lone wolf terrorist does not require orders from an organisation, the actor may still 
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need the assistance of a range of motivations from other individuals (Appleton, 2014). 
Furthermore, terrorists’ main goals are usually political rather than pecuniary, while 
criminals’ primary goals are usually monetary rather than political, and their acts are 
not usually intended to go beyond their victims or influence public opinion. In contrast, 
a terrorist act could be designed to influence public opinion or governmental decisions 
(Hoffman, 2006). However, terrorists can adopt criminal tactics to fund their 
operations and as Zenn (2014a) observes, BH has robbed banks to acquire money to 
fund its movement. 
 The most challenging aspect of trying to differentiate between terrorism and 
other forms of violence is trying to distinguish between terrorism and insurgency. This 
difficulty is created by these terms being seemingly interchangeable. Scholars argue 
that insurgency is characterised by open confrontation with state authorities in a form 
of political and military action designed to weaken a government through prolonged 
war (Joes, 2006; Lomperis, 19996; O’Neil, 2001). Conversely, terrorists are noted as 
being underground groups that apply indirect violence without engaging government 
forces in the form of military units (Sambanis, 2008). This indirect tactic aims to create 
fear and intimidation amongst civilians, as well as generating political reaction 
(Schmid, 2004). However, some studies suggest that insurgents can employ terrorism 
as a method. Studies of rebels in civil wars examine rebels employing terrorist 
methods against state forces. Findley & Young (2012) categorise studies on civil wars 
into the three categories of ‘before’, ‘during’ and ‘after’ civil wars. They propose that 
groups use terrorism before a civil war to facilitate the participation of a large 
population of individuals, while Kalyvas (2004) suggests that rebel groups use 
terrorism during civil wars to control populations through intimidation. Furthermore, 
Findley & Young (2012) argue that the use of terrorism post-war is to spoil the peace 
process.     
 The features of terrorism and insurgency show overlap in BH. BH has the 
attributes of an insurgent group because it has engaged in firefights with Nigerian 
forces (Adesoji, 2010; Mohammed, 2014; Zenn, 2014), and it has had territorial 
control of and acts in both urban and rural locations (The Guardian, 2014). Within its 
evolution, BH had indicated its desire to remain in cities by establishing clandestine 
cells (START Report 2014), and these were created across Nigerian states and Local 
Government Areas (LGAs) (DCCN, 2009: 14) instead of in rural areas. However, the 
violent approach of Nigerian counter terrorism (CT) contributed to a reduction in the 
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spread of BH to the border regions of the Northeast (UN News Centre, 2016). 
Nonetheless, it is pertinent to label BH as a terrorist group in consideration to the 
proportion of its civilian and military targets. Between 2009 and 2015, BH attacked 
1,045 civilians (private citizens and religious figures) and 437 state forces (military 
and police), according to the Global Terrorism Database (GTD). 
 2.2 Literature review on terrorism 
This section reviews literature on the causes, behaviours and consequences of 
terrorism. It also analyses literature on counter terrorism. 
 2.2.1 Causes of terrorism 
There are many studies about the causes of terrorism. These are classified as either 
psychological or environmental factors, and they are important in understanding the 
causes of both individual and group violence.  
Psychological explanations seek to understand behavioural dispositions that 
make individuals join a terrorist group, with these being further divided into 
psychopathological and psychosocial explanations (Kegley, 1990). The 
psychopathological explanation argues that an individual engages in terrorism because 
of mental disorders, and as such speculates on what it terms a ‘terrorist personality’ 
(Taylor, 1988). This explanation is derived from a psychiatric perspective and 
encompasses different mental disorders such as ethnology, psychopathy and antisocial 
personality. In another explanation, Post (1990) argues that terrorism is a deviant 
behaviour and therefore terrorists suffer from some form of psychological disorder. 
However, terrorists are logical in their thinking and they plan and rationalise their 
actions before they act, as well as consider the benefits of their actions before they 
carry them out (Kydd & Walter, 2006). This thereby renders the psychopathological 
strand inadequate as an explanation for individual or group level terrorism.  
The psychosocial explanation debunks the psychopathological one and is 
widely used to explain the cause of terrorism. The psychosocial explanation connects 
to an individual’s internal (cognitive) and external perspectives, with the most popular 
psychological explanation being the relative deprivation (RD) theory. This theory was 
espoused by Gurr (1970), who constructed it based on Dollard et al.’s (1939) 
frustration-aggression theory. The frustration-aggression theory suggests that when an 
individual is frustrated, they become aggressive. Gurr (1970: 25) describes RD as, 
“perceived discrepancy between value expectations and value capacity.” By ‘value’, 
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Gurr is referring to socioeconomic and political goods. Nonetheless, RD has been 
criticised by scholars as being too simplistic in explaining the causes of terrorism. 
Walker and Pettigrew (1984) argue that RD cannot determine a level for measuring 
deprivation as all individuals have different thresholds of deprivation; therefore, 
understanding the uniformity of individual deprivation and how it can mobilise 
towards group violence cannot be standardised. Moreover, deprivation can lead to 
non-violent cooperation where individuals can mobilise and pursue their goals without 
violence. For instance, Martin Luther King Jnr’s non-violent movement enabled 
deprived Black Americans suffering injustices to seek justice through nonviolent 
approaches.  
Some scholars argue that environmental influences such as economic, socio-
political and religious factors drive individuals to engage in violence. Economic 
explanations suggest that economic hardship and a lack of educational opportunities 
make people willing to join terrorist groups. In addition, some scholars argue that these 
factors also provide opportunities for entrepreneurs of violence to mobilise individuals 
towards violence by encouraging their perception of there not being any other 
alternatives available to them (Shafiq & Sinno, 2010). However, some scholars have 
a different perception of this with Bueno de Mesquita (2005) for example, observing 
that in terms of selection of recruits, terrorists generally pick the most educated ones 
in spite of economic explanations of terrorism having been debated widely. In their 
study of violent British jihadists, Cole and Cole (2010) observed that individuals with 
earnings above the national wage who were often well-educated engaged in terrorism, 
with terrorists becoming an elite fighting for their deprived constituencies. 
Several debates exist on whether religion causes and/or motivates terrorism. 
Pratt (2010) emphasises that fundamentalism is evident in Islam, but it can also be 
found in Christianity, Hinduism, Judaism and other religions. As Islamism dominates 
modern terrorism, numerous scholars have built on Huntington’s (1993) clash of 
civilisation theory to argue the influence of religion on terrorism. This theory has 
become more prominent since events such as 9/11, the Madrid bombings of 2004 and 
the London Underground terrorist attacks (Neumayer & Plumper, 2004). Added to 
this, between 11th September 2001 and 31st December 2016, over 4,000 attacks were 
perpetrated by jihadists such as Al Qaeda and IS in the Middle East, North Africa, 
Sub-Saharan Africa and Western Europe (GTD). Such a large number of attacks is the 
reason for the bourgeoning debate about Islamist terrorism in modern studies on 
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terrorism. Huntington’s (1993) clash of civilisation theory predicts that contemporary 
conflicts do not depend primarily on economic or ideological issues, but instead on 
cultural ones. Huntington’s profoundly reactionary approach (1993) sees civilisations 
as the cultural groupings of people of similar identity, categorising, for example, 
civilisations into Western, Sinic (Chinese and allied races), Japanese, Islamic, Hindu, 
Slavic-Orthodox (Russian and Eastern European), Latin American and African 
civilisations. Such classifications could be seen as stereotyping though, as they do not 
allow for consideration of individual preferences. He argues that these civilisations are 
deeply anchored within their history, values, norms, institutions and religions. 
Furthermore, he notes that especially with regards to Islam, such civilisations will 
radically depart from Western civilisation in their quest to return to their roots. 
Huntington’s (1993) idea has been criticised. Notably, Goel (2009) argues that 
Huntington perceives civilisation in a monolithic manner, and that even within the 
West there are violent conflicts based around religion, for example the Protestant and 
Catholic conflict in Northern Ireland. Other studies suggest that religion does not on 
its own cause terrorism, but rather it justifies political violence driven by political 
grievances (Juergensmeyer, 2000; Pape, 2003). In other words, politically alienated 
individuals resort to the use of religion as an instrument to mobilise and fight their so-
called oppressors (a government, other religious bodies or a secular society).  
Moreover, Juergensmeyer (2000) suggests that religion can either be a tool for peace 
or a motivation for violence. This thesis subscribes to this view and also argues that 
religion can be a source of nonviolent conflict where individuals engage in 
acrimonious debates or civil disobedience. Since the extant literature on BH suggests 
that it is a mix of radical Islamic views and grievances, the findings of chapters five 
and six are particularly relevant in challenging Huntington’s (1993) clash of 
civilisation theory by highlighting the environmental influences and dynamics that 
have facilitated the evolution of BH. 
2.2.2 Consequences of terrorism 
Much of the literature on terrorism focuses on its causes and motivations, CT and 
terrorist behaviour, with there being fewer studies on its consequences. Previous 
studies on the consequences of terrorism suggest that terrorism has socio-political and 
economic consequences.  
From a political perspective, there are contrasting points of view on whether 
terrorism does not achieve political change (Abrahams, 2006), or that if it is effective 
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in achieving political goals (Rose et al., 2007; Gould & Klor, 2010). Scholars argue 
that the effectiveness of terrorism as a political tool can be seen in the 2004 Madrid 
bombing, which was instrumental in the Spanish government’s decision to withdraw 
its troops from Afghanistan (Laia & Gerrard, 2017). Additionally, in a study on the 
effects of terrorism on the political behaviour of civilians in the Basque region of Spain, 
Laia & Gerrard (2017) found that terrorists fighting against a democratic government 
could have had the unintended outcome of encouraging democratic participation. 
Other studies illustrate how terrorism militates against the existence of human rights 
(through killings and the strangulation of civilian liberties through fear) (Piazza & 
Walsh, 2009) and tourism (Enders et al., 2007), as well as results in the breakdown of 
economic activities of a territory affected by terrorism (Sandler & Enders, 2008). 
2.2.3 Counter terrorism 
Studies are divided as to whether CT is effective or counter-productive. Some scholars 
argue that CT fuels grievances and radicalises individuals (Bueno de Mesquita & 
Dickson, 2007), while others suggest that CT weakens and causes turmoil within 
terrorist groups which gradually leads to the defeat of the group by the state (Jordan 
2009: 721; David 2002). 
Many studies examine CT in terms of the cost and benefits of a state’s 
responses, with such studies suggesting that the implications of CT are dependent 
upon a government’s policies and its agencies (Rosendorff & Sandler, 2004; Jacobson 
& Kaplan, 2007; Acre & Sandler, 2007). 
CT efforts are mainly divided into violent and nonviolent responses. Violent 
responses use military approaches, and these can involve the infiltration of a terrorist 
group, leadership decapitation, targeted killing of terrorists and different forms of 
terrorist camp raiding. Nonviolent responses are non-military measures designed to 
prevent terrorists from attacking, and these require the creation of strict laws and 
penalties, as well as involving an increase in technology and related costs (Enders & 
Sandler, 1993; Sandler & Arce, 2005). 
Further to the debate on whether a government’s policies and agencies 
determine the implications of CT, chapter six of this thesis examines this theory further. 
Most studies on BH have acknowledged that Nigeria’s CT efforts have motivated 
BH’s campaign of violence, but these studies do not adequately examine these policies 
in terms of their timing, application and outcome; nor do they consider how they have 
affected BH’s behaviour over time. 
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 2.2.4 ‘Old’ versus ‘new’ terrorism 
Terrorism scholars suggest that the nature of terrorism has changed. Even prior to 9/11, 
Hoffman (1998) and Laquer (1999) had observed that terrorist groups of the 1970s 
and 1980s were gone and that new ones were emerging. The debate on the distinction 
between ‘old’ and ‘new’ includes a diverse array of factors such as group structure, 
transnational nature, motivation and goals, lethality, targeting and tactics. 
Neumann (2009) argues that the structure of old terrorism is hierarchical, 
whereas the structure of new terrorism is loose with nodes of networks. Marc 
Sageman’s work (2004) on the spread of Al-Qaeda also gives credence to this notion 
of new terrorism. He suggests that as a result of Al-Qaeda’s global strength and 
visibility, groups with similar ideological beliefs declared allegiance to them without 
Al-Qaeda needing to reach out to them. In contrast, Crenshaw (2008) argues that old 
terrorists groups such as the Red Army Faction (RAF) and the Irish Republican Army 
(IRA) had units that acted independently. This thesis would argue that the difference 
in the organisational structure between old and new terrorist groups depends on a 
group’s strategy and on CT. Chapters five and six highlight how BH’s strategy and 
the nature of the Nigerian state’s CT have influenced the organisational structure of 
BH. Research is yet to show that BH units act independently, despite the group having 
cell structures across the regions it dominates. The organisational structure of BH in 
fact suggests that it is a hybrid of both old and new structures in terms of hierarchy 
and loose networks.  
With regards to the transnational nature of terrorist groups, Neumann (2009) 
argues that new terrorist groups are more transnational in their operations than old 
terrorist groups were. Added to this, this study argues that since new terrorism is 
characterised by religious revival, the operational range of terrorist groups is spread 
across borders as a social movement. However, Crenshaw (2008) debunks this 
argument. She observes that leftist groups in the 1980s collaborated with anti-
imperialist groups across different regions. Regardless of the concept of old and new 
terrorism, this study would argue that the transnational nature of terrorism is 
contextual. Notably, existing studies on spillover and diffusion of conflict 
acknowledge numerous factors that enable a spillover of terror from one territory to 
another. Such factors include external intervention by foreign governments (Tony & 
Mushed, 2002), ethnic linkages (Buhaug & Gleditch 2008) and neighbouring states 
with weak CT (Buhaug, 2009). Moreover, Braithwaite & Chu (2017) suggest that the 
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return of foreign fighters from a conflict results in new violence in their home 
countries. 
In terms of motivation, Neumann (2009) and a number of scholars argue that 
new terrorism is motivated by religion (Hoffman, 1998; Laqueur, 1999; Benjamin & 
Simon, 2003). Another difference between new and old terrorist groups is their goal. 
It is argued that the goals of a new terrorist group are often unclear and the goal is not 
primarily to achieve political change; with this being in contrast to old terrorist groups 
who were mostly characterised by this (Neumann, 2009). On the other hand, it is 
argued that new terrorist groups are more motivated by eschatological goals and large-
scale destruction, with new terrorism being more violent than old terrorism because 
of religious beliefs and revenge (Stern, 1999; Neumann, 2009). However, it is 
important to point out that terrorist groups motivated by political Islam use it as a tool 
to achieve their political goals. Moreover, numerous studies, especially from a rational 
choice theory (RCT) perspective, suggest that terrorist groups are both strategic and 
unitary actors. Unitary actors vis-à-vis RCT suggest that terrorists may have individual 
preferences but remain united by a movement’s goal (Dugan et al., 2005), and that if 
there is no unity of goal then the group will splinter (ibid). Moreover, terrorists use 
violence as a means of communication with both governments and civilians in order 
to achieve their goal. 
On the distinction of lethality when applied to old and new terrorism, Neumann 
(2009) suggests that new terrorism is more lethal than old terrorism. Additionally, 
Stern (1999) argues that new terrorism is more likely to use weapons of mass 
destruction such as nuclear or chemical weapons because of modern advancements in 
technology, although it is difficult to know if the use of chemical or nuclear weapons 
is more likely as it has to-date not happened. However, Crenshaw (2008) argues that 
the disparity in the destructive nature of both old and new terrorism is complicated 
because for example, an old and new Japanese terrorist group had and has the 
potentiality of using weapons of mass destruction, with Aum Shinrikyo once having 
used chemical weapons. Crenshaw (2008) further suggests that the level of casualties 
recorded in Al-Qaeda attacks is not remarkably dissimilar to those of old terrorist 
groups. However, it can be argued that the lethality of terrorist groups depends more 
upon modernity and a group’s ability to access more deadly weapons.  
In terms of targeting, scholars argue that old terrorism was more restrained. 
The old terrorist groups discriminated in their targets and did not believe in the 
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unrestrained use of violence because they relied on civilians or their constituencies for 
support (Hoffman, 1999; Benjamin & Simon, 2003). In contrast, Crenshaw (2008) 
argues that old terrorist groups were not always discriminatory in their selection of 
targets, and she gives examples of attacks such as the 1946 Zionist attack on the King 
David Hotel in Jerusalem and the FLN attack on Europeans during the Algerian war 
to note that old terrorist groups were also indiscriminate in their attacks. This thesis 
would argue that terrorist targeting depends on a group’s strategy of operation and 
ability to carry out attacks. Moreover, terrorist targets depend on the message a terror 
group wants to pass to a government, the level of fear they wish to instill in civilians 
and their ability to carry out an attack (Kydd & Walter, 2006). Notably, weak terrorist 
groups often resort to attacking civilians instead of state forces (Wood, 2010).  
Rigid assumptions within the debate on old and new terrorism are not helpful in 
analysing BH because in some ways, BH is more of a hybrid organisation in terms of 
its organisational structure. This thesis looks at the behaviour of BH in depth whereas 
many studies on old and new terrorism look at groups comparatively, i.e. which groups 
are more lethal, transnational or engage in different types of targeting. 
2.3 Literature on Boko Haram 
This section reviews existing literature on BH and importantly, it critically examines 
existing studies from both ontological and methodological perspectives. It takes into 
consideration the numerous studies on BH classified as either the origins or the 
evolution of BH. Studies on the origins of BH attempt to explain its emergence and 
sustenance, whereas studies on the evolution of BH encompass its changing behaviour. 
The majority of literature on BH focuses on causes and motivation, with the group’s 
dynamic nature being understudied. Additionally, the majority of studies on the 
origins of BH have been carried out by Nigerian scholars (Adesoji, 2010 & 2011; 
Levan, 2013; Agbiboa, 2013c; Akinola, 2015; Alozieuwa, 2015), while the majority 
of studies on its evolution have been conducted by non-Nigerian scholars (Zenn 2014b, 
2016; Pantucci & Jesperson, 2015; Eveslage, 2013; Comolli 2015; D’Amato 2017). 
This section highlights major arguments about BH and identifies gaps in the existing 
literature on BH.  
2.3.1 Cause and motivation of BH 
Studies of the causes and motivation of BH have primarily been carried out by 
Nigerian scholars, and attempt to explain BH’s emergence and sustenance. These 
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studies argue from both theoretical and empirical dimensions. The two central 
arguments underpinning the cause and motivations of BH are that first, BH was caused 
by a history of religoisity in Nigeria and that second, it emerged because of socio-
economic and political deprivations. In other words, they focus on examining how BH 
emerged from a society characterised by inherent poverty, religiousity and politics. 
While the studies in this section argue from different perspectives, they do agree on 
the trigger cause of BH’s campaign of violence: that Mohammed Yusuf (the founder 
of BH) and his successors have been instrumental in the emergence and subsequent 
growth of BH (Thurston, 2016; Adesoji 2011; Maiangwa et al., 2012). The majority 
of scholars also argue that the extra-judicial killing of Yusuf escalated BH violence. 
However, most of these studies focus on BH solely as a group (Adesoji, 2010; Loimier, 
2012; Oyeniyi, 2014; Agbiboa, 2013 a, b & c). 
2.3.1.1 Religion and history of religoisity in Nigeria 
Studies about radical Islam suggest that BH’s campaign of violence has been 
influenced by the nature of Islamism in Nigeria (Adesoji, 2010 & 2011; Levan, 2013; 
Agbiboa, 2013c; Akinola, 2015; Alozieuwa, 2015).  
 Adesoji (2010 and 2011) is a scholar whose writing laid the foundations for 
other studies on BH. He sees BH as Islamic revivalism in Nigeria and in his narrative, 
he argues that militant Islamism, ethno-religious conflicts and the Maitasine uprising 
of 1980 influenced the advent of BH. He views the 2009 BH uprising as a significant 
event by Islamic conservatives at imposing a fringe religious ideology on a Nigerian 
secular state. In addition, that Nigerian religious sensitivities, economic hardship, 
desperate devices by politicians for political power and the increasing trend for global 
Islamic fundamentalism enabled the emergence of BH. Moreover, he notes that the 
intensity of the group’s violence is motivated both by the nature of Nigeria’s counter 
terrorism (CT) and links to Islamist movements across Nigeria. From an economic 
perspective, he suggests that Islamic movements outside of Nigeria and BH use 
religion to attract individuals, recruit poor and uneducated individuals and more 
specifically, that BH recruits Almajirai as members. Contrary to the argument that 
poverty and illiteracy are the predominant tools of BH recruitment, findings by 
Nigerian forces suggest that individuals above the average national income willingly 
join BH (Hart, 2015). Relative deprivation, frustration and a struggle for identity can 
be applicable to many Nigerian Muslims, but only a select few turn to violence. 
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Further to the assertion of Adesoji (2010 and 2011) on the role of Islamic 
revivalism in BH’s emergence, Loimeier (2012) argues that the emergence, in-fighting 
and subsequent division of the Izala (Society of Removal of Innovation and Re-
establishment of the Sunna) Salafists influenced the emergence of BH. He examines 
BH from a historical perspective and argues that the group’s rise is a consequence of 
theological disputes within Islam, as well as a number of factors within the Yan Izala 
(members of Izala). Loimeier (2012) observes that the dan Fodio jihad of the 19th 
century laid the foundations from which theologian argumentation was set as the basis 
for political decisions in Northern Nigeria. He suggests that the advent of British 
colonial rule plunged northern Nigeria into deep crisis to the point where British law, 
economic dynamism and Western education were perceived as a threat to Islamic 
education. He describes this situation as ‘modernisation shock’. Loimeier (2012) 
suggests that Yan Izala engaged other Sufi (unorthodox Islam) Muslims in 
acrimonious debate in which they perceived other Sufi to be illiterates (jahilai), and 
then fought violently with them to ensure reform within Islam. Furthermore, this led 
to divisions within Yan Izala which happened in two stages. The first was between the 
old and new generations. The new generation underwent ‘new education’ in Saudi 
Arabia but could not secure jobs in Nigeria nor occupy leadership positions within the 
Yan Izala group. This situation made them create their own schools, mosques and non-
governmental organisations (NGOs). The second stage was division within the new 
generation which resulted in the creation of two parties, with Yusuf rejecting modern 
Islamic schools and the secular system of education in Nigeria, and Shiek Ja'afar 
Mahmud Adam (Yusuf’s teacher) opposing the worldview of Yusuf and urging 
Muslims to be educated and occupy public office. 
In line with Loimeier (2012), a number of scholars (Oyeniyi, 2014; Azumah, 2015; 
Aliyu et al., 2015) argue that BH emerged as a result of disputes within the Izala 
Salafist movement. They also attribute the trigger of BH violence as being the killing 
of Yusuf. Oyeniyi (2014) takes a broader perspective on the emergence of BH in 
relation to Salafism. In his attempt to explain the emergence of BH from the Izala 
movement, Oyeniyi (2014) blames the rise of BH on Salafist doctrine. Like 
Huntington’s clash of civilisations theory, he sees the rise of the Salafist movement in 
the 19th century as a reaction to the spread of European ideas and resistance to Western 
hegemony within Muslim civilisations. He maintains that Salafism sees political 
participation as un-Islamic because a core Salafist belief is that of monotheism, i.e. 
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the supreme authority of the books of Allah, the following of the prophets of Allah 
and the supremacy of Allah’s will. He suggests that different groups interpret these 
core beliefs as their religious duty as well as the reason for their struggle to establish 
an Islamic government and as such, BH interprets these through violence. 
Regardless of the role of the Izala dispute in the emergence of BH, some scholars 
argue that international jihadism or the global revivalism of radical Islam has a source 
of inspiration for BH (Onapajo et al., 2012; Zenn et al., 2013). In other words, the 
authors see the emergence of BH as a reflection of the revivalism of radical Islam. 
When analysing the import of global terrorism to Nigeria, Onapajo et al. (2012) 
contend that BH emerged due to global jihadist movements and escalated due to 
domestic factors such as extreme poverty, ethnicity and state and leadership failure, 
as well as power struggles between political actors. Useing Rapoport’s (2001) ‘Four 
Waves of Modern Terrorism’ as a framework, they say that BH are inspired by anti-
Western hatred from the Muslim world and as such, see Christians as the West and 
non-BH Muslims as the elite and stooges of the West, with this thinking informing 
their strategic use of violence. Rapoport (2001) classifies the trend of terrorism into 
four parts: anarchist, anti-colonialist, leftist and religious waves. He sees the anarchist 
wave (1880s - 1890s) as a period dominated by the assassination of politicians and 
key state officials. The anti-colonialist era started during World War 1 (WW1) and 
was dominated by colonial resistance - an ambiguous term for those fighting colonial 
powers as they can be perceived as terrorists or freedom fighters. Rapoport (2001) 
argues that the leftist wave started in the mid-1960s, a period characterised by global 
anti-American movements during the Cold War era. The fourth wave referred to by 
Onapajo et al. (2012) is the religious wave of terrorism that started in the 20th century. 
They argue that the 20th century gave rise to events and groups such as the Iranian 
Revolution of 1979, Aum Shinrinkyo and the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA). 
However, Rapoport’s (2001) ‘waves of terrorism’ suffers from some weaknesses in 
explaining the cause of modern terrorism and BH. Harrow (2008: 4&5) suggests that 
ideology, grievances and framing are also necessary when explaining the cause of 
terrorism. He implies (2008) that ideology on its own cannot explain the cause of 
terrorism as a mix of ideology, grievances and framing play a major role in influencing 
terrorism. Similar to Onapajo et al. (2012), Zenn et al. (2013) suggest that BH was 
greatly inspired by the Taliban from 2003 – 2009, and note that BH was at one point 
referred to as the Nigerian Taliban. They also argue that Abubakar Shekau’s 
 40 
emergence as BH’s group leader led to more internationalisation of the group. 
Abubakar Shekau transformed BH into a Takfiri group, which refers to people who 
do not share BH ideology with Kafirs (infidels), and this encouraged him to ally the 
group with other terrorist groups such as AQIM, Ansar and MUJWA (The Movement 
for Oneness and Jihad in West Africa). 
 The emergence of BH is acknowledged to have been influenced by the 
politicisation of Islamic fundamentalism (Levan, 2013; Agbiboa, 2013c; Akinola, 
2015). Levan (2013) notes that as the British colonial system of indirect rule in 1914 
allowed Sharia, this encouraged successful attempts by Muslims to make Sharia part 
of the Nigerian constitution. He holds that these attempts for a Sharia state elicited 
confrontational resistance from Christians, and further suggests that attempts inspired 
by the Iranian Revolution of 1979 extended to Nigeria’s return to democracy in 1999, 
following a long period of military rule. Furthermore, he notes that the year 2000 was 
marked by acrimonious debate on how to give more powers to existing Sharia courts 
in order to apply stricter Sharia laws. He argues that the brutal response by the 
Nigerian government to BH led to the radicalisation of the group, thereby motivating 
BH’s violence. On the notion of politicisation of religion, Levan’s (2013) account is 
insufficient in offering explicit understanding of BH’s disposition of violence. There 
is an established Sharia legal system in Nigeria that BH is not supportive of, making 
it therefore pertinent to understand the argumentation of BH over existing Sharia. 
Further to the politicisation of religion, Agbiboa (2013c) uses social identity theory 
(SIT) to posit that BH emanates from extreme religious identity, excruciating poverty 
and deprivation. SIT implies that membership of a social group is central in forming 
an individual’s identity (Agbiboa 2013b: Tajfel & Turner 1979). He further attempts 
to unveil the nexus between religion and politics by giving examples of the Muslim 
Brotherhood in Egypt, Hamas in Palestine and Liberation Theology in Latin America. 
He suggests that Islam is symbolic to a religion-politics nexus that has always clashed 
with secularism. He holds that the Prophet Mohammed is both a spiritual and political 
leader of his city, and that the Prophet inspires Muslims to practise such a theocratic 
system. In addition to the role of politicisation of Islam in the rise of BH, Akinola 
(2015) argues that BH emerged because of Islamic fundamentalism in Nigeria, but 
was sustained by the politicisation of religion and excrutiating poverty in Northern 
Nigeria. Alozieuwa (2015) in contrast, argues that BH emanated from political Islam, 
which seeks to achieve political goals through the vehicle of religion. He further 
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argues that Nigerian politicians who felt alienated by the Nigerian political system, 
supported BH’s development from an isolationist to a large-scale violent movement. 
2.3.1.2 Socio-economic factors 
Studies under this sub-section suggest that socio-economic deprivation is responsible 
for the cause and motivation of BH’s campaign of terror. Each scholar under this sub-
section has combined a direct and indirect explanation of the Nigerian state to 
highlight the causes and motivations of BH. The direct explanation talks about CT in 
the Nigerian state, whereas the indirect explanation refers to factors such as 
socioeconomic and political conditions, as well as the ethno-religious fault lines of the 
Nigerian state. The indirect explanation talks more about BH using individual 
motivation such as poverty to recruit and mobilise individuals as a way of revolting 
against elite corruption. Explanations within this section overlap in terms of both the 
direct and indirect nature of the Nigerian state in terms of cause and motivation, and 
are reviewed according to the ontology and methodology of studies such as Marxist 
thinking, frustration aggression, framing theory and ‘wretched of the earth’ theory.  
The Marxist ontological underpinning of class or the ‘have’s and have not’s’ has 
been applied when trying to understand the thinking and activities of BH (Ogunrotifa, 
2013; Epelle & Uranta 2014). Ogunrotifa (2013) suggests that BH is a product of class 
struggle emanating from socioeconomic problems caused by global capitalism. He 
notes that religious manipulation (interpreting politics through the prism of religion) 
used by Northern political elites in maintaining power, particularly in northern Nigeria 
where poverty and hardship are most prevalent, has snowballed into BH. He argues 
that Yusuf mobilised the working classes to fight Western education because he 
believed it had created capitalism and a corrupt ruling class. Similarly, Epelle & 
Uranta (2014) use the Marxist political economy approach to note that the poor 
material conditions of BH members led to their quest for control of government 
machinery and means of production. They suggest that the Nigerian state is 
characterised by its acrimonious rivalry for power and that politicians deploy all 
available means to acquire and maintain political power, resulting in the 
destabilisation of the political system. As a result, poor people have been manipulated 
on religious and ethnic lines, which in turn have provided a platform for them to vent 
their frustrations about their poor economic situations.  
Marxist ideology appears too simplistic to explain the rise and motivation of BH. 
It does not explain why the same working class and lumpen proletariat attack soft 
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target areas like markets, motor parks and other public places that individuals 
(including the poor) occupy. Although not all groups have the capacity to attack 
protected targets such as state forces and residential areas of senior government 
officials, BH attacks civilians in their strongholds. If BH were explainable from a 
Marxist point of view, the elite would be their main target. Epelle & Uranta’s (2014) 
argument does not give a convincing account of the religious motivation of BH 
towards violence, and their views are in fact more appropriate in explaining leftist 
terrorism. Moreover, the authors do not explain how the masses have been 
manipulated, for example whether they were influenced by propaganda, extremist 
ideology or material benefits. 
Other scholars adopt the state-failure thesis and frustration-aggression frameworks 
to explain how the Nigerian state has caused and motivated BH’s activities (Maiangwa 
et al., 2012; Agbiboa, 2014a; Akinfala et al., 2014; Aghedo & Osumah, 2012). The 
state-failure thesis suggests that a state loses its sovereignty when it cannot provide 
security, infrastructure or law and order (Zartman, 1995). In contrast, the frustration-
aggression thesis holds that both individuals and groups act violently when their goals 
are prevented by society. Using the state-failure and frustration-aggression 
frameworks, Maiangwa et al. (2012) explain the emergence, motivation, goals, targets 
and extremism of BH. They suggest that security deficiencies, corruption, military 
brutality and economic hardship are responsible for BH’s violent activities. They 
argue that Yusuf created BH to fight ‘corruption and to establish a state governed by 
morality’. This means that BH perceives the Nigerian government as its enemy 
because it believes that it perpetuates societal ills through its constitution and through 
liberal democracy, and that these ensure privileges to women, homosexuals and 
prostitutes. Thus BH has termed the West and anything perceived to be western, 
including the Nigerian government, as an infidel, and as such it sees a Sharia state as 
the solution to this. Furthermore the authors suggest that BH adopted its violent 
strategies after a clash with Nigerian security agents and the subsequent extra-judicial 
killing of its leader. Maiangwa et al. (2012) hold that BH’s motivation to use violence 
has been influenced by endemic poverty, corruption and failure of government, and 
that this has translated into frustration and aggression (Maiangwa et al., 2012). 
Similarly, Agbiboa (2014a and 2014b) suggests that BH feels alienated in the north 
compared to developed southern Nigeria, and that government corruption and 
incompetence, alongside of brutal security agents, motivate BH.  
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Akinfala et al. (2014) apply the frustration-aggression theory, Maslow's concept 
of a hierarchy of needs and Bandura's social learning theory in their examination of 
BH. Maslow’s hierarchy of needs suggests that humans have three stages of needs: 
basic, psychological and self-actualisation (a sense of fulfilment). Bandura’s social 
learning theory stipulates that people learn more effectively through observing others 
(models) than from direct experience (Bandura, 1986 & 1998). Akinfala et al. (2014) 
use Maslow’s basic needs (food, shelter and security) to suggest that the rise of BH is 
as a result of poor quality of life, youth unemployment, legal impunity and corruption. 
They also posit that these factors have culminated in militancy, insurgency, 
kidnapping and assasinations in Nigeria. Through Bandura's theory, the authors 
explain the motivations of BH members to use violence, with the writers suggesting 
that the militants of the oil-rich Niger-Delta region of Nigeria have served as a 
psychological motivation for BH. They argue that the successes of militants such as 
Asari Dokubo and Henry Okah, who successfully carried arms against the Nigerian 
state and were subsequently granted state pardons, serve as motivation for BH. With 
regards to the argument of Maslow’s hierarchy of needs, Akinfala et al. (2014) argue 
that until 1980, the majority of basic needs for Nigerians were met.  
An attempt to draw a parallel between BH and the militants of the Niger-Delta 
region of Nigeria (Akinfala et al., 2014) is overly simplistic. The aggrieved individuals 
in the South choose to force their government to alleviate poor economic and 
environmental conditions, while in contrast BH wants to spread ideology. Moreover, 
the underlying cause of BH is different from the restlessness of the militants in the 
Niger-Delta. Hence the two militant groups are not comparable within this context, 
and in fact Akinfala et al. (2014) do not illustrate any methods or evidence to prove 
that BH has been inspired by the Niger-Delta region militants. Contrary to Bandura's 
social learning theory, not all individuals learn or derive inspiration from violent 
backgrounds (Taylor & Quale 1994: 32), and therefore this is insufficient in explaining 
BH. In addition, the frustration-aggression theory is not enough to justify the use of 
violence. Socioeconomic hardship, political frustration or deprivation are not 
applicable to all individuals as some people like to live in isolation, while others like 
to cooperate with others through non-violence (Rummel 1977, Sidanius & Pratto, 
1999). 
With regards to the assertion made by Akinfala et al. (2014) about self-
actualisation as a contributory factor in the emergence of BH, Salaam (2012) makes a 
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similar argument from a demographic perspective. He argues that levels of youth 
deprivation are connected to the emergence and motivation of BH. Salaam (2012) 
suggests that the cause of BH violence is as a consequence of wide economic 
disparities between the rich and the poor, of unemployment and of unequal educational 
opportunities, particularly in the North. He argues that these factors create a feeling of 
injustice amongst the youth, and that such feelings motivate them to support radical 
Islam. The author uses the risk factor model to analyse the radicalisation of youths, 
and suggests that the most influential risk factors motivating members of BH to engage 
in violence are the poverty gap and social injustice. He believes that these has been 
provoked by the absence of protective factors, resulting in a complete loss of 
confidence in the government’s ability to ensure the welfare and security of its people. 
Regardless of how BH has evolved in its recruitment of youths, they have now adopted 
a strategy of recruiting children and teenagers, most of whom are female (BBC 2014a).  
Another comparative study between BH and MASSOB (Movement for the 
Actualisation of Sovereign Biafra) of Eastern Nigeria was been carried out by Sa¨ndig 
(2015). He uses the framing theory in an attempt to understand their ideology, and 
suggests that even though both movements feel economically and politically alienated, 
they have a different approach to rebellion. He argues that while MASSOB adopts 
non-violence, BH adopts violence because of the culture of radical Islam in Northern 
Nigeria. However, such an argument does not explain the existence of numerous other 
Islamic social movements within the North such as FOMWAN (Federation of Muslim 
Women’s in Nigeria) or MURIC (Muslim Rights Concern) who use non-violence in 
their struggle for justice, equality and an improvement in the welfare of Muslims in 
Nigeria. 
Some studies argue that state fragility is the cause of BH violence (Aghedo & 
Osumah, 2012; Salaam 2012). Aghedo & Osumah (2012) conclude that the emergence 
of BH was as a consequence of governance failure and institutional fragility. They 
argue that BH members cut across poor and uneducated people who have 
overwhelming feelings of ‘social injustice, marginalisation and human insecurity’, 
particularly in the north where poverty is more prevalent. Moreover, they note that 
this situation is coupled with the government’s inability to unite a fractionalised 
Nigeria. The authors selected academics, journalists, members of the Nigerian forces 
and politicians in four northern state capitals to participate in a survey. A total of 80 
questionnaires were administered, with 20 questionnaires given to 20 participants in 
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each of the four states. The questionnaire was designed to understand BH’s ideology 
and intentions that included making Nigeria an Islamic state, the abolition of Western 
education, the abolition of democracy, an end to bad leadership and the alleviation of 
poverty. The results of their survey showed the following response frequencies:  
 - making Nigeria an Islamic state   78%  
-  the abolition of Western education   82%  
-  the abolition of democracy    42% 
- an end to bad leadership    84%  
- the alleviation of poverty    72%  
Along with these responses, Aghedo & Osumah (2012) further identified factors 
such as the Nigerian government’s use of brutal force in fighting BH during its 
formative stages. Even though their study was supported by secondary data, the 
questionnaire appears to be inadequate in evaluating a complex group such as BH. The 
questionnaire did not allow space for the respondents to give independent answers in 
addition to those asked for by the researchers. Moreover, the study would have been 
more rigorous if respondents had been members of or had access to BH. 
Some studies suggest that BH is motivated by the nature of Nigeria’s corrupt elite 
(Isa, 2010; de Montclos, 2014; Smith, 2015). Scholars argue that long years of 
mismanagement and endemic corruption within the Nigerian system encouraged the 
emergence of the BH movement. Additionally, the weak and indecisive nature of the 
Nigerian state has enabled BH to mature into a larger and more violent movement. 
Similarly, it is also argued that BH is a consequence of the manipulative nature of 
individuals in positions of authority within the Nigerian state. Isa (2010) sees BH as 
the product of many attempts by different Islamist movements through history to 
establish their concepts of governance, and traces these attempts through the dan Fodio 
jihad (Qadariyya; a school of thought in Islam), Mahdiyya, Maitasine, the Islamic 
Movement of Nigeria (IMN) and BH. In addition, Hasen & Musa (2013) use the Fanon 
theory (‘wretched of the earth’) (Fanon, 1961) to explain the cause of BH’s use of 
violence. They view BH as working in resistance to the greed of rich Nigerian elites. 
In their analogy, Hasen & Musa (2013) argue that BH members see themselves as 
having been colonised by Nigerian elites, who act as colonialists. They contend that 
since BH members are aggrieved with their poor socioeconomic and political 
situations, they have chosen to revolt and are partly supported by the nature of northern 
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Nigeria, where people are more loyal to religion than ethnonational affiliations and as 
such, their revolt would dislodge a corrupt government. 
While explanations about the causes and motivation of BH are important in 
explaining how BH came about in the first place, they do not explain the changing 
nature and dynamics of the group. As a result, this thesis examines BH’s changing 
dynamics over time. 
2.3.2 Evolution of BH 
Few studies within the literature on BH appear to have shifted their focus from the 
cause and motivations of BH towards explanations about its evolution. The dynamism 
of BH has been studied both internally and externally. The internal dynamism includes 
leadership disputes within BH (Zenn 2014b, 2016; Pantucci & Jesperson 2015); 
external dynamics involving BH’s strategy (Weerarate, 2014; Folade, 2016; Walker, 
2016) and tactical reasons as to why BH’s campaign of violence has transcended 
beyond Nigerian borders (Eveslage, 2013; Comolli 2015; D’Amato 2017). Some 
major developments in the study of BH also emanate from the studies of Barkindo 
(2016) and Pieri & Zenn (2016), who highlight the implications of history and 
ethnicism to both the internal and external dynamics of BH.  
With regards to internal dynamism, scholars have explored leadership disputes 
within BH. Zenn (2014b & 2016) and Pantucci & Jesperson (2015) suggest that the 
death of BH’s founder facilitated the rise of a more militant leadership, and that this 
generated internal conflict between his successors (senior disciples). Zenn (2014b & 
2016) and Pantucci & Jesperson (2015) observe that the movement’s leadership has 
created and coordinated different factions of the movement against the Nigerian state. 
The authors suggest that BH factions connect with international jihadist groups, such 
as Al-Qaeda and its affiliates, across Africa.   
With regards to external dynamics, Weerarate (2014) examines the expansion of 
BH from Borno and outside of the Northeast of Nigeria. Weerarate (2014) looks at 
how BH has expanded in its target selections, strategies, severity of violence and 
geographic locations. He argues that BH’s expansion is because of ties with Al-Qaeda, 
Nigeria’s armed CT measures and internal fragmentation within BH. By internal 
fragmentation, he means that leaders within the group have broken the movement into 
a cell-like structure, with each group being loyal to its own leader. With regards to 
Weerarate’s (2014) argument on the impact of Nigeria’s CT on BH’s violence, this 
thesis argues that Nigeria’s CT has been under-examined because the timings, 
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application of policies and outcome of their effects on BH behaviour over time has not 
been sufficiently evaluated. Walker (2016) highlights the transformation of BH from 
being a sub-national level from Borno State, which is the theatre of BH’s campaign of 
violence. The author highlights the nature of democratic failure at a sub-national level 
in the Northeast of Nigeria, and how BH took advantage of poverty in the region to 
recruit individuals through Islamic evangelism and financial inducements, with it then 
going underground in 2010 to reinforce itself against the Nigerian state. Walker (2016) 
presents a strong argument highlighting the logical strategy of BH, yet his argument 
does not give reasons for the evolution of BH’s tactics to the use of firefights, suicide 
bombing and kidnapping. 
Folade (2016) offers a distinction to the above by focusing more on the changing 
strategy of BH against the Nigerian government from 2010-2015 through the ‘hybrid 
wars’ framework. In other words, the author examines BH’s reactions to and plans 
against Nigerian CT. The hybrid wars framework is a combination of both 
conventional and unconventional tactics such as combat, kidnapping, beheading and 
suicide bombings in war. Folade (2016) argues that BH is dynamic, and that 
international linkage to other terror groups is because both BH and Nigerian forces 
need foreign support to defeat each other. 
With regards to the transnationalisation of BH, Eveslage (2013) attempts to 
explain BH’s likely spread outside of Nigeria. He conducted a content analysis of 
BH’s public statements, and his analysis strongly suggests that BH is a domestic 
terrorist movement and is unlikely to spread to neighbouring countries. Eveslage 
(2013) suggests that BH is intrinsically a domestic group because of factors such as 
religious revivalism and the weak nature of the Nigerian state, and with regards to the 
likelihood of BH spreading out of Nigeria, the author predicts that global Salafist 
ideology could enable BH to be transnationalised. However, recent events suggest that 
the transnationalisation of BH is as a result of a multitude of factors such as ethnicity, 
international military cooperation, tactics and geographical factors (see chapter eight).  
Comolli’s (2015) examination of the spread of BH in Nigeria’s border regions 
relies on interviews with members of the Nigerian forces and media reports as the 
major source of data. Arguably, the study of a complex phenomenon such as BH 
requires a far wider variety of methods. Comolli (2015) argues that the Nigerian 
government’s weak CT was responsible for BH’s transformation, and that BH has 
taken advantage of countries bordering the Lake Chad region to connect with other 
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international terrorist groups such as Al-Qaeda and Al-Shabaab. However, Comolli 
(2015) does not clearly highlight the connection between BH and radical groups 
outside of Nigerian borders beyond that of symbolism. Furthermore, D’Amato (2017) 
conducted case studies on BH and Al-Qaeda in the Maghreb (AQIM) to look at how 
the transnationality of nationalistic terrorist organisations can be costly. She suggests 
that organising terrorist attacks across national boundaries entails physical, social and 
strategic costs. Physical refers to geographical obstacles, social to the ability of 
terrorists to benefit from opportunities such as support, food and recruitment across 
boundaries, and strategic implies the ability of terrorist groups to move across 
countries to carry out attacks. In terms of physical costs, the distance between Borno 
and Nigeria’s neighbouring countries makes it difficult for BH to relocate out of Borno 
(the epicentre of BH activities) or plan attacks. In terms of social costs, BH has less 
ethno-religious support than it claims because of the numerous attacks it has carried 
out against the Northeast region (it regards this region as its constituency) and Niger 
and Cameroon, who both have transnational histories of ethnic and political affiliation 
to. With regards to strategic costs, the author argues that Nigerian CT has contributed 
to the transnationalisation of BH by pushing its members to territories they feel safe 
in. In fact the transnationalisation of BH is complex because of the porous border 
within the Lake Chad region resulting from trans-Sahara trade (Hill, 2009). The 
Kanem-Bornu Empire created historical ties to North-eastern Nigeria, the Republic of 
Chad, Eastern Niger, Northern Cameroon and Southern Libya (Barth, 1858; Hill 2010). 
Moreover, BH has succeeded in recruiting individuals across these neighbouring 
countries (International Crisis Group, 2016a; 2016b; 2017), thereby suggesting that 
there are in fact a number of factors that coalesce to explain the spillover of BH 
violence. 
2.3.3 Emerging arguments about BH 
Emerging studies about BH suggest that it has adopted a new method of exploiting 
history and ethnicity to motivate and sustain its movement (Pieri & Zenn, 2016; 
Barkindo, 2016). These scholars suggest that BH uses the narrative of the Kanuri 
ethnic group across Lake Chad to maintain its movement. Barkindo (2016) argues that 
BH exploits history and memory to justify its targeting of Northeastern Nigeria and 
parts of the Lake Chad region, which they regard as the ancestral home of the Kanuri. 
Barkindo (2016) interviewed a BH suspect undergoing de-radicalisation at a Nigerian 
prison and found that BH uses the history of the Kanem-Bornu Empire to mobilise 
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and motivate individuals to violence. Similarly, Pieri & Zenn (2016) argue that BH 
draws inspiration from dan Fodio’s jihad of the 19th century and his establishment of 
the Sokoto Caliphate. They argue that BH seeks to establish a caliphate in the Kanuri 
homeland of the Kanem-Bornu Empire, which was destroyed by British colonial 
powers. The authors argue that the reason why BH rejects democracy, 
constitutionalism and Western values is because they believe that the British colonial 
authorities destroyed their value system. The new thinking within this study is a 
challenge to the idea that BH is dominantly characterised, and that its motivation is 
radical Islam and the elimination of poverty. Until now, the majority of studies about 
the causes and motivation of BH analyse BH within the areas of radical Islam, poverty 
and CT. Barkindo (2016) and Pieri & Zenn (2016) highlight that there is an ethnic 
dimension to BH and that this element has been used internally to motivate its 
members, and externally to expand BH’s control across Lake Chad. (This thesis builds 
on these studies to highlight the ethnic dimension of BH  - see chapters five, seven 
and eight). 
2.4 Literature summary 
This sub-chapter summarises what is already known about terrorism and BH and in 
doing so, it highlighted the gaps on BH literature that this thesis seeks to narrow. 
On the causes of terrorism, psychological, environmental and religious factors 
have been discussed. They have been criticised because different individuals do not 
have same levels of deprivation; and deprivation as well as religion can be seen as a 
source of non-violent cooperation rather than solely as a source of violence (Walker 
and Pettigrew, 1984; Juergensmeyer, 2000; Pape, 2003). Also, contrary to 
conventional arguments that economic hardship causes terrorism, studies show that 
even individuals who earn above minimum wage engage in terrorism (Cole & Cole, 
2010). Illiteracy being a cause of terrorism has also been debunked because terrorists 
select educated recruits (Bueno de Mesquita, 2005). Debates about the consequences 
of terrorism have acknowledged the destruction of lives and property, tourism and 
economic activities. This thesis would also argue that the spill over of violence from 
one region to another could also be as a consequence of terrorism. Therefore, chapter 
eight discusses how terrorism in Nigeria affects countries in the Lake Chad region. 
Furthermore, not much has been discussed about violence against women with regards 
to radicalisation, nor on trauma and stigmatisation of female victims of terror. The 
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fifth chapter of this thesis outlines how women have been affected by BH. In terms of 
CT, different accounts have acknowledged that CT can be effective, counter-
productive or make no difference. Since government policies and agencies of 
government determine CT activities (Rosendorff and Sandler, 2004; Jacobson & 
Kaplan, 2007; Acre & Sandler, 2007), chapter six of this thesis examines the CT 
policies of the Nigerian government and their implications. In terms of old and new 
terrorism, strict demarcation between old and new might not be relevant in analysing 
BH because it appears to be more of a hybrid of old and new terrorism. The majority 
of studies on old and new terrorism generally focus comparatively on group variation, 
i.e. on the types of groups that are more lethal, transnational or differing in their 
targeting. Therefore, chapter five highlights why BH appears to be a hybrid of both 
old and new terrorism in terms of its organisational structure.  
Along with the broader literature on terrorism, existing studies about BH 
highlight the origins and evolution of BH. They suggest that BH came into existence 
in 2002, yet by 2002 BH was already a small isolationist movement, even though little 
was known about it. The majority of studies on BH agree that Mohammed Yusuf (the 
founder of BH) and his successors have been instrumental in the emergence and 
subsequent growth of BH (Thurston, 2016; Adesoji 2011; Maiangwa et al., 2012; 
Pantucci & Jesperson 2015 Zenn 2014b). They suggest that the extra-judicial killing 
of the founder of BH escalated BH violence (Adesoji, 2010; Loimier, 2012; Oyeniyi, 
2014; Agbiboa, 2013 a, b & c; Barkindo 2016), with some scholars suggesting that 
BH emerged as a result of radical Islam. Other studies argue that socio-economic 
problems are the cause of BH violence (Maiangwa et al., 2012; Akinfala et al., 2014), 
while others talk about the symbolic connection of BH to international radical Salafist 
movements (Onapajo et al. 2012). A few studies focus on the evolution of BH both 
internally and externally. With regards to internal evolution, the dispute within the 
leadership of BH is emphasised (Zenn 2014b, 2016; Pantucci & Jesperson 2015). With 
regards to external evolution, some studies identify the unconventional tactics of BH, 
but do not explain the reason for their changing tactics over time (Folade, 2016). 
Furthermore, the transnationalisation of BH has been under-examined, with only a few 
studies attempting to explain the spillover of terrorism out of Nigeria (D’Amato, 2017). 
More recent studies have examined the influence of ethnicity as it illustrates how BH 
mobilises it members in its efforts to spread across the Lake region in order to reclaim 
the old Kanem-Bornu Empire (Barkindo, 2016; Pieri & Zenn 2016). 
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Studies in existing literature on BH are important in understanding a number 
of factors that may have influenced the BH campaign of violence. Hence this thesis 
builds on the extant literature of BH and then attempts to address gaps in existing 
literature. 
This study looks at BH in a different manner. It examines the group’s 
behaviour and evolution both internally and externally over time, and as a strategic 
actor using multi-level analysis. The study attempts to explain how different aspects 
of BH’s behaviour complement each other. Using a broader range of methods, theories 
and empirical studies within the literature on terrorism and political violence, the study 
allows for an indepth analysis of BH.  In order to highlight the behaviour and evolution 
of BH, a number of gaps in the existing literature have been identified. 
Even when BH became prominent in 2009, it was not as deadly as it is at 
present. Numerous studies on BH agree that the extra-judicial killing of its founder 
triggered BH’s violence. However, such positions are inadequate as the movement 
was already radicalised before its leader’s death. In addition, the majority of scholars 
on BH suggest that BH seeks to establish a strict Islamic state in Nigeria, yet such 
studies are do not sufficiently explain why BH is spreading across Nigeria’s borders. 
BH has transformed from a small isolationist movement to a full-blown terrorist group 
with transnational influences, with there being little explanation as to how or why this 
has happened. Existing studies on BH do not address the variations in BH’s behaviour 
over time. Such behaviour includes the relationship between BH principals and agents, 
group structure and variation in recruitment strategies, goals, target selection and the 
spillover of violence. The paragraphs below outline these and other puzzles within the 
literature on BH. In addition, they go on to highlight how these puzzles can been 
addressed, and these form the different chapters of this thesis.  
Firstly, previous studies on BH do not examine the relationship between BH 
leaders and followers, and how such leaders maintain their legitimacy. Moreover, 
studies do not explain the recruitment approaches of different BH leaders, nor do they 
quantify the intensity of violence under different leadership tenures. There is therefore 
a need for further studies on the effects of leadership on the variation of violence and 
chapter four, which is the individual level of explanation of this thesis, will be 
addressing this. 
Secondly, previous studies on BH are inadequate in accounting for the ethnic 
composition of BH and the changing nature of its recruitment. Chapter five, which is 
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the group level explanation, discusses BH’s group structure and composition. The 
chapter examines how BH’s structure has changed over time, and it explains the 
changing nature of BH recruitment, including conscription and hypnotism, which 
numerous studies on BH have not examined. 
Thirdly, scholars on BH argue that Nigeria’s CT efforts motivate BH violence, 
but existing studies do not adequately assess such policies in terms of their timing, 
application, outcome and impact on BH behaviour over time. Additionally, studies 
have not adequately analysed the nonviolent approach of Nigeria’s CT. Chapter six, 
which is the state level explanation of this thesis, assesses Nigerian CT (violent and 
nonviolent) and its implications on BH’s behaviour. 
Fourthly, previous studies have not adequately explained the reasons for the 
variation in attacks across different BH targets. Chapter seven, the sub-national level 
of explanation, will outline different rationalisations for the disparity of attacks across 
the most BH affected territories in the Northeast of Nigeria.      
Finally, previous studies do not adequately address either the import of 
extremism into Nigeria or the spillover of terror to Nigeria’s neighbouring countries. 
The majority of existing studies on BH suggest that the goal of BH is to establish a 
strict Islamic state in Nigeria, but presently BH has transnational influences across 
countries in the Lake Chad region. Factors in the spillover of terror such as external 
intervention, ethnic linkages and weak neighbouring states are not assessed in the 
extant literature. Thus chapter eight, the international level of explanation, details out 
an in-depth assessment of the spillover of extremism and terror to countries in the 
Lake Chad region. 
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Chapter 3: Research Methods 
This thesis draws upon a range of sources in order to conduct a detailed case study on 
Boko Haram (BH). Two distinct methodological approaches are introduced and used 
in this research. This chapter firstly outlines the use of a case study method, the use of 
documents, a qualitative technique of semi-structured interviews with various experts 
on BH and then the use of statistics. Secondly, it explains the use of the Most Similar 
System Design (MSSD) comparative method for assessing the variation of BH 
violence at a sub-national level. The rationale for using the different methods are 
discussed, as well as their utility to each chapter or level of analysis. 
3.1 Case study on BH 
The rationale for applying a case study method to study the evolution and behaviour 
of BH is that it is an active terrorist group that uses tools of violence similar to those 
of other terrorist groups. Moreover, a case study can incorporate the complexity of BH 
that general arguments related to poverty, pathological or mental abnormalities or 
sustained ideological indoctrination cannot account for. Hence such an approach is 
pertinent in understanding the BH phenomenon through in-depth investigation. Case 
studies can investigate contemporary phenomena within a real-life context empirically, 
and can ensure thorough, in-depth investigations in which a particular instance or 
aspect can be studied (Yin, 2003: 13; Gilbert, 2008:36). A further justification for 
using a case study approach is its flexibility (Yin 2003) and allowance for the 
incorporation of different methods such as interviews or documents, as well as the use 
of numerical data. Such a combination of methods adds strength to a study. 
In a longtitudinal case study, a group is observed over a long period of time. 
This allows for better understanding of for example, a group’s path to violence. 
Depending upon what is being studied, longitudinal cases constitute a major rationale 
for selecting a study (Bryman, 2008: 55-56, Yin 2014:51). Additionally, longitudinal 
studies focus on any change or changes that may occur over time, or how certain 
events and conditions transpire (Yin, 2014: 52-53). Although this research uses a case 
study for a group, an embedded case study approach involving distinct parts has been 
adopted because the study utilises a level of analysis framework to understand changes 
in BH’s behaviour over time. Moreover, studying the influence of an individual, a 
state, a sub-state or any international factors on BH’s choice of violence allows for a 
systematic and comprehensive study of the group.       
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There are several advantages to using BH as a case study. Firstly, the study 
will explain the complexity of BH as a terrorist group. Furthermore, as case studies 
are flexible (Sarantakos, 2013: 227), this will allow for the incorporation of a variety 
of sources and methods in this study. Available sources about BH that are both 
qualitative and quantitative have been employed in this research. The findings of these 
can inform further studies on the rise and motivation of terrorist groups. Such findings 
may be used to challenge some theoretical assumptions within the field of terrorism 
and political violence. The findings will also be important in providing more 
information about linking Salafist ideology to terrorism since BH is a Salafi group. 
Popular opinion suggests that Salafi ideology is linked to terrorism despite several 
different studies suggesting Salafi Jihadism is a subculture of Salafist ideology 
(Sageman, 2004; Wiktorowicz & Khaltenthaler, 2006; Cottee 2010).   
This study has some drawbacks, all of which are common in case studies. Case 
studies have problems with bias in case selection, generalisation and internal validity. 
In order to address any bias, the researcher has ensured that a critical literature review 
has been conducted along with a step-by-step case study protocol being executed in 
order to guarantee robust scientific enquiry. In other words, the case selection has been 
driven by the researcher’s background, but the methodological rigour in the case study 
investigations ensures that biases that may affect the findings are reduced. Moreover, 
the background of the researcher is in fact beneficial to the case study as others may 
not be able to gain similar access to expert interviewees. In terms of generalisation, 
the findings of this study cannot be generalised to other terrorist groups because this 
study only investigates BH. Nonetheless, some of the variables identified could be of 
theoretical importance and thus be incorporated in analysis of other groups. 
Replicating this study may not be possible when it comes to internal validity, i.e. the 
establishment of causal relationships where some conditions lead to others (Yin, 2003: 
34). This is because the interviews are anonymous and the behaviour of terrorist 
groups, including that of BH, changes over time.  
Finally, security risks and access to participants is problematic as BH is an 
active violent group. However, the researcher's background as a Nigerian has helped 
counteract this. The researcher is not only aware of security risks, but can also access 
selected interviewees without a gatekeeper or a fixer being required to connect the 
researcher to the participants and aid in moving around a research location. As 
interview data from participants have been used, a mixed methods approach has been 
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incorporated in order to triangulate all sources of data and to address any weaknesses 
within the interview data.  
3.1.1 Documents 
National and international documents and reports have been used in this study to 
corroborate interview data. In addition, reliable online sources and academic articles 
have been accessed. National documents used include the Nigerian Counter-terrorism 
Terrorism Strategy (NACTEST) 2014 and 2016, the Terrorism Protection Act (TPA) 
(2011 & 2013) and the 2009 document on the resolution of the Da’awah Coordination 
Committee of Nigeria (DCCN). At the time when these documents were obtained, 
they were not in the public domain. In addition, some documents were suggested and 
given to the researcher while others were obtained online by the researcher. How and 
why these documents are used in this thesis is discussed below. 
TPA 2011 was the first Nigerian counter-terrorism (CT) law. However, it had 
numerous shortcomings in terms of administrative structure and prosecution of 
terrorism laws, and TPA 2013 superseded it. The researcher has used these documents 
in chapter six in order to understand the implications of the late enactment of the CT 
laws, as well as the pitfalls of these laws in relation to BH.   
NACTEST 2014 and 2016 have been used in chapter six to discuss CT within 
the Nigerian state. NACTEST 2014 was the first official document in Nigeria to 
outline strategies for addressing terrorism through violent and nonviolent approaches. 
Before the introduction of NACTEST 2014, Nigeria depended heavily on a violent 
approach that dictated the use of force for combating terrorism. Furthermore, 
NACTEST 2016 was used to understand the shortfalls of NACTEST 2014. 
NACTEST 2014 and 2016 have provided the researcher with the opportunity to 
examine the nonviolent approach of Nigeria's CT which outlines psychological and 
non-military ways of ending terrorism.   
The Da’awah Coordination Committee of Nigeria (DCCN) is an umbrella 
body of different Islamic evangelical organisations. The DCCN met with some 
members of BH in 2009 after the BH uprising of that year to try and address the 
increasing radicalisation of BH. The gathering involved a meeting of over 40 
influential Islamic leaders across Nigeria who sought to address BH violence by 
countering their narrative and dialogue. The document obtained from this meeting 
explains BH ideology and its grievances against the Nigerian state. This is available 
to the public and was suggested by one of the interview participants. The DCCN 
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document has been used in chapters four and five to explain BH ideology. The 
researcher was also told about a document called Hazihi Aqeedatun wa minhaju 
Da'awatuna (Our Creed) which the founder of BH used when mobilising and 
recruiting individuals into BH. However, the researcher has been unable to obtain a 
copy of this. 
Non-Nigerian documents such as reports from International Crisis Group 
(ICG), Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch (HRW) have also been used 
as sources of data. The reports of the ICG were used in chapter eight to highlight BH’s 
activities in Cameroon, Chad and Niger Republics. The reports of Amnesty 
International and HRW were more useful in chapter six in discussing the CT of the 
Nigerian government. Data from academic articles, journals and books on BH as well 
as the broader field of terrorism have also been incorporated. These documents are 
used in chapters four to eight where the explanatory variables of this dissertation will 
be further discussed. 
3.1.2 Media sources 
A number of national and international media sources are employed in the chapters of 
this thesis. BH is a topical issue that has gained widespread media reportage. The 
researcher incorporated media sources to highlight BH and Nigerian state activities, 
i.e. CT measures and forces. With regards to BH activities, media sources help with 
research observing the changing tactics of BH. In other words, the researcher has been 
able to notice any such changes in BH incidents through media reporting. For example, 
the reportage of BH activities highlights turning points in BH’s use of firefights, 
suicide bombings and abductions. These events have added more information about 
the dynamics of BH for the researcher to analyse. Using the media, this thesis attempts 
to understand the ideological position of BH (example; page 122), its propaganda 
(example; page 121). The media is also a source to acquire the threat messages 
released by BH and its reaction (example; page 122) to the CT actions of the Nigerian 
government. 
With regards to media reportage about events in the Nigerian state, media 
sources have assisted the researcher in understanding how Nigerian forces operate 
against BH. In addition, they have helped the researcher ascertain whether these are 
consistent with the Nigerian state’s CT approach, as well as the implications of this 
for BH. Through the media, the researcher has also been able to gain insight into the 
views on BH and the Nigerian state held by some Nigerian senior government officials 
 57 
and influential individuals. These opinions have helped in understanding how the 
Nigerian government has reacted to BH and why individuals have joined BH for 
ideological reasons. Moreover, the researcher has used events reported in the media to 
further corroborate this study’s interview data. 
Media reportage has been criticised by scholars for simply falling into terrorist 
group’s traps. Such scholars suggest that reportage and analysis about BH by the 
Nigerian local media in fact promotes BH’s propaganda (Ngige, et, al., 2016), while 
others argue that the reportage and analysis of international media reveals an 
inadequate understanding of BH (Ezeah & Emmanuel, 2016). This research does not 
soley rely on local or international media analysis, but instead incorporates verified 
events reported by leading local (e.g. Daily Trust, Punch and Vanguard) and 
international media (e.g. Aljazeera, BBC and CNN), and then corroborates events with 
other data. Such data is firstly interview data as it helps in interpreting reported events, 
as well as helping support the argument of other scholars with factual examples. 
Secondly, reported events assist in interpreting statistics about BH, and such statistics 
include BH’s intensity of violence (see chapter seven) and casualties (see chapter four).  
3.1.3 Semi-structured elite interviews 
In addition to official documents, this study has drawn on data from a series of semi-
structured interviews. The study explains how the interviews were planned, conducted 
and analysed. Semi-structured interviews are used in this research to generate new 
data on BH. Moreover, they provide a platform from which the researcher has been 
able to interact with influential individuals in order to obtain deeper insight into their 
experience with and views on BH. Previous studies on BH have attributed their rise 
and motivation to Islamism, counter terrorism, structural factors and international 
Jihadism. However, these studies are mostly based on secondary data (Adesoji, 2010 
&2011; Loimeier, 2012; Zenn 2014 a&b). Silke (2004) notes that interviewing 
terrorist groups is a difficult task due to their secretive and violent nature. It would 
have been useful to have been able to gain access to BH members but due to security 
risks, this was not possible.  
The main interview questions in this study sought to investigate the evolution 
of BH. The questions were divided into cause and motivations of BH violence in order 
to start the conversation of the evolution of BH. A question schedule was designed 
with two sections, with each of these containing probing questions (see Appendix 3). 
The participants were also asked if they had different opinions to those expressed 
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within the researcher’s questions. Section one of the interview schedule focused on 
the cause of BH, while section two looked at the motivation behind BH violence. 
Questions about the influence of leadership, group, state and international units were 
asked. The question schedule reflected various levels of analysis.  
A number of scholars highlight the importance of semi-structured and elite 
interviews. Kvale (1996:14) suggests that, “the qualitative research interview is a 
construction site for knowledge, it is literally an inter-view, inter-change of views 
between two persons conversing about a theme of mutual interest.” A semi-structured 
interview usually specifies a set of questions, with the interviewer retaining the 
leverage to “probe beyond the answer for clarification and elaboration” (May 2011: 
135).  
Lilleker (2003:207) posits that, “elites can be loosely defined as those with 
close proximity to power or policy making" which may include leaders of 
organisations beyond the confines of politics. Richards (1996: 1999) sees elites as a 
group of people who hold or who once held a position of authority. Additionally, 
Richards (1996: 200) argues that elite interviewing “helps you to understand the 
context, set the tone, or establish the atmosphere, of the area you are researching.” 
These views describe the group of participants selected for this research project. 
Elite interviews conducted with senior state officials, local negotiators and 
experts on BH were pertinent in understanding the anatomy and thinking of BH since 
it was impossible to interview BH members themselves (see Appendix 1). Thus these 
interviews have been helpful in interpreting events and factors that have influenced 
BH. These interviews are important to this study because some of the experts 
interviewed had overseen the making of laws and policies for the Nigerian state and 
its institutions, particularly within the security sector. As a result, they were in a 
position to explain how government decisions influenced BH violence.  
It is important to emphasise that interviewing these elites has provided new 
information that is not available in other existing studies on BH. Though the media 
does on occasion interview participants (senior state officials), the information they 
then release may be limited due to security risks or the fear of causing public fear. 
Moreover, interviews with state officials were important for this study because they 
were able to explain the reasons for the Nigerian state’s actions against BH. In addition, 
some of the data obtained from the interviewees also further corroborated events and 
documents incorporated in this study.     
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Elite interviews come with problems of reliability. The issue of reliability 
relates to whether a study can be replicated easily. This study cannot be replicated 
easily because the interviewees’ memories may fade on certain issues due to 
increasing occurrences of BH activities. Moreover, accessing the interviewees again 
could be problematic for study replication due to guaranteed anonymity; participants 
cannot be approached to answer similar questions again because their details are 
confidential. Lilleker (2003: 208) observes that since interviews have severe 
limitations particularly with regards to reliability, one of the ways to address this is to 
support interviews with other sources of empirical data such as documents and books. 
Another issue that has been addressed is the researcher’s background and 
positionality as these could pose bias. The researcher is Nigerian, but his background 
adds strength to the study because the researcher had access to information which non-
Nigerians may not have had access to. The researcher’s positionality on BH is that it 
is a movement inspired by radical interpretations of Islam by a few individuals. The 
researcher’s opinion about BH’s evolution is derived from the group’s changing 
behaviour, which is dependent on the group’s desire to achieve its goal. This goal is a 
crusade to establish its ideology and control within its community of origin, as well as 
its surrounding environment. The researcher’s belief about BH participants is that they 
have knowledge about Nigeria and BH that helps give a more rounded picture of BH. 
However, the researcher remains mindful about the accuracy of participants, and so a 
number of sources were applied to verify and triangulate the interview data. 
Regardless of the researcher’s opinion, the researcher has adopted a critical assessment 
as well as a systematic approach to investigating BH in order to arrive at an informed 
rather than speculative understanding of the group. 
3.1.3.1 Selection of participants 
22 participants were identified based on their engagement in dialogue with BH. Some 
of these participants were senior government officials in the three most BH-affected 
Nigerian states. Some were Islamic scholars with extensive knowledge of Islamic 
theology, with some also having access to BH. In addition, some participants were key 
government officials in the security sector. Importantly, some participants had been 
involved in the drafting of Nigeria’s CT policies. Previous interviews and public 
comments by other potential participants were also considered to ensure objectivity 
on issues.  
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3.1.3.2 Interview process 
After obtaining ethical approval for fieldwork (i.e. conducting interviews), interviews 
were conducted in Nigeria between June and September 2015. For security reasons, 
North-eastern Nigeria was excluded as a potential interview location. No gatekeeper 
or third party was involved in meeting interview participants due to the sensitive 
nature of the research topic. Interview requests were sent to seven interview targets 
through their secretaries. One participant received a request via the researcher’s email 
address (see Appendix 2 for sample letter). A total number of 14 potential interviewees 
were approached face-to-face in their offices. When a face-to-face contact was 
initiated, an interview request letter was given to the potential participant. In line with 
Lilleker's suggestions (2003: 209), this letter contained concise explanations of: what 
the research was about, why they were selected and the nature of the questions they 
would be asked. Moreover, issues of confidentiality, privacy and anonymity of the 
potential interviewees were discussed with the researcher giving assurances of secrecy.      
Out of the 22 potential participants that were contacted, three declined, four 
did not respond and five had a busy schedule and kept on postponing. Though several 
attempts to recruit female participants were made, this proved particularly difficult 
and as a result, the gender balance of interview participants is skewed. In total, the 
researcher interviewed 10 participants.  
In terms of religion and origins of the participants, five of the 10 are 
Christians, with two participants from Northcentral and Northeast Nigeria, and one 
from Southwest Nigeria. The five other participants are Muslims, with two Muslims 
from the Northeast and Northwest of Nigeria, and one from the Northcentral area. 
From the six ‘geo-political’ zones of Nigeria, the participants represent four 
zones. Non-Nigerians usually classify Nigeria as North and South. While this is not 
an incorrect classification, it is simplistic as the majority of Nigerians further classify 
the country into ‘six geo-political zones’. The North consists of the Northcentral, 
Northeast and Northwest, while the South consists of the Southeast, Southwest and 
Southsouth (Paden, 2008). Four of this study’s participants are from Northeast, three 
from Northcentral, two from Northwest and one from the Southwest. The North is the 
only region that is affected by BH, and most especially the Northeast (GTD). As noted 
above, the participants were selected because of their influential roles in government 
or as negotiators. Four participants are directly involved in enacting laws and drafting 
CT policies, four others are former government officials, and there is an Islamic cleric 
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appointed by a government committee to negotiate with BH. Two others are conflict 
negotiators and security consultants who have had contact with BH. The data obtained 
from these interviews has more strength in terms of understanding the thinking of 
government officials about BH than on BH’s perspectives. The researcher was unable 
to get first-hand information about BH because of the researcher’s inability to talk to 
BH directly. However, this weakness was addressed by comments about BH from the 
media, and these supported the information given by the interview participants. This 
thesis is therefore able to make a strong contribution to understanding the 
government’s views of and subsequent actions against BH. 
Interview locations were decided between the researcher and the participants. 
The locations were confirmed as Lafia, Abuja, Minna, Kaduna, Zaria Wamba and Jos. 
Before starting each interview, participants signed an informed consent form and were 
given opportunities to clarify any doubts or ask any questions they had about the 
research. Interviews were recorded, transcribed and stored securely (see sample of 
consent form in Appendix 4).  
3.1.3.3 Coding 
For analysing interview data, the researcher used QSR Nvivo 10 software to code the 
interview transcripts. Moreover, the interview data were coded using priori and 
posteriori methods of coding. Priori approach requires a researcher to insert into 
already established codes, whereas posteriori are codes generated from emergent 
issues within the interview data (Punch, 2014: 27). Yin (2003) suggests that interviews 
should be rigorously examined in order not to lose the originality of the interview data 
through carelessness or bias (2003). Given Yin’s (2003) emphasis, a hybrid of both 
priori and posteriori was adopted for analysing the interview data. 
To use the priori approach, the researcher created codes from the research 
problem, research questions, units of analysis and empirical arguments about the cause 
and motivation of terrorism in the literature of terrorism studies. These codes included 
the role of poverty, religion, CT and individual and international influences in the 
emergence and growth of BH.  
For the posteriori approach, the researcher generated codes from emergent 
themes within the interview transcripts. The generated codes included determinants of 
target selection, the spillover of BH violence to countries in the Lake Chad region and 
public reaction to BH. The researcher created sub-codes within the codes; for instance, 
under the code ‘recruitment and motivation,’ sub-codes such as conscription, 
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economic benefit, ideological indoctrination and evangelism, willing recruitment and 
spiritual initiations were created.  
3.2 Use of statistics 
In addition to other sources of data, statistical data from the Global Terrorism Database 
(GTD) and the National Bureau of Statistics (NBS) were incorporated in this study. 
The statistics were used at a disaggregate level in chapters four, six, seven and eight. 
Data extracted from GTD were used to explain the intensity of violence as well 
as targeting patterns of BH. GTD is an open online source database with 150,000 
recorded incidents. It stores information about targets, casualties and weapon types 
related to major terrorist groups or individuals globally. It has information about 
terrorist groups dating back to the 1970s and adds new statistics annually. For this 
thesis, the researcher collected data on BH attacks and casualties between 2009 and 
2015 because 2009 was the first year the group appeared in GTD’s dataset. In addition, 
2015 was the year when BH became the deadliest terrorist group in the world (Global 
Terrorism Index, 2015). In terms of reliability of the GTD dataset, GTD systematically 
collects data from open media sources around the world. GTD data have been used in 
chapters four, six, seven and eight. In chapter four, GTD statistics were incorporated 
to empirically illustrate the possible influence of different BH leadership in the 
variation of BH violence. In chapter six, Nigeria's CT efforts and BH’s responses have 
been discussed with GTD data measuring the intensity of BH’s responses. In chapter 
seven, data on BH attacks were used to conduct a comparative analysis on the 
frequency of incidences in the three most affected states of Nigeria, Adamawa, Borno 
and Yobe. In chapter eight, GTD statistics were used to quantify the spillover of 
violence to Nigerian neighbouring countries in the Lake Chad region including 
Cameroon, Chad and the Niger Republics. 
The National Bureau of Statistics (NBS) is the official agency in Nigeria that 
gathers and publishes data about different sectors of Nigeria. Such data include 
economic indices, demographics and geographical indices. Available statistics from 
the NBS were sourced from the Knoema website and obtained from the NBS office in 
Nigeria. Knoema is a website that collates official data from different sectors (such as 
demographics, agriculture, etc.) from different countries. The statistics were useful in 
a comparative study of Adamawa, Borno and Yobe - are the states most affected by 
BH. Indices on population, adult literacy levels, unemployment, poverty, child labour, 
and landmass were incorporated to illustrate the level of deprivation in these three 
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states. The statistics obtained from the NBS were between 2006 and 2011. There were 
insufficient statistical data about the indicators of deprivation between 2009 and 2015. 
However, the available statistics (2006-2011) are significant because they cover the 
early stages of BH’s campaign of violence. Moreover, they indicate data similarities 
between Adamawa, Borno and Yobe. These indicators often change slowly over time 
rather than varying every month.  
3.3 Comparative analysis: most similar system design (MSSD)  
Chapter seven of this study includes a comparative analysis of the three most 
frequently targeted states in Nigeria. The study incorporates a small N approach, more 
specifically the most similar system design (MSSD) of comparison. MSSD is applied 
in chapter seven. It is used to examine and compare target patterns and variations in 
target type frequencies at a sub-national level. Landman (2003: 405 &406) suggests 
that in selecting comparable cases, efficiency, relevance and generalisations are the 
three most important things to be considered. The researcher also emphasises that the 
selection of cases could be determined by a research proposition and logic of 
comparison. Landman (2003) further argues that selection should also be guided by 
what the researcher wants to compare as well as what the researcher needs to know. 
Moreover, MSSD required the researcher to gain substantial information about the 
geographical locations to be studied in order to consider how similar they are. 
Additionally, these areas were picked because of how relevant they were to explaining 
the control variable (factors) of a phenomenon (Landman, 2003: 408) Such factors 
included size, population, economy, ideology and climate (ibid). MSSD allows for 
comparison between two and five cases using one explanatory variable (Keman, 2014). 
The researcher selected Adamawa, Borno and Yobe as the cases to be 
investigated because they are three of the most BH affected states in Nigeria. These 
states have several commonalities. They have similar populations, religions and ethnic 
compositions as well as being similar in size, economies, education and deprivation 
indices. The researcher has adopted frequencies of target types in each state as 
dependent variables, while reasons for attack frequency variation (i.e BH’s capacity 
to attack) for different target types have been used as explanatory variables. 
Like other sources of data, MSSD has drawbacks. Some of these have been 
pointed out by Landman (2003), who suggests that MSSD is limited by weak 
inferences and findings because it is less rigorous as a result of limited methods to 
support it. In terms of rigour, statistics and interview data have been used in order to 
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support MSSD by empirically explaining the variation in the frequency of BH attacks 
across the three states of Adamawa, Borno and Yobe. Moreover, the statistics gave 
the researcher the opportunity to draw inferences for analysis. 
3.4 Chapter conclusion  
This chapter has explained how and why the methods used for this thesis are 
systematically applied. It highlights the strengths and drawbacks of each method and 
where appropriate, how these have been addressed. Moreover, this chapter explains 
how the strengths of different methods give more rigour to this thesis because the 
methods complement each other through triangulation. For example, interviews were 
supported with documents, MSSD was corroborated by statistics and the BH case 
study was grounded with mixed methods. The following chapters contain the levels 
of analysis and illustrate how the methods in this chapter have been realised. The 
subsequent chapters, which are the levels of analysis chapters, also review related 
literature within the broader field of terrorism and political violence. For example, 
chapter four examines BH individual leadership and also reviews relevant literature 
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Chapter 4: Leadership Influence 
The previous chapter justified broader sources of data and methods being applied 
when carrying out this research and discussed the application of these within this thesis. 
Accordingly, this chapter lays the foundation for discussing the different levels of 
analysis of this dissertation by examining the individual level explanation of BH. It 
looks at how and why different individual leaders have contributed to organising group 
violence, and attempts to highlight how individual leaders influence BH violence. It 
also investigates why BH members cooperate with their leaders by becoming agents 
of atrocities. Moreover, the implications of leadership decapitation on BH and its 
campaign of violence are highlighted, along with how changes in leadership have 
affected the intensity and repertoire of BH violence. 
In order to understand the dynamics of individual influence on BH, this chapter 
discusses BH under its five key leaders. Since its emergence, BH has had five leaders: 
Mohammed Yusuf, the founder of the movement, and his successors Maman Nur, 
Abubakar Shekau, Mahamat Daoud and Abu Musab al-Barnawi, who have 
subsequently sustained the movement. Additionally, the influence of some senior and 
intermediary members of BH such as Khalid al-Barnawi, Adam Kambar, Kabiru 
Sokoto and Abu Mohammed who have also impacted on the rise and spread of the 
group will be discussed.  
Individual leadership has played a fundamental role in the emergence, survival 
and use of violence by BH. More significantly, the internal leadership dynamics have 
influenced the birth of BH as well as impacted upon the group’s levels of violence 
(Zenn, 2014b). Previous studies have shed some light into internal disputes and the 
lower level operatives of BH, but the role of individual leadership has not been widely 
examined. Zenn (2014b) and Pantucci & Jesperson (2015) have examined internal 
disputes between the key leaders who have divided the group. In other words, their 
study accounts for leadership disputes among the disciples of Mohammed Yusuf, 
founder of the movement. Both of these studies also considered the influence of senior 
figures and intermediary leaders on the activities of the movement. These studies are 
inadequate however, because they do not highlight ideological and theoretical factors 
that explain the relationships between the leadership and followers of other violent 
groups in Nigeria aside from BH. 
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This chapter illustrates that a leader- and follower-relationship, along with the 
influence of individual leadership in violence variation, is attributable to a number of 
factors. These factors include eschatological belief, leadership decapitation (targeted 
killing of leaders) and individual differences. In order to critically examine BH, a wide 
range of literature has been reviewed in order to understand the complexity of the 
group. Numerous studies exist about leader- and follower-relationships in civil wars 
within terrorism literature. In order to understand the relationships between leaders 
and followers as well as the influence of individual leadership on BH, this chapter will 
briefly review both theoretical and empirical studies on leadership and follower-
relationships in order to understand the context of this study. In addition, it will also 
link BH to a number of theological arguments as to why individuals remain loyal to 
violent movements.  
Studies on the leadership of violent groups look at leadership influence through 
different perspectives such as principals and agents, authentic leadership, leadership 
splinters and ethnic entrepreneurs. With regards to principals and agents, Weinstein 
(2007) categorises rebel organisations as either resource-wealthy or resource-poor. 
Resource-wealthy organisations attract individuals in search of economic benefits. 
They also tend to exert more indiscriminate violence against civilians because they 
have access to a plethora of resources from firstly, foreign sponsorship and secondly, 
natural resources (which also give them control of their agents). Weinstein (2007) 
argues that resource-poor organisations attract individuals who are motivated by 
political ideology or ethnic and religious identity. Resource-poor organisations tend 
to cooperate more with non-combatants, and this reduces the tendency for 
indiscriminate violence against civilian populations. BH cannot be described as either 
resource-wealthy or resource-poor because it receives funding from foreign sponsors, 
as well as engaging in criminality such as bank robbery and drug and human 
trafficking across Nigeria (Zenn 2014a). BH also applies political ideology (political 
Islam) and ethnic identity to attract members (Barkindo, 2016). However, Weinstein 
(2007) sees its violence as an unintended consequence of a lack of group discipline. 
This claim is similar to Mitchell’s (2004) argument about the relationship between 
principals and agents of violence, with Mitchell also positing that, “agents of atrocities 
are motivated not only by a movement’s leadership directives, but are also enticed by 
their selfish gratification for rape, revenge and loot” (p. 42). Mitchell also suggests 
that looting may be attractive to both the leadership and agents of a group as, “(the 
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loot) may well be shared among the commanders who may then use it to support their 
soldiers in battle” (p. 50).  Mitchell (2004) adds the caveat that the, “corrupt 
motivations of both leaders and agents of violent organisations may be at variance if 
there is low esprit de corps and pay for the agents.”  
With regards to the aspect of authentic leadership, Gurr (2015) conducted an 
extensive study to highlight the nature of legitimacy of leadership among followers. 
He argues that a group’s capacity for collective action depends on major factors such 
as the prominence of group identity, pre-existing organisational structures and 
authentic leaders who manage coalitions as well as direct and regulate a movement’s 
activities. He further notes that leadership is crucial in the process of mobilisation of 
individuals and that it requires, “a set of skills whose effectiveness depends on context, 
not a manual of organisational behaviour or a body of nationalist doctrine” (2015: 
111). Moreover, authentic leaders are perceived by their followers as advocating and 
representing the core values and aspirations of their movement. However, Gurr (2015) 
emphasises that authenticity varies and that a leader can lose or gain it through their 
position. Authentic leaders control resources, are symbols of a group’s identity, 
command pre-existing loyalties and have sufficient influence to address a group’s 
constraints. Furthermore, the legitimacy of authentic leaders may be relinquished or 
weakened by their words or actions and as such, alternative leaders or other influential 
figures may seek to capitalise on any errors made by in-position authentic leaders. 
Hence, this chapter seeks to explain how BH reflects such an ontological position as 
outlined by Gurr (2015).  
Further arguments about leadership suggest that it plays a crucial role in the 
splintering of groups. Such studies argue that disagreements between leaders of a 
movement can lead to the splintering of a movement. Such disagreements could be 
based upon goal differences between leaders, which could be either ideological or non-
ideological (Seybolt, 1999; Bueno de Mesquita, 2008). There could be disagreements 
over strategy and modes of operation (della Porta, 1995; Cunningham, 2011), or as a 
result of military pressure from the state (DeNardo 1985). Moroever, disagreements 
could be related to the support or rejection of peace processes or foreign support 
(Cunningham, 2011). Literature on ethnic conflicts suggests that ethnic entrepreneurs 
or elites also serve as mobilising forces for violence. Some arguments suggest that in 
weaker states, ethnic entreprenuers promote myths and memories to engender fear 
and/or violence in their quest for legitimacy (De Maio, 2009). Another argument posits 
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that ethnic entreprenuers forge group ideologies in order to incite ethnic hatred by 
interpreting their own ethnic group’s grievances against other ethnic groups through 
collective violence (Kuafman, 2000).  
An eschatological argument by scholars is needed in order to understand BH 
within the context of authentic leadership as espoused by Gurr (2015). From a 
theological perspective, Yusuf’s legitimacy may have been supported by apocalyptic 
and/or eschatological beliefs or goals. In this context, apocalyptic goals or ideas refer 
to interpretations of religious scriptures and the use of large-scale violence and 
destruction to instigate ‘end-of-the-world’ feelings. These feelings stimulate the need 
for religious obligation by ideologically-bonded people. Rapoport (1987) suggests that 
apocalyptic terrorists are inspired by the notion that a messiah will come at the end of 
time. Similarly, Mayer (2001:369) suggests that apocalyptic imagining is a major 
motivation for terrorism in cults and new religious movements but in itself does not 
elicit violence, with groups such as Al-Qaeda only adopting violence as a reaction to 
millennialism, real-world threats and in-fighting.  
Explaining the influence of terrorist organisational leadership is essential to 
understanding how members of terrorist groups are organised for the use of strategic 
violence. Moreover, understanding BH’s leadership influence also provides 
information for analysing the implications of leadership decapitation on the survival, 
unity and overall use of violence by a terrorist group. Leadership decapitation tactics 
refer to the counter-terrorism (CT) strategy of targeted killing or the capturing of 
terrorist group leaders, with the aim being to destabilise and end their operations. The 
effectiveness of leadership decapitation is divided into two conflicting views. Firstly, 
some argue that decapitation reduces the intensity of violence because it deters others, 
thereby creating turmoil within a terrorist organisation (Jordan 2009: 721; David 
2002). Secondly, it is counter-argued that decapitation facilitates more recruitment and 
therefore increases motivation among individuals for violence because it draws more 
public sympathy among moderates who share a similar ideology to a violent group 
and it exasperates and ultimately triggers group members to violence (Cronin, 2006: 
22). 
This chapter adds to the existing body of literature by applying both theoretical 
and theological explanations to BH’s leadership influences. It does this by explaining 
the relationship between leaders and followers and the influence of different 
leadership to variations in violence. It also contributes to the general argument on 
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leadership decapitation. This chapter uses statistics obtained from the Global 
Terrorism Database (GTD) to account for the role of individual leadership in the 
intensity and pattern of BH violence between 2009 and 2015. The chapter is organised 
into two sections and begins by discussing individual leaders Mohammed Yusuf and 
his creation of BH, Maman Nur, Abubakar Shekau and factions within BH, Mahamat 
Daoud, Abu Musab al-Barnawi and other key leadership figures. This is followed by 
an examination of the implications of leadership change on BH and notably, leadership 
is discussed according to the succession of BH leaders. Mohammed Yusuf and 
Abubakar Shekau are the most prominent and widely discussed BH leaders in the 
media. Mohammed Yusuf is significant to the movement because he established it as 
well as the pre-existing loyalty that Gurr (2015) notes. It is important to state that this 
chapter only discusses Abukar Shekau between 2009 and 2015, this being the time 
period that this thesis investigates. Events suggest that Shekau was replaced as a BH 
leader but subsequently resurfaced, and the sections below analyse this. 
4.1 Mohammed Yusuf and the creation of BH  
Firstly, this section outlines a narrative about Mohammed Yusuf and how he founded 
BH and recruited his followers. The section also highlights Yusuf’s leadership 
qualities and how he established loyalty amongst his followers through theological 
support.  
Mohammed Yusuf and his successors are interchangeably called Sheikh, 
Imam or Amir. Mohammed Yusuf established the BH movement and first named it 
the Yusufiyya Movement (after his own name). Yusuf was born on 29 January 1970 in 
Girgir Village, Yobe state, North-East Nigeria (Kalu, 2011), and he was known for his 
charisma and oratory prowess (Dibal, 2009). He started the BH movement in 2002 
(Loimeier 2012; Mohammed 2014) and led the group through its embryonic stage by 
mobilising people through preaching. Yusuf had violent confrontations with the 
Nigerian authorities because of his quest to implement a strict version of Sharia law 
(Agbiboa, 2013a). He also engaged in battle with the Nigerian state because he felt 
betrayed by the former governor of Borno state (further discussed in chapter six) 
(African Spotlight, 2016). After violent confrontations with Nigerian security forces, 
Yusuf fled to Saudi Arabia and did not return until 2003 (Mohammed, 2013). 
After exile, Yusuf returned to Nigeria to revive and spread his ideology. His 
return from exile invoked a period of intensive radicalisation within the Borno and 
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Yobe axis of Northeast Nigeria (Mohammed, 2014: 10; Zenn, 2014a: 5). Yusuf 
mobilised people who were either economically-challenged with few opportunities or 
were convinced by his theological arguments. Numerous messages by Yusuf were 
passed via audio cassettes, CDs and pamphlets (Loimeier 2012: 148). He wrote 
materials containing the creed of BH (from Tamiyyah's philosophy) and used these to 
mobilise and radicalise individuals. He also used a document written in Arabic called 
Hazihi Aqeedatun wa Minhaju Da’awatuna (Our Creed) (Mohammed, 2014: 18) as 
the guiding principle of his movement. Participant Two (A member of the former 
Presidential Committee on BH who is knowledgeable in Islamic theology) confirms 
the use of this document by saying: 
I read a pamphlet entitled Hazihi Aqeedatun wa Minhaju Da’awatuna – these 
are our tenets, what we believe, what we want to achieve and why we disagree 
with the people or other Muslims. That is a rough translation of the title of the 
booklet. 
During Participant Three’s visit with some incarcerated BH members, there was 
conversation about books that might be similar to the document Participant Two is 
referring to. Furthermore, Mohammed (2014: 11 & 14) attempts to explain how Yusuf 
used written doctrine to mobilise his followers, and he argues that: 
This suggests that there is a range of literature that has helped shape BH’s 
ideology over time. Yusuf’s followers and students (almajirai) received 
instructions from his mosque, which he called Markaz ibn Taymiyyah 
(Mohammed, 2014: 14) and which was the centre for the promotion of 
Taymiyya's philosophy. Yusuf preached on four specific topics: first, he talked 
about idolatry (taghut) which deals with secularism and democracy; secondly, 
he admonished his followers for following Western education and 
Westernisation; thirdly, he reprimanded those working for an un-Islamic 
government; and fourthly, his teachings rejected the public, local Islamic 
scholars (ulama) and his former colleagues in the Wahhabi group in Borno for 
referring to his group (BH) as rebellious Muslims (Kharijism) (Mohammed, 
2014:11). 
Yusuf and his followers had a number of confrontations with the Nigerian forces over 
civil offences (see chapter six for further details). As a result of the intense and violent 
face off between the Nigerian forces on 26th July 2009, BH instigated a violent 
uprising that affected Maiduguri, Yobe and Bauchi in the Northeast of the country. On 
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29th of July, Nigerian security agents invaded Yusuf’s house in Maiduguri to arrest 
him (Aljazeera, 2010). The Nigerian police claimed that Mohammed Yusuf was shot 
dead in a gunfire exchange when he tried to escape. However, in February 2010, 
Aljazeera (2010) video footage showed the dead body of Mohammed Yusuf with 
handcuffs on. The video caused extensive criticism of the Nigerian authorities, as it 
seemed likely that they had engaged in extra judicial killing and/or the torture of Yusuf. 
With regards to leadership qualities, Yusuf had a cult-like following and the 
BH movement was built around him. He also had all the present-day leaders, including 
Abubakar Shekau, as his disciples (BBC 2014b). Regardless of any Islamic schism 
between radical and non-radical Muslims, it is traditional for leaders or theologians to 
have their movements named after them; for instance, Wahhabiyya emanates from the 
theologian Muhammad ibn Abd al-Wahhab, Ahamadiyya comes from Mirza Ghulam 
Ahmad and the Tijaniyyah Movement is from Sīdī 'Aḥmad al-Tijānī's ideology. Hence, 
it is important to note that this may be the reason why BH started as the Yusufiyya 
Movement, derived from the name of its founder Mohammed Yusuf.  
Leaders also encourage their acceptance by their followers by referring to 
Quran 4:59, which says: "O you believe, obey God and obey the messenger and also 
those in charge among you.” This verse has different interpretations with the belief of 
it in part explaining why personalities such as Khomeini, Bin Laden, El-zakzaky and 
Yusuf had cult-like status within their various movements. Moreover, this verse is 
used by some leaders in Northern Nigeria to command loyalty from their followers 
through the famous saying in the Hausa language, "bin na gaba, bin Allah" (loyalty to 
leaders is obedience to God) (Aminiya, 2014). 
From a theological perspective, Yusuf’s legitimacy may be supported by 
apocalyptic and/or eschatological beliefs or goals. The apocalyptic argument can be 
linked to BH by understanding the philosophy of Mujaddid (reformer or reviver) and 
Mahdi. Abu Dawud, Musnad and Bayhaqi’s Hadiths (documented reports of the life 
of the Prophet Mohammed) report that the concept of Mujaddid is built on the belief 
that at the turn of every century, a person will emerge who will revive the Deen 
(Islamic religion) (Ahmad, 2014). This belief has two major interpretations: non-
takfiri (a takfiri is a Muslim who accuses other Muslims of apostasy) Muslims 
construe it as the act of being in harmony with modern day reality whereas leaders of 
takfiri groups use it to justify violence. Indeed, violent Islamists view it as a revival of 
the Deen (religion) to its original form through fighting (Ahmad, 2014).  
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The concept of Mahdi is often confused with Mujaddid. Mahdism is the 
eschatological belief by Muslims that at the end of the world, a redeemer or Mahdi 
(rightly-guided one) will come at the same time as Jesus Christ (Prophet Isa) comes. 
Together, they will fight and kill the anti-Christ (Dajjal) and his followers (Lambert, 
2013: 199). The Mujaddid belief is applicable to Islamic radicalism. In the history of 
Islam, several Islamic theologians and jurists such as Al Ghazali, Abdul Quadir 
Geelani and Ibn-e-Arabi and the BH's role model, Ibn Taymiyya were seen as 
Mujjadid. In the 21st century, some Takfiri groups and Islamic scholars across the 
world saw Osama Bin Laden as the Mujaddid and the eschatological Moses, whose 
mission was to liberate Muslims from the clutches of the United States (US), who they 
saw as being led by a modern-day ‘pharaoh’ (the American government and its forces) 
(Weimann, 2015; Flannery, 2015:102). This concept to some extent explains the 
acceptance of Al Qaeda by similar ideologues across different continents. 
The concept of Mujaddid is fuzzy and subject to different interpretations. It is 
uncertain whether the reformer will come for the entire world, or if there will be a 
reformer in each part of the world to address the needs and aspirations of every distinct 
region (Ahmad, 2014). For example, the history of Islamic radicalism in Northern 
Nigeria reflects this belief. Usman dan Fodio was referred to as the Mujaddid for the 
jihad (war) he led in 1900. According to some scholars (Isa, 2010), the jihad was aimed 
at reforming the Hausa societies from un-Islamic practices. Following the death of dan 
Fodio, the weakening of his dynasty and the advent of the British colonial masters, the 
Mahdiyya movement emerged as a continuation of his reform and waged an 
unsuccessful war against the British. In the 1970s, members of the Maitasine 
movement saw their leader as Mahdi, even though he claimed to be a prophet (Adesoji, 
2011). Given this, it is reasonable to argue that some BH members still see their 
leaders as Mujaddid. Moreover, BH recruits may see their leaders as those destined to 
rescue them from the Nigerian ‘pharaohs’ (the Nigerian government and its forces), 
and this apocalyptic thinking may have motivated some members of BH to fight, kill 
and die for their cause. 
Regarding leadership functions, I would argue that even though a BH leader 
consults with other leaders (this is discussed in detail later), he enjoys a centralised 
power both politically and spiritually. He stands as Amir and Imam and plays a 
spiritual role in the nourishing of the minds of the faithful, as well as offering spiritual 
direction (Henry, 1993: 30). This is why for example, Yusuf through his oratory 
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prowess was instrumental in the radicalisation of members of BH. He was functioning 
as an Amir, and an Amir functions as a leader or commander of a movement, society 
or country who has been elected to lead a mission (Ibn Taymiyyah, 1300). 
Apart from organising violence, BH leaders also take part in direct 
confrontations. BH was in fact united under Yusuf (2002-2009) and he enjoyed a 
harmonious relationship with his disciples. His death and subsequent succession by 
Shekau created significant internal divisions. Mohammed Yusuf’s style of leadership 
attracted unity and coherence that can be explained by Gurr’s notion of authentic 
leadership (2015), in direct contrast to that of Shekau. Moreover, Yusuf exhibited the 
qualities of authentic leadership through his oratory powers and use of personal 
resources, which encouraged his followers to believe entirely in his cause. After his 
return from exile, he endeared himself to large numbers of people with his preaching. 
He also donated substantial amounts of money to charity and was included in several 
violent face offs with Nigerian forces (Walker, 2016). The combination of these 
factors reflects Gurr’s argument (2015) about leadership gaining legitimacy through 
action and deeds.  
Yusuf’s narrative shows that he was an authentic leader who was confident, 
assertive and resilient. Significantly, Yusuf did not give preferential treatment to his 
Kanuri tribe as Shekau did to his (Zenn, 2014a). He organised his followers through 
‘morals’ (the BH creed), and his preaching prepared the minds of his supporters by 
invoking the firm sense of identity and awareness against the ‘un-Islamic and infidel 
nature’ of Nigerians (Loimeier, 2012). He also encouraged BH supporters to be 
tenacious in the face of ‘persecutions’. Hence it is fair to say that this kept the unity 
and balance of BH as a group. Similarly, Gurr (2015) argues that communal leaders 
or leaders of movements are seen as authentic by their followers when their actions, 
thoughts and behaviours reflect the significant, “values and aspirations of the group” 
(p.111). Thus, the actions of leaders must also conform to the common interest of the 
movement. For these reasons, Mohammed Yusuf was seen by his followers as an 
authentic leader, and his disciples remained loyal to him because of scriptural 
interpretations and his practical approach to leadership. It is crucial to note that the 
kind of pre-existing loyalty Gurr (2015) espouses was created by Yusuf’s leadership 
style. As the founder of BH, Yusuf provided the pre-existing loyalty within BH 
organisation for his successors. In other words, Yusuf established a movement 
 74 
whereby his successors assumed their positions of power without any perceived 
legitimacy difficulties from the group’s followers (Zenn, 2014a).   
4.2 Maman Nur 
This section discusses the emergence of Maman Nur as a BH interim leader, his 
subsequent exile and return and the implications this had on BH and Nigeria. Nur’s 
exile and return intensified BH’s connection with Al Qaeda, but also caused an internal 
rift within BH.   
At the time of Yusuf's death in 2009, Nur served as interim leader of BH from 
being third-in-command in the movement. He became the leader because Shekau, who 
was second-in-command, was recovering from gunshot wounds while in custody with 
the Nigerian security forces (CEP). Nur was born to a Chadian family in 1976 in the 
capital of Borno state, Maiduguri (Kalu 2011). He was a student of theology in 
Maiduguri but dropped out to join BH (ibid). He led the group when most BH 
members had fled to neighbouring countries or had been detained (Umar, 2012: 128). 
Nur remained in charge until July 2010 (Kalu, 2011), but left Nigeria because he was 
unable to withstand the battle against the Nigerian forces.  
Nur’s escape enabled him to acquire new skills and establish international 
connections. He was in exile in Chad and from there went to Somalia where he met 
with leaders of Al-Shabaab, AQIM, and AQAP, received training and established 
international connections (Kalu, 20ll; Zenn, 2014b: 22).  Nur’s international 
connections informed his choice of victims - Westerners and non-Muslims. His targets 
were the opposite of Shekau's as he attacked indiscriminately, regardless of religion. 
In 2011, Nur returned to Nigeria and masterminded the bombing of the United Nations 
(UN) building in Abuja under the banner of BH. Zenn (2014b) argues that this was 
significant because of his meeting with Al Murabitoon leader, Mokhtar Belmoktar. 
Belmoktar is a notorious terrorist and staunch loyalist of Al-Qaeda leader Ayman al-
Zawahiri (Joscelyn, 2015). Nur was also accused of involvment in the bombing of the 
police headquarters in Abuja in June 2011. 
Nur’s return from exile was significant to the splintering of BH. He broke away 
from BH and formed the Ansaru (Ansarul Muslimina Fi Biladis Sudan’ - the 
‘Vanguards for the Protection of Muslims in Black Africa’ - which is made up 
predominately of Hausa tribe members (Mohammed, 2014). Before Ansaru broke 
away, there was disagreement between Shekau and Nur over who was competent to 
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lead BH. This disagreement may have been unconnected to Nur's desire to reclaim the 
leadership of BH, which he had held before his exile (Pantucci & Jesperson, 2015). 
Nur's Ansaru supporters argued that Nur was competent because he had more foreign 
links than Shekau (CEP; Pantucci & Jesperson, 2015) Moreover, Ansaru's grievances 
against Shekau were due to his preferential treatment of the Kanuri tribe over the 
Hausas. Although Nur has not been captured or killed, he has not been heard of in the 
media since the 2012 Ansaru secession. 
The emergence and exile of Nur is significant when looking at the resurgence 
of BH as it highlights the implications of decapitation on the group. Historically, 
decapitation of leaderships within violent groups such as Maitasine (1970s-1980) and 
the Islamic Movement of Nigeria (1979-1999) by the Nigerian government have been 
relatively successful. However, the war against BH gives a contrary narrative about 
the effect of Nigeria’s leadership decapitation strategy. Arugably, the killing of Yusuf 
by Nigerian forces was intended to scatter his followers and ultimately end the 
movement. The proponents of leadership decapitation (Jordan, 2009: 721; David, 
2002) argue that it destabilises and causes divisions within violent movements which 
ultimately lead to the ending of the group. The killing of Yusuf and the manhunt for 
Nur in fact provided an opportunity for a deadlier BH leader to rise (Pantucci & 
Jesperson, 2015). While it did cause division within the movement, the divisions 
increased the intensity of violence in Nigeria, created more international linkages for 
BH and the division of the attention of the Nigerian forces fighting BH. This failure 
of the intended results of decapitation is proven under Abubakar Shekau’s leadership 
and is discussed below. 
4.3 The rise of Abubakar Shekau and the emergence of factions 
within BH 
Because Nur did not stay long as the leader of BH, Shekau is seen as the second most 
influential leader after Yusuf. He is the deadliest leader of BH and thus discussion of 
dynamics such as group division and unity, along with BH’s spike in the intensity of 
violence under his tenure, is pertinent. Participant Seven (A media practitioner and 
conflict negotiator in Nigeria) suggests that: 
Yusuf was more a moderate and Shekau was actually the extremist. Shekau 
wanted things to be done faster than when Yusuf had been moderating him. 
When Yusuf was out of the way, he killed of course and there was anger, and 
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such anger usually you know, it goes to galvanise such feelings. You…, we've 
been telling you these people are killing us, these people are rudderless, these 
and all of that, so, of course, it gave more sympathy to them, and of course, it 
encouraged them to act even more aggressively under Shekau who was already 
very aggressive. 
With this statement, Participant Seven is attempting to differentiate between 
Mohammed Yusuf and Shekau. The participant suggests that Shekau was more violent, 
and encouraged BH members to see the Nigerian government as brutal and that they 
should be responded to with violence. Following Nur’s exile and Shekau's release or 
escape from custody in July 2010, Abubakar Shekau declared himself the new leader 
of BH (Zenn, 2014b: 24). Shekau was Yusuf’s second-in-command. He was born in 
1975 and is a native of Shekau village of Yobe state. He is from the same Kanuri tribe 
as Yusuf, speaks four languages (Kanuri, Hausa, Arabic and English (BBC, 2014b)), 
and is nicknamed Darul Tawheed (the abode of monotheism) (BBC, 2014b). His 
background, combined with his aggressive leadership style, may have contributed to 
his ability to mobilise his followers towards violence. Although Shekau had firm 
control of the movement, not all the intermediary leaders of the movement were happy 
with his leadership style. Some members were dissatisfied with his indiscriminate 
killings as well as preferential treatment of his Kanuri tribe, and such disputes 
eventually resulted in the splintering of the movement. Shekau then had problems with 
the Yusifiya Islamic Movement (YIM) and the Nur faction. 
The Yusufiya Islamic Movement (YIM) splinter group emerged in July 2011 
and not much information is known about it. It was a small group that excluded key 
leaders of BH. The group was concerned about the high rate of civilian killings and 
was determined to reconcile with the Nigerian government (Mahmood, 2013; Zenn, 
2014b: 25). However, Shekau ended the movement by killing members of the group 
as well as those who had defected from BH (ibid). The information about the 
individuals who created the YIM movement remains unknown to researchers and 
investigators. 
Another significant division under Shekau’s leadership was the splinter group, 
Nur’s Ansaru movement. The root cause of the division and subsequent split was 
influenced by a tussle for leadership by Nur and Shekau, with Nur and his members 
being dissatisfied with Shekau’s leadership style. The actual splintering was triggered 
by the 2012 attack on the ancient Hausa city of Kano (Mohammed, 2014: 30).  
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Ansaru's secession was encouraged by a desire to create a less violent group that would 
spare non-BH Muslims from violence, with his major target being Jos in North-central 
Nigeria, a city with a dense population of Christians. Nur and his Ansaru group also 
cooperated with MUJOA and other Al-Qaeda affiliates across Sub-Saharan Africa 
such as AQIM and Al-Shabaab (Weeraratne, 2015:13). Ansaru's targets included 
governmental agencies, schools, businesses and Westerners. As part of his strategy of 
attacks against Westerners, Nur kidnapped a Mr Colump, a French engineer in the 
Northwestern city of Katsina. In addition to YIM and the Ansaru groups, there was 
also a suspected coup against Shekau led by Abu Zamira Mohammed in August 2013. 
However, other narratives suggest that Shekau died in Mali and Abu Zamira 
Mohammed in fact replaced him (Kalu, 2013). Even though this narrative remains 
unclear, there was significant growing discontent with Shekau by BH members. 
Shekau was the deadliest of the BH leaders with the level of atrocities under 
his tenure being higher than those of the previous three leaders (see Figure 4.3). He 
introduced conscription of individuals in cluding the use of child soldiers, and the use 
of girls for suicide bombing as a mode of recruitment (Zenn & Pearson, 2013), 
Moreover, it was under Shekau’s leadership that Nigeria first experienced a suicide 
bombing organised by BH (Isaac, 2011). 
In his face off with the Nigerian state, Shekau was reported dead by the 
Nigerian security three times, but subsequently appeared in videos denying his death 
and mocking the Nigerian state and its security agents (BBC, 2014b). However, 
Shekau has not been heard from or seen since he declared BH to be an affiliate of IS 
(Islamic State), and this has generated new rumours of his death. The President of the 
Chad Republic, Idris Deby, speculated that Shekau had been replaced with Mahamat 
Daoud and that BH was no longer headed by a, “notorious radical terrorist” (Freeman, 
2015; Varghese, 2015). This speculation was at odds with a video message from 
Shekau in March 2016 in which he said that he was tired of fighting and urged his 
supporters to embrace peace. However, the video attracted scepticism by analysts, 
security experts and Nigerian forces as it was widely believed to be a strategy to 
distract the Nigerian forces from their growing success against BH. It was thus seen 
as a BH diversionary tactic to deflect attention from increasing military successes 
against them (Sahara Reporters, 2016a). This led to speculation that internal 
dissatisfaction eroded Shekau's legitimacy as BH’s leader. 
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Shekau became an established leader after being Mohammed Yusuf’s deputy. 
Shortly after he emerged as leader, BH divided and the Ansaru and YIM factions 
emerged. The senior members of BH also divided between Al-Qaeda and IS. These 
factors, to some extent, reduced his legitimacy and bond within the group. It is 
important to emphasise that factions and suspected coup d’etats under Shekau were 
influenced by his perceived wrong-doings (Kalu, 2013), and as argued by Gurr (2015), 
wrong words or deeds weaken or end the legitimacy of a leader. Shekau’s ‘wrong 
deeds’ were his indiscriminate killings in which Muslims were not spared. Such acts 
weakened his power and resulted in the emergence of different factions within BH. 
However, his leadership style and BH internal tensions aside, BH factions remained 
united by ideology and operated together across Nigeria (Zenn, 2014b). Before his 
ousting, Shekau enjoyed considerable degrees of legitimacy in spite of some frosty 
relationships within BH. Gurr (2015) argues that the power of a leader is a matter of 
degree, and this thesis notes that even if Shekau had problems with other leaders, he 
retained his local support because he was an ethnic entrepreneur and operated in an 
area dominated by people from his native Kanuri tribe. 
4.4 Mahamat Daoud 
This section discusses Mahamat Daoud’s emergence and impact on BH. Daoud 
became BH leader after Shekau in 2015 (France 24, 2015). He had a year’s tenure as 
BH’s leader and this was characterised by sustained attacks on civilians, as well as a 
reduction in the strength and spread of BH as a result of both Nigerian and regional 
forces’ successes in dealing with the threat of BH.  
Daoud became BH’s leader in August 2015 (France 24, 2015) and he led the 
movement until the emergence of Abu Musab al-Barnawi as its new leader. There is 
uncertainty as to the identity of Daoud with Jonathan Hill, a BH security expert at 
London’s King’s College, noting that Daoud remains an unknown figure because he 
had not been previously heard of or discussed in the media (Varghese, 2015). It is fair, 
however, to assume that Daoud was in a power position in BH, perhaps as an interim 
leader. In August 2015, President Deby of Chad said that Daoud was ready to engage 
in a truce with Nigerian authorities (ibid). However, this claim was ostensible as BH 
continued attacks amidst it. Added to this, several unknown groups claimed to be 
negotiating with the Nigerian government, thereby casting further doubts about 
President Deby’s negotiation claim. 
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Regardless of the conflicting claims and truces, BH in fact weakened under the 
rule of Daoud. This was partially due to an increase in military operations in Lake 
Chad countries under the banner of the Multi-National Joint Task Force (MNJTF), 
which kick-started a robust crackdown on BH in January 2015.  
Dauod’s preferred strategy was suicide attacks and attacking camps of 
internally displaced people (IDP camps) who had fled from areas terrorised by BH. 
Attacks on IDPs and the indiscriminate targeting of poor communities in Lake Chad 
caused renewed disagreement and discontent, and divided the leadership of BH about 
the direction being taken by Daoud (Salkida, 2016). Some leaders of the group argued 
that since the refugees and poor communities were supporters of the soldiers of the 
Kafirs, they should be subjected to hardship (ibid). In contrast, other leaders argued 
that BH goals supported by the doctrine propagated by Mohammed Yusuf had been 
overtaken by an individual’s ‘vengeful ploy’ and as the movement was exerting more 
hardship on the people than the soldiers of the Kafirs did, people would change their 
support to the forces of the Kafirs (Salkida, 2016). 
4.5 Abu Musab al-Barnawi 
The emergence of Abu Musab al-Barnawi was a clear indication of BH ties with IS. 
IS announced Abu Musab al-Barnawi as leader of BH, and this appointment created a 
new faction within BH with Shekau as a faction leader. This section analyses Abu 
Musab al-Barnawi’s assumption of BH leadership. 
On 3rd August 2016, IS declared Abu Musab al-Barnawi the new leader of BH. 
Little was known about Abu Musab al-Barnawi until he appeared in a video in January 
2015 as a BH spokesperson (Ajayi, 2016). Abu Musab al-Barnawi is the son of 
Muhammed Yusuf, the founder of BH. He re-affirmed BH’s allegiance to IS and 
promised to continue the fight against the government, and to spare Muslims while 
targeting Christians and churches (ibid). Zenn Jacob (2016), a security expert 
specialised in analysing BH, noted that Abu Musab al-Barnawi was the first successful 
BH key leader to depose Shekau from the leadership of BH for two key reasons: firstly, 
Abu Musab al-Barnawi criticised Shekau’s indiscriminate killings, and secondly, IS 
supported his emergence. This thesis would also add that these factors coalesced with 
the rapidly decreasing power of BH. This was why IS saw the need to bring in a 
transformational leader in the form of Abu Musab al-Barnawi. It is also notable that 
because Abu Musab al-Barnawi was a fellow Kanuri as well as being the son of 
 80 
Mohammed Yusuf (Zenn, 2016), I would argue that, he seemed to win the majority of 
local support from BH members over Shekau, whose popularity faded as result of his 
leadership approach and indiscriminate killings. 
Abu Musab al-Barnawi appeared to be more of a Khalifa than Shekau. A 
Khalifa is a leader who is vested with the power to control a state or movement by 
being a successor or vicegerent (Hendricks, 2015). At the time of Yusuf’s death and 
the exile of Nur, Shekau, Mohammed Yusuf’s immediate deputy, emerged as leader. 
He had pre-existing loyalty from BH members and he had also married one of 
Mohammed Yusuf’s four wives (BBC, 2014b). Perhaps at the time of Yusuf’s death, 
Abu Musab al-Barnawi was not capable or ready to lead because of his level of 
experience and age. In contrast, Mohammed Yusuf was 39 years old (1970-2009) at 
the time of his death, Nur assumed the leadership position at the age of 33 years old 
(born 1976), with Shekau taking over the leadership role at the age of 33 (born 1975). 
4.6 Other key leadership figures 
This section focuses on other key leaders that have helped sustain BH. However, this 
section does not conclude that these are the only key leaders because of the clandestine 
nature of terrorist groups. Getting information about the profiles of these people comes 
with great security risks. 
Apart from Mohammed Yusuf, Nur, Shekau, Daoud and Abu Musab al-
Barnawi, other key leaders such as Adam Kambar, Khalid al-Barnawi, Kabiru Sokoto 
Ali Konduga and Abu Qaqa have influenced the BH movement. These key leaders 
served as intermediaries and performed specialised roles in order to execute the 
group's goals. All the aforementioned individuals as well as Shekau have being listed 
by the US in the Designated Global Terrorists under section 1(b) of Executive Order 
13224 (US Department of State, 2012). It is important to note that while Nur, Kambar 
and al-Barnawi are bonded to Al Qaeda goals, Shekau’s goals are tailored towards IS.   
Kambar hails from Kano, Northwest Nigeria. He was highly connected and 
was known as the link man between Boko Haram, Al Shabaab and AQIM (Zenn, 
2014b: 24). He was also in charge of financial transfers for BH and Al Shabaab. Zenn 
(2014b: 24) notes that Kambar may have facilitated the meeting between Nur and Al 
Qaeda affiliates in Africa because of their Hausa ethnic connection. Before his death 
in 2012, Kambar may have acted as a specialist in foreign relations due to his links 
with other groups in the region. 
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Khalid al-Barnawi was a close associate of Kambar. They shared the same goal 
of regional cooperation with Al-Qaeda and they met in Algeria at an AQIM training 
camp. One of al-Barnawi’s trainees engaged in Nigeria’s first terrorist kidnapping of 
foreigners (British and Italian) in May 2011, with Al-Qaeda in the lands beyond the 
Sahel claiming responsibility for  this kidnapping (Zenn, 2014b). Al-Barnawi operated 
with Abu Mohammed, a specialist in kidnapping in the North-western command of 
BH. Even though Shekau and Ansaru had factionalised, they still communicated on 
matters of common interest with Abu Mohammed as Shekau's link to Ansaru 
(Pantucci & Jesperson, 2015: 28). This working relationship had been encouraged by 
the training they both received in the same Algerian AQIM camp. Mohammed 
represented the main interest of Shekau – the kidnapping business. (BH also funds 
itself through kidnapping and there are further details about this in chapter six). Shekau 
used Mohammed to provide protection for Al-Barnawi's group (Zenn, 2014b: 25; 
Pantucci & Jesperson, 2015: 16), and he died of gunshot wounds while captive in a 
police net. Rumours surfaced that Shekau had leaked information that led to 
Mohammed's capture (Pantucci & Jesperson, 2015: 16). This could have been because 
Nur, Al-Barnawi and other members of the splinter group had less local support than 
Shekau, as most of them had been working for Al Qaeda for a long time in the Sahel 
region of Africa (Pantucci & Jesperson, 2015: 28). 
Kabiru Sokoto was an intermediary leader of BH and his specialty was 
attacking churches. His target areas were Christian-populated districts, especially the 
Middle-belt region of Nigeria (Premium Times, 2012; Zenn, 2014b: 25; Pantucci & 
Jesperson, 2015: 16). He was the brains behind the 25th of December, 2011 bombing 
of St Theresa Catholic Church in Madalla, a town on the outskirts of Abuja (Reuters, 
2013). Nigerian forces arrested Sokoto twice, with his first arrest being at the Borno 
state governor’s lodge in Abuja, together with a serving military officer (Premium 
Times, 2012). The reason for Sokoto being at the Borno governor’s lodge remains 
unknown. Sokoto escaped from the Nigerian police when a group of angry youths 
attacked the Nigerian Police Force (NPF) convoy en route to Abaji, a town close to 
Abuja where Sokoto’s temporary residence was to be searched. The Nigerian police 
re-arrested Sokoto in Taraba state in the Northeast where he was establishing a cell 
(Premium Times, 2012). He confessed to having trained an estimated 500 individuals 
as terrorists (Pantucci & Jesperson, 2015: 15) and was sentenced to life imprisonment 
by the Nigerian courts. The arrest of Sokoto was important in preventing the expansion 
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of BH cells to Taraba, a state bordering Adamawa that had been severely affected by 
the rampaging violence of BH. 
Abu Qaqa was the spokesperson or public relations officer of BH. However, 
this name appears to be a pseudonym used by several different people. In January 2012 
when Abu Qaqa was arrested, he had a variety of names including Abu Dardaa, 
Mohammed Bello, Abu Tiamiya and Abdulrahman Abdullahi (Pantucci & Jesperson, 
2015: 13). In February 2012, the Nigerian forces captured another person who also 
claimed to be Abu Qaqa (ibid) and in 2013, Shekau ordered the killing of another Abu 
Qaqa named Mohammed. Abu Qaqa served as a communication link between BH and 
the local and international media. The relationship between BH and the media was 
centered on issues concerning negotiations with the government, threat messages to 
the public and the desire for future attacks (ibid 14). This suggests that BH had selected 
professionals to carry out propaganda tasks and perform intermediary functions 
between the group and the media. Since these representatives often would speak over 
the telephone, it was hard for security agents to track them down. 
Within BH, there is an established leadership structure. However, the structure 
remains secret and unknown to outsiders. This is common with most terrorist groups 
due to security risks and the clandestine nature of their activities (Silke, 2004; Sinai, 
2008; Kirby 2013). However, Figure 4.1 illustrates a possible BH leadership structure 
(given the forgone discussion) before the emergence of Daoud. 
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Figure 4.1: Structure of BH leadership in 2013 
 
 
 
The top-left of the figure shows the leadership of the movement with immediately 
beneath it the two deputies who work with the Shura council. The Shura council is an 
advisory council of senior BH members that advises the leader on important matters 
related to decision-making. Some BH sub-national coordinators and specialists are 
also part of the Shura council. BH specialists include spokespeople who communicate 
with the media and the government when it comes to BH's decisions and matters 
related to dialogues. The sub-national commanders execute directives from the leader. 
The role of the Ansaru factions in Figure 4.1 illustrates them sometimes collaborating 
with the BH leader through an intermediary. The leadership of both Ansaru and BH 
are presently united, although there is no precise information about when these 
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factions united. The decimation of Al Qaeda and its affiliates as well as the arrest of 
Al-barnawi in 2016 indicate that both groups united with Al-barnawi as the second-
in-command (more details follow below). Moreover, the intensive military campaign 
of Nigerian security may have distorted the group's leadership (more analysis of this 
is in chapter Five). 
4.7 Implications of leadership change on BH 
Changes in the leadership of BH have been directly connected to the killing and 
targeting of BH leaders by Nigerian forces, as well as BH internal pressures and 
decisions. The extra-judicial killing of Mohammed Yusuf and the targeting of Nur 
paved the way for the more violent leadership of Shekau. Shekau’s subsequent ousting 
from power was because of pressures from the Nigerian forces as well as 
dissatisfaction from within BH. The replacement of Daoud with Abu Musab al-
Barnawi was because of collaboration with IS. It is therefore useful to explore how 
these leadership changes affected BH. 
BH became a fully-fledged terrorist group under the command of Shekau. 
Although Yusuf and Shekau shared the same violent ideology, Shekau was far more 
violent. This may be attributed to the substaintial pre-existing local support he had, 
his aggressive approaches in executing BH's goals, the group's grievances over the 
killing of Mohammed Yusuf and confrontations with Nigerian forces. Under Shekau, 
BH expanded, made strong global connections and increased the intensity of its attacks. 
These factors made Shekau far more violent than Mohammed Yusuf. While 
Mohammed Yusuf was responsible for the emergence of the movement, Shekau 
maintained a robust execution of the group's objectives. When asked about the levels 
of violence under Mohammed Yusuf and Shekau, Participant One (A former top 
government official in a Northern Nigerian state) said: 
You need to listen to their preaching to know that they have the same radical 
perceptions as the driving force of their messages and their modes of operation. 
So, the change of leadership has not affected anything. If anything, it is just a 
continuation of an agenda that was set long ago. Perhaps the rate at which they 
action things may vary; Shekau may have more speed than Mohammed, but 
Mohammed plans more than Shekau. 
In other words, Participant One is suggesting that although Yusuf and Shekau shared 
the same agenda, Mohammed Yusuf may have been more patient in achieving the 
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long-term goals and strategies of the movement. In contrast, Shekau conducted an 
increased number of  attacks without much planning. In addition, the participant may 
be inferring that Yusuf recruited and mobilised people more systematically than 
Shekau. This could be true because Mohammed Yusuf enticed individuals with his 
eloquent preaching whereas Shekau introduced conscription as part of BH’s 
recruitment strategy. The statement by Participant One is supported by Yusuf's 
message (on CD) to his followers in which he was preparing the minds of his disciples 
for the consequences they were going to face. He said: 
In the process they will abuse you, call you names and some of you may even 
die. They will shoot some of you, and we will just pray, “May Allah give you 
aljanna” [Paradise] and proceed without any qualms. Can we endure? We 
ought to endure. May Allah give us the will to endure. This is how our dawah 
[evangelism] is. Patience - this is what we need, brothers. And perseverance 
upon the truth. Allah is watching us. Victory is certain. What we lack are the 
helpers. We are not yet primed for victory, but we are working towards getting 
ready for victory. This is what we are looking for, brothers. This is an incipient 
dawah, and it cannot be crushed. It cannot be killed. If we really stand by what 
the Prophet says we should stand up, even if we die in the process. This dawah 
will continue – even after a hundred years. (Mohammed, 2014: 15) 
After the death of Mohammed Yusuf, his disciples inherited his global connections 
through which he had drawn increased support for his movement. The time he had 
spent in Somalia and Saudi Arabia (Mohammed, 2014) highlighted his renewed 
commitment to spreading Takfiri ideology across Nigeria. Nur’s links to and 
preference for Al Qaeda and its affiliates across Sub-Saharan Africa explain BH’s 
targeting pattern under his command. Westerners, anything related to Christians, 
schools and business spaces were his primary target preferences and this to some 
extent, indicated the pattern of BH ideology as a group within the Al Qaeda network. 
Shekau focused on the expansion of the BH movement and sought to spread 
radical beliefs across Nigeria by capturing territories that would enable him to spread 
the Sharia caliphate. His ideology was similar to the expansionist nature of IS. In June 
2014, IS declared its expansionist agenda from Iraq, Syria, Iran and the Levant to other 
parts of the world (Roggio, 2014). Simultaneously, Shekau captured 21 Nigerian 
territories from the three states of Adamawa, Borno and Yobe in North-Eastern 
Nigeria (The Guardian, 2014a). Apart from local rivalry among the top echelons of 
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BH, the different violent styles and orientations of the leaders show that there was, or 
there would be, conflicting allegiances to IS and Al Qaeda because Takfiri groups 
across the Maghreb and Sub-Saharan Africa are either loyal to Al Qaeda or IS, not 
both. 
Proponents of leadership decapitation argue that it reduces the intensity of 
violence as it deters others from the violence that creates turmoil within a terrorist 
organisation (Jordan, 2009: 721; David, 2002). However, from the above discussions, 
BH has shown that internal divisions do not necessarily end violent groups, and that 
decapitation can be counter-productive with regards to religious or ideological group 
like BH holding uncompromising belief. In other words, terrorists of a religiously 
motivated group are bonded by their uncompromising belief so as such; decapitation 
may not necessarily cause disunity among them. 
Figure 4.2 illustrates the divisions within BH after the death of Mohammed 
Yusuf. Figure 4.3 compares the number of fatalities under different BH leaders from 
2009 - 2015. Within this period, BH atrocities were committed under Mohammed 
Yusuf (July 30th 2009), Shekau (July 2010 - August 2015) and Daoud (August 2015 - 
August 2016).  
Table 4.1 shows the number of attacks and percentages of different target 
selections under Mohammed Yusuf, Shekau and Daoud. It is important to note that 
before 2009 (i.e. under Yusuf), there were some undocumented attacks, but the attacks 
were not as severe as during the 2009 uprising and thereafter. Statistical data from the 
GTD suggest that there were no attacks under Nur. This is true because at that time, 
BH went underground to reinforce itself against the Nigerian authorities. Perhaps Nur 
could not withstand the Nigerian forces and therefore had to relinquish his position 
and go into exile. As well as debunking the above argument about leadership 
decapitation, Figure 4.3 and Table 1 measure the degree of an individual leader’s 
effect on the movement in terms of intensity of violence and target selection. 
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Figure 4.2: Divisions and unity after the death of Mohammed Yusuf 
 
 
Figure 4.2 above shows how BH was divided after the death of Mohammed Yusuf. 
Notably, divisions within BH started in 2011 through the emergence of the YIM 
faction. The movement was terminated in the same year it emerged. BH and Ansaru 
were the dominant splinter groups and they united in 2013. In 2016, BH divided into 
the Abu Musab al-Barnawi and Shekau factions. In spite of internal divisions and in-
fighting, BH remains strong in its ability to continue its war against the Nigerian state.    
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Figure 4.3: BH casualties under different leadership figures: 2009-2015 
 
From 2009 to 2015, 12,849 deaths were recorded as a result of BH attacks. During 
Yusuf's leadership, 304 deaths were recorded, under Shekau 10,985 deaths were 
recorded, and 1,560 deaths under the leadership of Daoud.  
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Table 4.1: Percentages and number of attacks of target choice under different 
BH leaders 
Target type  Leaders & number of attacks  
with the breakdown of types of attacks (shown in 
percentages) 
Yusuf 
10 attacks 
Shekau 
1,665 attacks 
Daoud 
310 attacks 
Airports & aviation - 1 (0) - 
Business - 102 (6) 11 (4) 
Educational institutions - 77 (4) - 
Government 11 (2) 137 (8) 7 (2) 
Journalists & the media - 5 (0.27) - 
Military - 193 (11) 51 (17) 
NGOs - 2 (0.2) - 
Non-state militias - 14 (1) 6 (2) 
Police 22 (4) 242 (14) 18 (5.8) 
Citizens & private property 56 (10) 809 (45) 188 (62) 
Political parties - 4 (0.22) - 
Religious figures and 
institutions 
11 (2) 131 (7) 22 (7) 
Telecom - 35 (2) - 
Transportation - 36 (2) 6 (2) 
Tourists - 1 (0) 1(0.6) 
 
Table 4.1 shows 15 target choices under the leaderships of Mohammed Yusuf, Shekau 
and Daoud. Given the information in both Figure 4.3 and Table 4.1, a total number of 
10 attacks were carried out against four different target types and 304 people were 
killed under Mohammed Yusuf's leadership. Under Shekau's leadership, 1,665 attacks 
were carried out against 15 target types and 10, 985 casualties were recorded. Lastly, 
in 2015 under Daoud's leadership, BH undertook 310 attacks against nine target types 
with this resulting in 1,560 casualties. 
Furthermore, it is interesting to compare the target selections of these three 
leaders. Under Yusuf, 56% of targets were citizens and private property, 22% were 
the police, 11% of attacks were directed against the government and 11% of attacks 
against religious figures and institutions. Yusuf attacked government officials in 
Borno state because he felt they had betrayed him by not honouring the agreement he 
had made with them about implementing a strict brand of Sharia law. He also believed 
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that government officials were using the state apparatus to terminate his movement 
and his goal for a Sharia state (more details about this are in chapter six). Yusuf’s 
reason for attacking the police was two-fold: he believed the police to be the primary 
instrument the government used to attack his followers, and he attacked police stations 
to free his group’s members. With regards to attacks on citizens and private properties, 
Yusuf felt that citizens were supporting the government and its forces, and this was 
coupled with historic land disputes - notably the Kanama clash (more details about 
this are in chapter six). Yusuf’s decision to attack religious figures and institutions 
was because they criticised his ideology and referred to his movement as Kharijism 
(rebellious Muslims), a highly offensive term to BH members. Added to this, he 
believed many religious leaders to be collaborators with the Kafir government 
(Mohammed, 2014: 11). 
As BH leader, Shekau ordered attacks against the most diverse groups of 
targets, and he attacked all 15 targets noted in Table 4.1. He was the most violent of 
all BH leaders and arguably reflects the destructive millennial terrorism suggested by 
Crenshaw (2000). The majority of his attacks were against citizens and private 
property (45%), followed by the police (14%), the military (11%) and the government 
(8%). Under Shekau, attacks on the government spread from the Northeast to 
Northwest and to Abuja, the capital of Nigeria. Because Shekau was an expansionist, 
he attacked the government and its security agents to weaken the power of the Nigerian 
state, with his attacks on civilians being to undermine the legitimacy of the state. He 
combined his civilian attacks with the additional goal of conscripting civilians into 
BH in contrast to Yusuf’s style of recruitment through preaching.  
Daoud most frequently targeted civilians (62%) and the military (17%). The 
targeting of the military was in reprisal for the robust clampdowns on the movement 
by Nigerian forces. The increasing attacks on civilians under Daoud’s leadership are 
perhaps indicative of Kydd & Walter’s (2006) argument that these are a sign of 
weakness. 
Mohammed Yusuf, Shekau and Daoud attacked a range of targets with 
government and military targets being particularly prominent. However, they all 
attacked for different reasons and their targeting choices are further discussed in 
chapter seven.  
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4.8 Chapter conclusions 
Leadership influence on the BH movement is complex and it cannot be explained 
using a single theoretical assumption or empirical fact. The findings of this chapter 
suggest that there are multiple explanations influencing the legitimacy of BH 
leadership. In addition, there are a range of factors that determine the division or unity 
of BH leaders and the chapter has outlined the influence of individual leadership on 
the intensity of BH violence. 
A first important finding relates to the relevance of authentic leadership. This 
chapter illustrates how Mohammed Yusuf endeared himself to his followers through 
his actions and words, while wielding power through theological and dogmatic beliefs 
coupled with apocalyptic imagining. The chapter highlights out how Yusuf established 
the organisation and loyalty for his successors to assume their positions of authority.  
Shekau became popular because he represented the aspirations and common 
radical views of the movement, and this earned him the Darul Tawheed. His 
favouritism towards his tribespeople was both a strength and weakness. It was strength 
because he had more local support than Nur and the Ansaru faction as BH dominated 
his Kanuri homeland, and as such he acted through ideology and ethnic 
entrepreneurship. However, his tribalism style of leadership contributed to the 
vitiation of his legitimacy, with this reflecting the notion of leadership ‘wrong-doing’ 
that Gurr (2015) espoused. Shekau’s legitimacy weakened over time because of his 
indiscriminate killings that did not spare Muslims. This and the disputes he had with 
the Ansaru faction reflect the argument of the role of leadership in group splintering 
(della Porta, 1995; Cunningham, 2011). Moreover, it furthers the argument about 
foreign support splitting movements, with the divisions between Nur’s faction 
stemming from them being more connected to Al Qaeda with Shekau being more 
aligned to IS’ expansionist agenda. 
A second important finding of this chapter is that leadership decapitation 
against BH increased the intensity of its violence. Moreover, it paved the way for a 
more radical leader. The killing of Yusuf and targeting of Nur facilitated the 
emergence of Shekau. Moreover, the targeting of Nur and his self-imposed exile in 
fact resulted in him gaining more military training and forging more international 
connections with foreign jihadists. This suggests that the targeting of leaders of terror 
groups not only radicalises a group, it also strengthens avenues for the 
transnationalisation of terrorist groups. This chapter therefore challenges the argument 
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that decapitation creates internal turmoil within terrorist organisations (Jordan, 2009: 
721; David, 2002) with BH splintering initially because of internal dynamics and then 
secondly because of decapitation. The targeting of BH leadership influenced the 
emergence of Nur who after his return from exile, attempted to take back his position 
of authority but was thwarted by Shekau. Regardless, Nur and Shekau continued to 
work together and their factions were later united. I would argue that this is because 
BH is connected by the instrumentality of political Islam, which enables it to pursue 
its political agenda through religion. Regardless of the individual differences between 
its leaders or of external pressures, BH appears bonded by an ideology that is derived 
from dogmatic eschatological belief.  
In the next chapter the organisational goals of BH will be discussed, along with 
the reasons why BH works effectively as a group.  
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Chapter 5: Group Level Explanation 
Chapter four examined the relationship between BH leadership and its followers. It 
discussed the variation of violence under five different BH leaderships. It also 
highlighted the implications of the Nigerian government’s decapitation approach with 
regards to BH. Chapter four therefore has laid the foundations for understanding the 
internal dynamics of BH and how external forces such as CT affects its entire group 
structure.  
This chapter critically examines BH internally. It discusses the following 
components of BH: its organisational structure, its organizational goals and 
motivations, membership composition and the recruitment backgrounds of over fifty 
thousand members (Vanguard, 2015). It also discusses how the group coordinates its 
field operations. Furthermore, this chapter contributes to existing studies on BH by 
examining the implications these internal factors and changes in organizational 
structure have had over time. This group level explanation provides information on 
how the internal dynamics of violent organizations such as composition, division, 
cohesion and goals contribute to BH’s campaign of violence.  
This chapter provides a broader perspective as to why individuals join BH 
instead of the conventional thinking that individuals join as a result of radical 
evangelism, poverty or illiteracy (Adesoji, 2010 & 2011; Maiangwa et al., 2012; 
Agbiboaa, 2013; Hansen & Musa 2013). As noted in chapter Two, such notions are 
inadequate when justifying why people join terror groups. Moreover, this chapter 
provides new insights into understanding the internal dynamics of violent groups more 
broadly because investigating violent organizations (including BH) remains a difficult 
task due to their secretive and violent nature. To that end, the interview sources with 
local negotiators enrich this chapter with pertinent information. In contributing to the 
broader literature of terrorist group behaviour, this chapter also examines how BH’s 
recruitment pattern is different to existing studies of terror group recruitment and how 
this affects BH. The chapter additionally looks at how BH combines individual goals 
into a unitary goal and is crucial in understanding how a mix of internal and external 
factors such as CT and public support have shaped BH.  
Scholars in the field of violence and conflict studies have applied different 
theories relating to civil wars, principals and agents of violence, rebel recruits and 
soldiers in an attempt to understand how violent groups’ organizational recruitment 
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and behaviours are applied while using terrorist tactics to achieve their goals. In order 
to understand BH’s organizational structure, recruitment types, goals and motivations, 
there is a need to engage BH in different theoretical and empirical debates within the 
broader field of terrorism while keeping in mind, the complexity of BH. This debate 
includes discussion of old and new terrorism, terrorist motivation and terrorist 
recruitment. Engaging BH in the debate about old and new terrorism is important 
because some scholars argue that the nature of terrorist groups in terms of their 
organizational structures, goals, lethality and transnationalisation has changed since 
the 9/11 attack in the USA, while others remain sceptical of such changes. The 
organizational structure of BH is reflective of both old and new terrorism, so 
investigating BH further expands upon this argument.  
Old terrorism is believed to have existed from the 1960s to mid-1990s in the 
form of right- and left-wing movements and ethnonational and separatist movements 
who used violence to achieve their goals. Enders & Sandler (2000:310) suggest that 
such traditional terrorist movements share the features of secularism and rational 
political cause as their motivation for engaging in violence. Proponents of new 
terrorism argue that new religiously-oriented terrorism is motivated by lethal and 
indiscriminate violence (Juergensmeyer, 2000; Laqueur, 2003). In terms of 
organizational structures, Gunratna (2002) and Neuman (2009) suggest that traditional 
terrorist organizations are hierarchically structured, whereas new terrorist 
organizations are more transnational with a loose network type of organizational 
structure in which cells are independent in terms of decision-making. However, other 
scholars debunk such claims. Crenshaw (2008) is sceptical about the concept of new 
terrorism and argues that even traditional terrorist groups such as the Red Army 
Faction (RAF) and Irish Republican Army (IRA) had loose organizational structures 
with many leftist groups being transnational in nature. BH is an organization that can 
be classified as new terrorism characterized by radical Islamism, and this chapter will 
investigate whether the organizational setting mirrors the organizational structure of 
new terrorism as argued by Neuman (2009) and other proponents of this notion. 
Understanding the motivation behind people joining terrorist groups attracts 
wide debate in terrorism literature. The most popular reasons put forward for 
recruitment into violent groups are economic reasons or ideological indoctrination, 
but other studies argue that violent groups use force to get new recruits, particularly 
when recruiting child soldiers. However, Blomberg, et al, (2004) and Shafig & Sinno, 
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(2010) suggest that economic motivation has no connection with terrorism. Krueger 
& Maleckova (2003: 122) suggest that there is a linkage between terrorism and 
poverty (often as a result of illiteracy) and argue that terrorist groups pay 
compensation to the families of recruits. Li & Schaub (2004: 232) find that economic 
development reduces terrorism, but studies on religious beliefs such as jihadism or 
martyrdom suggest that individuals earning above national minimum wages join 
violent organisations for theological reasons (Sageman, 2008; Cole & Cole, 2009; 
Cotte, 2010). Sageman (2008) and Cotte (2010) highlight the world view of Salafist 
jihadism and explain the expansion of the Al Qaeda network and its violent ideology. 
Through his “bunch of guys” theory, Sageman explains the self-radicalization and 
transformation of individuals into violent extremists. The “bunch of guys” theory 
examines the evolution of the radical Salafist movement and the global spread of the 
Al Qaeda network. The theory emphasises how isolated individuals are collectively 
radicalised and become willing Al Qaeda recruits. Using the United Kingdom as a 
case study, Cole & Cole (2009) assess how Islamic fundamentalists recruit their 
members from young Muslims in the West. Cole & Cole (2009) suggest that a 
combination of psychological and social processes facilitate the recruitment of young 
British Muslims. They posit that such psychological and social processes include 
feelings of socioeconomic alienation, dogmatic views of Hizbut and Mouhajiroun 
reactions to the international war on terror, interactions with international jihadist 
organizations and an individual’s conscience to engage in acts of violent extremism. 
In contributing to the extant arguments about why people join terrorist groups, this 
chapter examines more broadly why people engage in terrorism. Using BH as a case 
study, this chapter seeks to illustrate that terrorist groups switch or diversify their 
modes of recruitment so as to sustain their violent campaigns. 
The evolving tactics of BH include the forceful recruitment of young people, 
particularly as foot soldiers. The use of child soldiers attracts numerous debates about 
its strategic advantages to violent movements. Violent groups often “threaten, abduct 
and abuse” child soldiers and so turn them into agents of atrocities (Becker, 2009; 
Beber & Blattman, 2013). Dallaire (2011) argues that areas with large populations of 
children enable violent movements to recruit more easily. In addition, children are also 
perceived as more easily indoctrinated, easily swayed into violence and less costly to 
maintain - especially if they come from poor backgrounds (Beber & Blattman, 2013). 
Scholars such as Boyden & de Berry (2004) suggest that children have the exuberance 
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and the physical capacity and agility to exact more violence on civilian targets; 
however, Wessells (2006) sees children as having insufficient capacity to sustain 
battles because of their age. Hence it is important to understand whether there are 
similar or distinct reasons as to why BH recruits children and how successful this has 
been for them. The sub section on recruitment examines the use of child soldiers by 
BH. 
The rational choice theory’s application in this thesis is discussed in this 
chapter. The rational choice theory (RCT) is crucial in understanding how BH’s 
unitary goals and internal cohesion enable it to continue to carry out its campaign of 
violence, regardless of whether it is achieving its goals or not. Modern RCT argues 
that violent groups select from several alternatives, “each with given benefits, and 
costs the ones that would maximize their satisfaction” (Dugan, et al. 2005). RCT does 
not take into account individual preferences as it has similar attributes at a group level. 
The structure of terrorist groups (whether hierarchical- or loose-structured) does not 
deny individual preferences. Such preferences are similar and shared from the 
leadership to the followers of an organization, and if choices differ then the group 
divides and splinter-groups pursue a more unitary goal. However, chapter four of this 
thesis indicates that even though BH is divided into different factions and movements, 
it is committed to a common goal.  
This chapter will look at BH’s recruitment patterns through two main 
approaches. Firstly, it will highlight the role of voluntary recruitment, which includes 
push factors such as grievances and pull factors such as religious identity. Secondly, 
it will discuss conscription as a method of recruitment, and in particular the use of 
child soldiers (boys and girls). Other methods of recruitment which do not fall within 
the aforementioned two categories will also be discussed  
This chapter is organised as follows: the first part looks at the organisational 
structure of BH; the second part examines organisational goals and motivations; then 
the membership composition of BH and its strategies and opportunities for recruitment 
are discussed in the final section of the chapter.
5.1 Organisational structure 
This section discusses the decision-making process of BH and its structure and 
presence in different Nigerian territories. It also points out how this structure is 
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weakened by both internal and external dynamics such as CT, international 
collaboration against BH and falling public support. 
With regards to decision-making, BH is unlike other terrorist groups such as Al Qaeda 
or IS which have loose organizational structures that are quasi-autonomous. BH is an 
organisation with a top-down command system but with clandestine cells (START 
Report 2014). It is headed by Amir ul-Aam (Abu Musab al-Barnawi) who is its leader 
and commander-in-chief, and he commands the movement’s members. Commands 
issued are either based on his decisions or on the advice of the Shura Council. Two 
deputies (Na’ib Amir ul-Aam I & II) assist him and they are also members of the Shura 
Council. There is not a great deal of information about the dynamics within the Shura 
Council except that it is a group of thirty elders of BH (Mahmood 2013: 2) that advises 
BH’s leader on the movement’s policy decisions (Smith 2015: 141). It is an advisory 
body that deliberates on issues that shape the decisions of the movement, but its 
recommendations are not binding upon the leader of the movement. Shekau’s 
authoritarian posture suggests that the commander of the group is vested with the 
power to singularly instruct followers of the movement. 
Both the leader and the Shura Council have direct control of specialists or 
officers who are in charge of areas such as kidnapping, bomb-making, the training of 
new recruits, foreign relations and killing. Some of these specialists are also sub-
national leaders who coordinate the state branch leaders where BH exists. For example, 
before the Nigerian forces killed Adam Kambar, he was both a specialist in foreign 
relations (he liaised between BH and AQIM, as well as Al-Shabaab) and a coordinator 
of operations in the North-West of Nigeria (Zenn 2014b: 24). Similarly, Kabiru Sokoto 
was a specialist in bombing churches and was the sub-national coordinator of North-
Central Nigeria before his arrest (Premium Times 2012; Zenn 2014b: 25; Pantucci & 
Jesperson, 2015: 16). 
The structure of BH is designed to match the structure of Nigerian local 
authorities with BH cells being based on different regional (sub-national) authorities 
in Nigeria. There are ten major states (Adamawa, Bauchi, Borno, Gombe, Kaduna, 
Kano, Kogi, Plateau and Yobe) where BH has organized violence as well as in Abuja, 
the capital of Nigeria. However, the structure in these states has collapsed gradually, 
largely as a result of a resurgent military campaign carried out by the Nigerian 
government in 2015 through the Multinational Joint Task Force (MNJTF). At the next 
level, a state leader oversees the activities of BH leaders in local government areas 
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(LGA). The LGA Amir controls the activities of BH cells in the towns and villages 
(DCCN, 2009: 14), with the cells being responsible for both carrying out attacks and 
the recruitment of new members. Figure 5.1 below shows the spread of the state and 
LGA branches while Figure 5.2 illustrates the organizational structure of BH. 
Sambisa Forest is the main hideout of BH with the forest being strategic to the 
group because it serves as its headquarters with the leadership coordinating local cells 
from there. It has borders with major BH-dominated areas and Cameroon, and shares 
a boundary with the Ngadda River which stretches to Lake Chad. This thesis posits 
that the strategic location of Sambisa Forest in relation to the major town of Gwoza 
informed BH’s decision to make Gwoza its caliphate.  
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Figure 5.1: Map of Nigeria showing the state and LGA branches of BH (created 
with QGIS software) 
Figure 5.4 above shows a map of Nigeria with states that have been affected by BH. 
Before the 2015 MNJT robust operations, BH had a presence in the states marked with 
both the light shade and dark shade. The states marked with the light shade have had 
a BH presence beyond 2015 (see chapter seven for more discussion). 
BH has a hybrid organisational structure consisting of a hierarchical 
(centralised) and cell structure. The organisational structure of BH is centralized in 
that the leader determines the activities of the group with regards to decision-making. 
The structure is hierarchical and bureaucratic with regards to divisions of labour. The 
leader has direct control of deputies, specialists and sub-national commanders, and the 
specialist and sub-national leaders in turn have direct control of the state Amir. The 
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state Amir has direct control of the LGA Amir while the LGA Amir has direct control 
of the cells. A cell is organized by individuals who regulate followers at a local level. 
Before its collapse, Ansaru was the strongest faction of all BH factions and 
coordinated its activities independently. However, it had ties with BH because of its 
leaders’ (Nur and Al-Barnawi) foreign connections to Al Qaeda. During his leadership, 
Shekau collaborated with Ansaru through an intermediary called Abu Mohammed. 
Mohammed assisted Ansaru (through Al Barnawi) with security cover (armed men) 
in the kidnapping of Westerners (Pantucci & Jesperson, 2015: 16). 
BH cell structure is designed to not only carry out atrocities, but also as a 
strategy of survival. As argued by Neumann (2009:1), the organizational structure of 
‘new’ terrorism has a cell structure because the compromise of a cell member will 
only destroy one cell and not an entire organization. For instance, Mudaisiru Jibrin 
(a.k.a. Namakele/Alarama) was operating in Yobe state and was the mastermind of 
the shooting of students at a Government Secondary School in Mamudo village near 
Potiskum, Yobe state in 2013. Investigations suggested that Jibrin also established a 
cell in Kano with 22 other individuals while he was being pursued by the Nigerian 
Department of State Security (DSS) in Kano (Vanguard, 2016a). Muhammed Hassan 
Idris (a Nigerien) and Baba Abdul Maina were arrested in the Panteka area of Abuja 
on 29th October 2015. They escaped and formed a cell in Abuja after their role in 
coordinating suicide attacks in Yobe, Plateau, Kano and Kaduna states (Premium 
Times 2015b). The arrest of Mudaisiru Jibrin and the 22 others suggests that a cell 
may constitute approximately 23 members. Moreover, the aforementioned arrested 
cell members were also perpetrators of attacks in BH strongholds of the Borno-Yobe 
axis, which suggests that more BH cells may have emerged in other regions due to 
increased pressure from state forces in the Borno-Yobe axis. The arrest of Hafsat 
Usman Bako, Zainab Idris and Aisha Abubakar, women specialized in recruiting 
females (Gigoya 2014), suggests that BH cells also include females. Thus a cell 
consists of both men and women who are specialized in coordinating attacks as well 
as recruiting individuals. 
The arrest of Baana Fanay and two other officials by Chadian authorities 
suggests that BH has cells in the neighbouring countries of Cameroon, Niger and Chad. 
Investigations revealed that Fanay recruited individuals and purchased weapons for 
BH. These investigations also indicated that he trafficked weapons within Nigeria, 
Chad and Cameroon (Khamis 2016). 
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Figure 5.2: Organisational structure of BH 
 
 
Figure 5.2 above illustrates the hybrid structure of BH with its hierarchical and cell 
structures. The figure illustrates a top-down and collaborative method of decision-
making. The top-bottom nature of the group suggests that decisions come from a chain 
of command. The group is collaborative because in spite of the absolute power of the 
leader, he seeks advice from the Shura Council. Moreover, prior to any collapse of a 
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faction within the group, the leader reaches out to such factions. This thesis posits that 
the leader reaches out to such factions because they are influential and have 
international connections (see chapter four). This assertion is backed up by the Shekau 
having killed factions such as the YIM faction as well as Abu Zamira, who was alleged 
to have masterminded a coup against Shekau.   
The organizational structure and spread of BH has altered over time due to 
both internal and external factors (December 2015-2016). Figure 5.5 below highlights 
significant factors that have led to the shrinking of BH’s organizational structure, with 
this having been reduced to the Borno axis since 2015. However, some of its foot 
soldiers remain in other Northern areas such as Kano state where they carry out 
occasional attacks.  
Figure 5.3: Reasons for changes in the organizational structure of BH 
 
Internally, Shekau’s authoritarian leadership caused the disintegration of the Ansaru 
and Yusufiyya factions (Mahmood 2013: 8), as well as the Abu Zamira Mohammed-
led Shura Council. Abu Zamira Mohammed was thought to have replaced Shekau in 
August 2013 with there having been speculation that in 2013, Abu Zamira Mohammed 
plotted a coup against Shekau (Kalu, 2013). However, other narratives suggest that he 
wanted to replace Shekau, who was shot in Mali (ibid) during a joint operation with 
other jihadists (ibid).  
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Other factors shaping BH’s structure include tribalism among its members and 
the external factor of plummeting public support for the group. Tribalism in this 
context implies the prefrential treatment Shekau gave to Kanuri members of BH over 
non-Kanuri members of BH. Furthermore, during its early days, BH enjoyed public 
sympathy and covert support of locals who saw it as a form of liberation theology or 
a quest for the establishment of a Sharia state (Adibe, 2014 a&b). This support has 
subsequently weakened because of indiscriminate killings of members of the public. 
Additionally, the arrest and killing of key individuals such as Kabiru Sokoto Konduga 
and Habibu Bama have altered the group’s composition. The military strength of 
Nigerian forces and the MNJTF have pushed BH back to their main stronghold in 
Sambisa forest and to other villages within the states of Borno, Adamawa and Yobe. 
For example, the arrests of Sokoto in 2012 and Al-Barnawi in 2016 by the Nigerian 
forces countered plans to establish cells in the Taraba axis of the North-East (Premium 
Times 2012) and the North-Central respectively. Moreover, continued military 
pressure on BH has weakened its operational capacity. Thus both internal and external 
factors have reduced BH’s structure and network up to the Borno axis and very likely 
to the border towns of Niger, Chad and Cameroon as a result of the spillover of 
violence and BH collaborators within these countries. 
Another reason to suggest that BH’s structure has altered over time is the 
reduction in its ability to attack in regions it once had structures. Chapters seven and 
eight suggest that the spread of BH has weakened. Between 2009 and 2015, BH (GTD) 
carried out 1,851 attacks with 231 being within Northwest and Northcentral Nigeria. 
In addition, 1,411 incidences occurred in the Northeast with 209 attacks being carried 
out outside of Nigerian borders. Interestingly, these attacks lessened in the Northwest 
and Northcentral in contrast to an increase in the border states of Adamawa, Borno 
and Adamawa, as well as countries in the Lake Chad region. Figure 5.4 illustrates the 
dominant presence of BH in the border regions between countries in the Lake Chad 
region. Chapter seven examines a number of factors that could explain the target 
selection of BH from a broader perspective. 
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Figure 5.4: Map of Nigeria showing Lake Chad region; the three border states 
and Nigeria's neighbouring countries (Cameroon, Chad and Niger) (created 
with QGIS software) 
 
Figure 5.4 above indicates the concentration of BH violence in the Lake Chad region. 
The region includes Nigeria (Adamawa, Borno and Yobe), Cameroon, Chad and Niger 
Republics (see chapters seven and eight for more discussion).  
5.2 Organisational goal and motivation 
The overall organisational goal supported by the majority of BH members is the 
propagation of an ultra-Islamic ideology. They believe that a strict Islamic state will 
guarantee their needs which the current ‘un-Islamic and evil’ Nigerian system has 
denied them (DCCN 2009). BH followers have differing needs but share the same 
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preference for a strict Islamic system, and are determined to join and remain in the 
group (discussed in chapter four) (ibid). The different methods of BH recruitment to 
a large extent determine the motivations of its members with individuals being 
motivated by theological/ideological, economical, revenge and marriage-based factors, 
as well as other psychological needs. Indeed, Participant Ten (a former lawmaker and 
attorney general) notes that:  
There are multiple factors. Some look at it from an economic perspective and 
some look at it from a religious perspective; but if you look at it holistically, 
you will realize that many of these are interwoven.  
Participant Ten is therefore suggesting that there are multifarious reasons motivating 
individuals within BH. It can also be argued that to get more recruits, BH is in fact 
deliberately designed to reflect differing individualistic goals in order to maintain this 
collective preference. Participant Six (involved in the drafting of the National Counter 
Terrorism Strategy) notes that: 
They [BH] started preaching issues of radicalism initially because they were 
talking about injustices in society with people getting rich without anybody 
checking how. They were talking about people being deprived of many things 
and when you bring up such issues alongside of religious  narrative, these 
becomes more potent. This kind of preaching started long ago before this thing 
started that we now know as Boko Haram. Anybody who has visited Yobe, 
Adamawa or Borno will know that these things are rapidly escalating and at 
the end of the day, people might think that this is because of the killing of the 
leader. 
This statement shows BH as organizers of atrocities who radicalise their followers 
with messages that contained both ideological and psycho-social goals. Given the 
individual goals that bond BH as a group, it is fair to argue that individualistic goals 
and motivations are pinned down to incentives, with these not always being 
materialistic. However, other individuals are in BH not because of desired goals, but 
because of fear, grievances and trauma. These factors remain seemingly unnoticed by 
the government, yet a number of individuals have been radicalised because of the 
indiscriminate killings of both BH members and civilians within BH affected 
territories by government forces (see 5.4.2, 5.4.3 and 5.4.6 sub sections). 
In spite of these individual motivations, it is arguable that BH individual goals 
are secondary to the overall goal of the organization, with this being common in 
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terrorist groups. The modern rational choice theory offers explanations as to how 
unitary goals supersede individual goals within violent organizations. It suggests that 
regardless as to whether groups are either hierarchical or loose-structured, individual 
preferences are similar from the leadership to the followers and if there are no similar 
preferences, a group tends to break up and splinter- groups will form that follow a 
more unitary goal (Hinkkainen, 2014). It can be argued that preferences could dictate 
the choice of approaches to achieving a goal. Chapter four explains the divisions of 
BH leadership across leadership rivalry modus operandi (e.g. indiscriminate killings) 
and ethnicity. Furthermore, chapter four explains how the different factions are united 
by the common ideology of political Islam. In all the factions of BH, it is yet to be 
determined whether the group is divided on grounds of economic benefits. Notably, 
the former YIM and Ansaru factions and the present Shekau and Abu Musab al-
Barnawi factions share a common ideology and perceived enemy, i.e. the Nigerian 
state, in spite of their divisions. Violent groups such as BH may be divided by 
leadership disputes or ethnicity yet be united in the same cause of political Islam. 
Again, this common goal of political Islam underscores the argument of RCT that a 
terrorist group’s shared utility is driven by the same political goal. This assertion does 
attract counter arguments such as the situation argued by Mitchell (2004: 50) where 
the goals of the principals may be at odds with the goals of the agents of violence, 
which could ultimately lead to in-fighting. However, chapter four emphasizes the 
significant role of leadership in the overall violent choices of BH.  
5.3 Membership composition 
BH members are great in number. Ahmed Salkida, a journalist who has established 
contact with BH, estimates that BH presently has close to 50,000 members (Vanguard, 
2015). These members are predominately a group of Islamists who come from 
different tribes in Northern Nigeria. However, the majority of the members come from 
the Kanuri tribe (BBC, 2015d). Participant Four (A member of the former Presidential 
Committee on BH and senior government official) suggests that BH is largely 
influenced by the Kanuri backgrounds: 
By the common nomenclature, Boko means ‘Western education’ and Haram 
means ‘forbidden’ or ‘don't do it’, and that has been a long-standing practice 
of your average Borno Kanuri man. If you go to a Boko or Western school, 
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you change your culture, you change your religion and you don't behave ‘quote 
and unquote’ like a decent Muslim. 
This statement by Participant Four suggests that such thinking by the majority of the 
Kanuri people has helped popularize BH’s ideology. Moreover, amongst all the 
interview participants, only participants four, five and eight (see chapter seven) were 
able to state the size of the Kanuri element within BH’s composition, which may 
conversely imply that the Nigerian government is unaware of the Kanuri ethnic 
component of BH. As Yusuf and Shekau have used the Kanuri tribe as one of their 
mobilizing platforms for recruitment (see chapter seven and eight), Hausa is the 
second major tribe from which members are drawn. Some scholars argue that a 
significant reason for the Hausa members within BH’s Ansaru faction was the attack 
on the ancient Hausa city of Kano (Mahmood, 2013: 8; Mohammed, 2014: 30). 
Moreover, data from GTD suggest that there was a series of attacks in Kano in the 
year Ansaru broke away from BH. Apart from these two major tribes, there are 
numerous other tribes in the 19 northern states of Nigeria (Onuaha, 2012:2) that are a 
part of BH for theological and ideological reasons. Regardless of this evidence about 
the composition of BH, it remains a Herculean task to quantify the ethnic composition 
of the group due to its clandestine nature. 
BH appears to have evolved in terms of age and gender of members, even 
though no research has been carried out to date that identifies the precise age and 
gender composition of its members. Available information and events (e.g. attacks by 
BH members and arrests of its members by Nigerian security forces) suggest that 
individual leaders and their followers are young. In terms of gender, the majority of 
BH females are young girls who were forced to join the group. In terms of age, 
Participant Four (A member of the former Presidential Committee on BH and senior 
government official) suggests that: 
They [BH] mix themselves within a community and most of the time they 
don’t wear any uniforms or masks [turbans or signs of recognition]. You will 
also see that the younger ones that have been recruited are being motivated in 
the wrong belief that once you kill yourself you go to paradise, you die a 
martyr ... 
A number of Participants suggest that BH members are youths for example, 
Participant Three (A member of the former Presidential Committee on BH and expert 
in conflict negotiation) notes that: 
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BH started more with persuasion and indoctrination, indoctrination to the point 
that many young graduates were completely indoctrinated. 
Participant Six (Involved in the drafting of the National Counter Terrorism Strategy) 
also says that:  
If you notice, most of the radical clerics have followers mostly among the 
teeming masses, and when I say teeming masses, we have large number of 
young people that are not in school, that are not educated.  
Participant Eight (An academic and security consultant who had several contacts with 
BH members) is of the opinion that:  
They [BH] are manipulating and misapplying religion to mobilise the youth - 
unemployed and unskilled youths from the fringes and margins of society and 
those who are dejected and deprived of the very basic essentials of life. 
Similarly, Participant Seven (A media practitioner and conflict negotiator within 
Nigeria) suggests that:  
Most young people attend the Almajiri school system where they are often left 
on their own roaming the streets and begging for food, and as you can imagine, 
these millions of young children grow up without any sound educational 
foundation. 
The comments from these Participants suggest that the majority of BH members are 
youths. Interestingly, the founder of BH and his disciples started BH while they were 
in their youth (see chapter four). In addition to this, a number of suicide attacks have 
been carried out by girls and there are substantial numbers of female recruiters, also 
suggesting that BH has female members. 
5.4 Strategies and opportunities for recruitment 
The majority of violent groups recruit either through top-down or bottom-up methods 
(Hegghammer, 2006). The top-down approach is a process whereby terrorist 
organizations get recruits through an agent or agents, while the bottom-up method 
entails the willingness of individuals to join terrorist groups through personal self-
radicalisation (ibid). While this chapter agrees that both approaches are applicable to 
the recruitment strategies of BH, it argues that the recruitment strategies of violent 
groups are highly dynamic in nature (see Figure 4 below). More specifically, terrorist 
groups can create situational factors such as fear, coercion or hypnotic affects to enlist 
the services of individuals, and that recruitment could be permanent or temporary (for 
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example, the use of mercenaries or informants). Participant Three (A member of the 
former Presidential Committee on BH and expert in conflict negotiation) gives a 
broader view about the various types of BH recruitment, suggesting that: 
 Initially, it started with persuasion in 2008 and 2009; in that period it started 
as more persuasion and indoctrination. Indoctrination to the point that many 
young graduates were so indoctrinated that they took up the  position that 
Western education was truly undesirable and that it is a corruption of mankind. 
By this, meaning that if mankind lives in the pure state that God expects of us, 
then it should have nothing to do with Western education. But many Muslim 
clerics find fault with this because the very things that Boko Haram are using 
are products and by-products of Western education - the vehicles they are using 
and the moving from one place to another are products and by-products of 
Western education. The telephones they use are not from Arabic education, 
they are products of Western education. They are not walking naked, they are 
beautifully dressed, and this is also a product of Western education. Now 
things have changed in BH recruitment to include abduction, kidnapping, 
enforcement and forcible conversion to Islam that we [have] seen in the 
kidnapping of the Chibok girls, for instance. Many people have been abducted 
and there is the use of fear, intimidation and forceful conversion… and at the 
initial stage we were told that part of the indoctrination process included the 
use of date palms. This is extreme because date palms are being used for 
diabolic means as when taken, they hypnotize you and you don't become 
yourself again. These are some of the means used for indoctrination and maybe 
forced religious conversion. 
The above account given by Participant Three highlights the different phases of the 
recruitment processes of BH that will be discussed further later in this chapter. 
Previous studies suggest that BH mobilises individuals through preaching, but 
Participant Three narrates how it has transcended to the use of force and how date 
palms, which are believed to be charmed by black magic, are used to initiate and then 
maintain the loyalty of recruits.   
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Figure 5.5: BH's strategies and opportunities for recruitment: voluntary and 
conscription 
 
Figure 5.5 above illustrates different BH recruitment strategies and opportunities, and 
how they have evolved over time. These strategies and opportunities are discussed 
below. 
5.4.1 Recruitment through preaching 
In the early stages of BH, its members were men between the ages of 20 – 35 years 
old (in contrast to the age of Muhammed Yusuf and his successors). They were 
recruited through preaching. Such preaching involved critiquing government officials 
who were corrupt and lived in ‘opulence’ (Mohammed, 2014). The preaching made 
some poor and unschooled (lacking ‘western’ education) members of the society join 
BH because they saw Yusuf's creed (aqeedah) as an alternative of a corrupt 
system. Other recruits seemed to have been enticed by the oratory prowess and 
charisma of Yusuf. These characteristics of Yusuf encouraged them to enroll in his 
school (Madarasa) where they were radicalised in a formal setting (Dibal, 2009) 
through his creed and scriptural fatwa. The Almajiranci system in Northern Nigeria 
supports the recruitment process of BH to a large extent. Almajiri is a Hausa 
translation for "almuhajiroun", and it refers to an individual who migrates for the 
specific purpose of learning (Aghedo & Eke, 2013). This system has been in practice 
for many years in Northern Nigeria. It allows parents to give up their children from 
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the age of six to travel to other parts of Nigeria where there are Mallams (teachers). 
Their journey is for Quranic education and the learning of the Arabic language 
(Aghedo & Eke, 2013: 103; Oladosu, 2012). These children are given to Mallams who 
stand as their parents and nurture them to the age of maturity (Oladasu, 2012: 1821). 
The system is fashioned to teach these children the art of working for survival and it 
involves the collection of alms for their livelihood. The almajiranci (the practice of 
almajiri) system has changed over time. The teachers (mallams) who look after these 
children sometimes exploit them through forced labour and unpleasant living 
conditions (Aghedo & Eke, 2013). As a result, this forces the almajirai (almajiri: 
plural) into street hawking, domestic servitude, dangerous artisan mining and 
destitution (Aghedo & Eke 2013; Aluaigba 2009), with many becoming available for 
criminal entrepreneurs to recruit (ibid). It is important to note that presently this 
almajiranci system provides a platform for not only children but also young people to 
be strictly mentored by their teacher. BH has taken advantage of the almajiranci 
practice together with the burgeoning youth population in its recruitment and 
radicalisation processes. When describing the rise of BH, Participant Four (A member 
of the former Presidential Committee on BH and senior government official) 
comments: 
Yusuf was arrested; he had a bunker. We visited it in the old railway station in 
Maiduguri, Gonja. I can't remember the name of the place precisely, but it was 
his headquarters and he had gathered there not less than a thousand, maybe 
two or three thousand children pupils or almajiris at [that] time. He would give 
them food and you know what an average Nigerian needs, three square meals, 
he would give them food. We went to the place, [it was] real [and] typical of 
the military - a kind of centre or a regimental set-up. He had his bunkers and 
armouries - lots of these - underground. 
5.4.2 Grievances 
In examining other reasons for people joining BH, this chapter argues that individuals 
may join BH due to fear or grievances resulting from having been caught up in the 
violence between BH and the Nigerian Army within BH-dominated territories. An 
Amnesty International Report (2015) suggests that in 2014, over 1,200 people were 
killed extra-judicially and 20,000 arrested arbitrarily: "Hundreds, if not thousands, of 
Nigerians, have become victims of enforced disappearances and at least 7,000 people 
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have died in military detention as a result of starvation, extreme overcrowding or 
denial of medical assistance." (Amnesty International, 2015a).  
Before BH started using women for suicide bombing, Ahmed Salkida (a 
journalist with longstanding contact with BH), predicted that some aggrieved women 
would be willing to join BH. He narrates that a woman approached him in Maiduguri 
and said to him: 
I was told you have access to Boko Haram. Please take my telephone number 
and give it to them. I lost my husband and two of his brothers at the hands of 
soldiers right before my eyes, and the trauma of this made me have a 
miscarriage. I want to kill as many soldiers as possible before they kill me. 
(Tijjani, 2016). 
The quote above suggests that this woman suffered a miscarriage after seeing her 
husband and two of his brothers killed by Nigerian soldiers. This resulted in the 
woman becoming aggrived and wanting to join BH to kill as many soldiers as she 
could. This example is one of the implications of indiscriminate killings by the 
Nigerian forces, yet this appears to have gone unnoticed by Nigerian CT officials. 
Moreover, it can be hypothesised that the military crackdowns in the main towns of 
Borno, such as Baga (Nossita, 2013) and the Bama massacres (Dearden, 2014) have 
also been instrumental in encouraging people to join BH. Rosendorff & Sandler (2004) 
argue that military actions by governments are capable of radicalising moderate 
individuals to become terrorists.    
5.4.3 Soft loans and marriages 
Due to the killing of many of its members and a decline in its capabilities, BH gives 
soft loans to local entrepreneurs such as butchers, traders, tailors and beauticians. 
These entrepreneurs are not bound to financially pay BH back within a specified 
period of time but are instead expected to pay by committing atrocities (Haruna, 2016). 
Participant One (A former top government official in a Northern Nigerian state) 
confirms the use of soft loans by BH and suggests that: 
The socioeconomic conditions of the regions where Boko Haram thrive are so 
pathetic; perhaps the North-east part of Nigeria can be classified as the axis of 
poverty in this country. Besides the fact that they lack natural resources, human 
resources are not well-developed to the extent that people are trying to survive 
in the face of extreme economic conditions. This is why some of them have 
been so easily enticed by these Islamic preachers. They don't just preach Islam, 
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they preach economic benefits. Some of these preachers encourage people to 
go into small economic activities such as trading and they provide them with 
soft loans to finance this. Sometimes these loans are not repayable but they 
entice them with such loans and go on to say that, ‘He who pays the piper 
dictates the tune.’ And so Islamic education is being combined with certain 
economic benefits that tend to overshadow state Islamic interpretations. 
Participant One further states that: 
Well, there are various ways they recruit. Like I told you, first and foremost 
they recruit by enticing people; trying to disorientate them about conventional 
Islamic teachings and telling them that the Islam that they have been taught is 
not the correct version of Islam. And so they introduce a new version of Islam 
which imbibes violence as a modus... Secondly, like I told you, they give out 
loans to these people, some of whom have never handled amounts like 300,000 
or 400,000 Naira. Overnight you are giving people this kind of money, and it's 
so tempting for them to accept that some of them get into BH in this way. In 
contrast, others are abducted and forced into accepting this money just to 
perhaps save their own lives.  
BH uses women to recruit single women, particularly widows and girls. They lure 
women by connecting them to young male BH members for marriage. This strategy 
was discovered after Nigerian security forces arrested three women, Hafsat Usman 
Bako, Zainab Idris and Aisha Abubakar, who were in charge of recruiting women. BH 
also entices young men by giving them money and marrying them to captured women 
(Gigova, 2014).  
5.4.4 Self-radicalisation and violent extremism: martyrdom and religious duty 
Willing recruits find ways to become members of BH or IS (Islamic State). Individuals 
from affluent families sometimes for example, travel long distances to join BH. In 
May 2016, 41-year-old Ibrahim Uwais, the son of the former Chief Justice of Nigeria 
was killed in Syria while fighting for IS (Sahara Reporters, 2016b). On their way to 
join BH, 21-year-old Ismaila Gambo and his sister were arrested by Nigerian security 
forces (Dickson, 2015; Premium Times, 2015a). Gambo confessed to Nigerian 
security agents that they were on a mission to perform a ‘public-service role’ that 
included delivering food to a BH camp, providing intelligence to BH and also fighting 
for them. He further stated that: 
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I did not just run with my sister. An Islamic State has been established and it 
is thus obligatory for every able-bodied male and female to fight to keep it. I 
wanted the comfort of a new Khalifah.   (Premium Times, 2015a) 
Gambo's statement is reflective of Abrahams' (2008) argument about terrorist 
incentives. He asserts that cohesion and solidarity motivate individuals to join terrorist 
groups, as well as to carry out atrocities. In other words, this sort of motivation is 
encouraged by feelings of belongingness and a sense of fulfilment. An army officer at 
the detention centre of BH suspects, Major Adegboyega Sam, notes that: 
There are many of them here, children of influential Nigerians, and some we 
have been keeping for more than three to four years. We only await instructions 
from above; ours is to follow orders.  (Hart, 2015) 
This is not the first time individuals from affluent background have joined radical 
groups. In an AQAP attack (Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula) in December 2009, 
Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab, the son of a Nigerian billionaire banker, attempted to 
detonate a bomb while on board Northwest Airlines Flight 253 en route 
from Amsterdam to Detroit. This trend of willing recruits joining BH has not been 
captured in early studies on BH; rather the studies rely on poverty as a causal or 
motivating factor for BH violence. As a determinant to violent extremism, poverty is 
a recurring subject of debate within the literature of terrorism. Moreover, poverty is 
also one of the gaps that motivates this thesis. Since these self-radicalised and violently 
motivated individuals are beyond poverty lines, what could be the factors that 
encourage them to violent extremism? To answer this question, we need to understand 
the role of martyrdom in the radicalisation and adoption of violent strategies by these 
willing recruits. Participant Four (Lawyer, Politician and Member of the former 
Presidential Committees on BH), Participant Six (a member of the NACTEST 
Drafting Committee) and Participant Seven (Author and Conflict Analyst) all confirm 
the role of martyrdom and religious benefits, with Participant Four (A member of the 
former Presidential Committee on BH and senior government official) suggesting that: 
Two, when they went to Boko Haram, they..., which is number two, received 
very dangerous indoctrination that once you join their military circle, you fight 
against the constituted authorities or military or whoever they say, and if you 
are killed you go to paradise that is aljanaah. That is the kind of terrible 
indoctrination people have been given and then follow blindly! 
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Participant Six (Involved in the drafting of the National Counter Terrorism Strategy) 
has a similar point, also suggesting that the narrative of individuals who live above the 
national average income becoming involved in radical extremism started before the 
killing of Yusuf (BH’s founder): 
You see, it's about ideology, and when we look at the meaning of ideology, it's 
a means of achieving a particular thing. But the problem is when you are at the 
extreme of ideology, you believe something is absolutely either this or that and 
so there is no room for negotiation at that point in time. And you see, turning 
to violence will not be the intention at the beginning but once people feel they 
can't get what they are looking for, the only way they will think they can is 
with this [violence]. Let me give you an example. Before Mohammed Yusuf, 
there was a case of a group of young people, children of rich people in the 
North-East, and they just took themselves into the bush and said they were 
carving out their own place. What did they mean? They were saying that their 
parents had made money through illegal means, and they didn’t want to be a 
part of that. But one thing is that they were not poor; they had access to money, 
to ammunition, to arms..., and of course the state would repress this and in fact 
they were repressed. But you see, this is what I mean by ideology. Now another 
tactic is being used: if you cannot get something then use the ideology of 
religion, and this is when Boko Haram comes in. The killing of Yusuf was a 
very good excuse to talk about using violence but to me, it was not the real 
cause. 
When discussing BH and international jihadist groups, Participant Seven (a media 
practitioner and conflict negotiator within Nigeria) was very clear in his explanations 
about the role of religious benefits. His comments also focus on individuals beyond 
poverty lines: 
You will find that it is always very, very appealing; these kinds of philosophies 
are very appealing to young Muslims. And now, [it] is not just the alienated 
and the poor who are attracted by this as you can see from the example of the 
Mutallab boy, it is also the rich families whose boys are passionately 
convinced by such preaching of this... Islamic movement. They are convinced 
that they benefit both in terms of their religious belief and the belief that they 
are working for God, [and] that is a satisfaction in itself. That is why a very 
rich young boy from Bauchi, a millionaire's son, will sacrifice everything to 
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go into Boko Haram, so he will gain these benefits. The leaders of course 
invariably benefit financially from their [the] activities [of young willing 
recruits].   
When considering these accounts by Participants about the role of martyrdom, it is 
important to understand why individuals who are not poor engage in self-radicalisation. 
Most of the factors that explain the role of martyrdom can be interpreted through the 
framework of Cole & Cole (2009). Cole and Cole explain how jihad and Islamic 
fundamentalism encourage young British Muslims to become willing recruits of 
Islamic fundamentalist movements. The authors argue that: 
Psychological and social processes encourage radicalism and violent 
extremism through social and economic exclusion, extremist dogma, reactions 
to the global war on terror, association with global jihadist movements and the 
overcoming of an individual's conscience to participate in the act of taking life. 
(Cole & Cole, 2009: 8)  
In the case of BH, it cannot be argued that economic exclusivity is involved because 
some individuals contribute vast sums of money to BH (Dickson, 2015; Premium 
Times, 2015a). 
Social identity is one important reason why people join violent movements. 
This is because violent groups influence both non- and self-radicalised individuals 
through propaganda. Violent groups consciously propagate reasons that justify violent 
behaviours. This situation causes both cognitive and emotional identification among 
willing recruits (Cole & Cole 2009: 21). The identity factor is supported by the belief 
and subsequent rejection of Western culture which is seen as being corrupt and evil. 
Thus, there is a need to ensure purity in Islam. These willing individuals seek to purify 
Islam through a violent form of jihad, which they see as a tool to fight for oppressed 
Muslims. They find justification in the ‘sword verses’ in the Koran (p.49). The sword 
verses say: 
Give thou good tidings to the unbelievers of a painful chastisement; (3) 
excepting those of the idolaters with whom you made covenant, then they 
failed. You naught neither lent support to any man against you. With them 
fulfil your covenant till their term; surely God loves the god-fearing. (4) Then, 
when the sacred months are drawn away, slay the idolaters wherever you find 
them, and take them, and confine them, and lie in wait for them at every place 
of ambush. But if they repent, and perform the prayer, and pay the alms, then 
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let them go their way; God is All-forgiving, All-compassionate. (5) And if any 
of the idolaters seeks of thee protection, grant him protection till he hears the 
words of God. 
The quote above literally suggests that unbelievers (in this case non-jihadists and in 
particular Judea-Christians) who agree with the believers (in this case the jihadists) 
have been absolved by Allah and the holy Prophet. It would therefore not be good for 
unbelievers who have repented to go back to their sinful ways. Idolators should be 
given good treatment through “painful chastisement” and that when the “holy months” 
are gone, unbelievers should be slain wherever they are found until they repent and 
when they repent, they should then be spared.  
The sword verses generate heated controversy between radicalised and non-
radicalised Muslims. Contrary to the interpretation of the jihadists, Holbrook (2010) 
suggests that the jihadists have de-contextualised the Koran to justify violence. The 
author observes that these verses are contextual to when the Koran was revealed by 
God to the Prophet Mohammed during the days of inter-tribal war, and that the verses 
were instrumental for the Prophet to establish Islam during his migration (hijjra) 
between Mecca and Medina. Holbrook (2010) argues that jihadists ignore the parts of 
the Koran that talk about peace, and that leaders of violent movements in fact edit 
medieval texts by inserting radical views to distribute to their various networks in 
order to promote jihadist propaganda. 
The international war on terror, the ousting of Islamic political leaders and 
“genocides against Muslims” internationally are further factors that influence the 
radicalisation of individuals into violence. The United States-led war against the 
Taliban, Al-Qaeda and the overthrowing of Saddam Hussein (Cole & Cole, 2009: 120) 
along with genocides in places such as Kosovo, Bosnia and Chechnya are examples 
of this. These situations can be connected to BH because BH changed its name from 
the Yusuffiya Movement to the Nigerian Taliban (Walker, 2016). Moreover, BH also 
shifted its allegiance from Al Qaeda to IS (Omojuwa, 2015; Lister, 2015). This thesis 
argues that the overthrowing of Muammar Gaddafi not only facilitated the activities 
of terrorist groups across Africa, it also encouraged the radicalisation of individuals. 
Gaddafi was seen as an influential Muslim figure across Northern Nigeria, having 
once suggested that Nigeria should split into Muslim-North and Christian-South. This 
suggestion invoked mixed reactions across Nigeria (Duodo 2010). The death of 
Gaddafi was mourned by many Nigerian Muslims, particularly in the North (Kron 
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2011). Mujahid Asari Dokubo, a former militant and leader of the Niger-Delta 
People's Volunteer Force, who once claimed to be sponsored by Gaddafi, said: 
“[Gaddafi] spilt his blood as a martyr to rekindle the fire of revolution all over the 
world. The people of the world will rise up against this.” (Kron, 2011). 
According to Cole & Cole (2009: 144), willing recruits are influenced by 
physical proximity and friendships translating from virtual to physical. This can be 
likened to the case of Gambo. Gambo and his sister were in contact with a BH recruiter 
over the phone. The Nigerian security agents discovered Gambo's plan because he 
mixed up the phone number given to him by his initiator to call a university lecturer 
(Premium Times, 2015a). 
Another means for recruitment into violent movements is deliberate terrorist 
propaganda via DVDs, the Internet and other media sources (Sageman 2008; Cole & 
Cole 2009). Yusuf, the founder of BH, circulated several of his radical preachings via 
audio cassettes and CDs as well as (Loimeier 2012) on YouTube. Shekau's messages 
and threats are also loaded on YouTube. Participant Six (involved in the drafting of 
the National Counter Terrorism Strategy) suggests that: 
People might be thinking of only financial motivation, but it's not just about 
financial motivation - it is also psychological. If you are following a path that 
everybody in society is condemning, you are likely to start having a rethink. 
But if you have people that are also on this path, this reaffirms your position: 
after all, I’m not the only one thinking this; you understand? Initially, there 
was no contact but now the sharing of ideas, particularly with the Internet, is 
very easy because the sources of information are so many now and no-one has 
control about what somebody else says or control about [over] the content. So 
no control over how they think coupled with the fact that the Nigerian 
government also does not have any serious national orientation policy, and you 
have a situation where some people feel they have obligations; first to my [their] 
religion before I [they] talk about the nation. 
Participant Six suggests that the determinant of self-radicalisation and violent 
extremism is more of a psychological factor. Moreover, the emphasis is on the role of 
communication, notably this being through the Internet, with this highlighting an 
important factor that seems to have been unobserved by other participants. In support 
of the opinion of Participant Six, there is the example of eighteen-year-old Auwal 
Musa, a man from an affluent family from Borno, who was arrested for BH activities. 
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When the reporters visited Musa's mother for an interview, she angrily smashed a 
television to the ground. She said that as parents, they had tried to supervise how their 
children used the Internet (Premium Times, 2015a).  
Since the media plays a significant role in encouraging willing recruits, it is 
important to explore what BH propaganda is. BH messages contain hatred for the West 
and its ‘allies in secularism’, including Nigeria. The messages also depict ‘Islam and 
Muslims’ as a superior religion with superior people and calls for violent evangelism. 
This causes emotional identification with BH because it portrays BH as a movement 
fighting against the depression of Muslims. Moreover, BH propaganda aims to present 
BH as an organisation with a strong military might and the ability to defeat its enemies. 
Below are three excerpts from the propaganda messages of Shekau that explain why 
willing recruits support the Nigerian, regional and international ‘jihad’. From a 
Nigerian perspective, Shekau says: 
We hardly touch anybody except security personnel, Christians and those who 
have betrayed us. Everyone knows what the Christians did to Muslims, not just 
once or twice. Why I've come out to explain myself is because of the 
explanation Jonathan and the CAN [Christian Association of Nigeria] 
President gave on us, including the various versions people give about us that 
we are like cancer (a terrible ailment) in this country called Nigeria. No, we're 
not like cancer, neither are we evil. If people don't know us, God knows 
everyone. Everyone knows what happened to our leader. Everyone knows 
what wickedness has been meted out to our members and fellow Muslims in 
Nigeria from time to time in Zango Kataf, Tafawa Balewa, Kaduna, villages, 
Langtang, Yelwan-Shendam. Different things were meted out to Muslims in 
this country. (Sahara Reporters, 2011) 
In this message, Shekau blames Nigerian security for killing members of his group 
unjustly under a Christian President (President Goodluck Jonathan). Shekau was also 
reacting to statements made by the President of the Christian Association of Nigeria 
(CAN) and some senior officials (BBC, 2011a; Cock & Ouah, 2011). In reaction to 
frequent attacks on churches in 2011/2012, the CAN President condemned BH and 
urged Christians to defend themselves. Shekau also recalls ethno-religious crises that 
happened in Zango Kataf, Tafawa Balewa, Kaduna, Langtang and Yelwan Shendam, 
claiming they were targeted mass killings of Muslims. The above statement made by 
Shekau is indicative of a fault line that Nigerian authorities seem unable to 
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acknowledge. Furthermore, it is this kind of propaganda that 18-year-old Musa Auwal 
drew his inspiration from. Auwal told Nigerian security officers that:  
This nation is openly against Islam and Muslims, especially since Jonathan 
became President, and the evil of this country makes me sick, living in this 
land is haram. (Premium Times, 2015a)  
BH’s propaganda against Africa (the Lake Chad region) can be observed through one 
of Shekau’s claims when he said that:  
We never rose up to fight Africa. We rose up to fight the world; we are going 
to fight the world on the principle that whoever doesn’t obey Allah and the 
Prophet must either obey or die or become a slave. You send 7,000 troops? 
Why don’t you send 70 million? This is small. Only 7,000? By Allah, it is 
small. We can seize them one-by-one. We can seize them one-by-one. 
This comment was Shekau's reaction to a regional alliance against BH in February 
2015 (The Nation, 2015). Below is a comment where Shekau classified Western 
leaders and Nigeria's senior Muslim clerics, traditional rulers and politicians as 
infidels:  
Niger-Delta, you are in trouble; Jonathan, you are in trouble…Ban ki-Moon, 
you are in trouble; Bejamin Netanyahu, you are in trouble; Queen Elizabeth, 
you are in trouble; Babangida, Kwankwaso, Shekarau, Kashim, Buhari, you 
are in trouble. “Yahaya Jingir…the cleric of Jos, the advocate of ‘Boko Halal,' 
right? We are Boko Haram, you are Boko Halal. You will see, bastard. We 
killed Albani of Zaria. We killed Albani of Zaria. Shekau killed Albani of Zaria. 
Tomorrow he will kill Jingir; the day after tomorrow he will kill Dapchia; the 
next day he will kill Wapchama. Next, he will kill Shehu of Borno, Ado Bayero. 
We rebel against you. Between us and you is enmity and rancour until you 
believe only in Allah. The reason why I will kill you is you are infidels, you 
follow democracy…Whoever follows democracy is an infidel. This is Shekau; 
this is why I’m in enmity with you. (Vanguard, 2014) 
Cole & Cole (2009: 295-297) argue that violent extremists use words such as ‘kaffir’ 
(infidels) to ‘dehumanise’ non-members. Such dehumanisation encourages violent 
extremists to kill non-members. In the quote above, Shekau is referring to adherents 
of democracy as infidels. Generally, BH also identifies non-members as kaffirs and 
fasiqun (wrong-doers) (DCCN, 2009: 4; Onuah, 2012; 2), and as such, infidels are 
expected to be killed. It can be argued that these kind of messages motivated Ibrahim 
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Uwais who died fighting for IS, which is the main body of BH. (Sahara Reporters, 
2016b) 
5.4.5 Conscription 
BH recruits through conscription of people, particularly women and minors, and this 
section looks at how and why BH recruits and uses child soldiers. BH has attracted 
global attention with the kidnapping and using of young girls in committing atrocities. 
Video footage was released by the AFP News Agency showing how more than 219 
kidnapped school girls (Chibok girls) were taught how to memorise Quranic verses. 
In explaining their ordeal, some of the girls who escaped described how they were 
conscripted. One of the girls said; 
Every day at dawn they would come and throw water over us and order us to 
wake up and start praying. Then one day they brought in a man wearing 
uniform. They made us all line up and then said to me, ‘Because you are always 
crying, you must kill this man.’ I was given a knife and ordered to cut his neck. 
I said I couldn't do it. They cut his throat in front of me. That's when I passed 
out. (BBC, Africa 2015a) 
The treatment of these young girls is similar to the training process of new recruits in 
Al-Qaeda in the Arab Peninsula (AQAP) where they are indoctrinated, socialised to 
violence and taught how to carry out atrocities (Hegghammer, 2006). The above 
statement shows how these young girls were stripped of their humanity. It further 
corroborates revelations on how girls are forced into suicide bombings of soft targets 
against their will (Zenn & Pearson, 2014; The Guardian, 2014b; Searcey, 2016). Such 
soft targets include public gatherings such as mosques, markets, motor parks and IDP 
camps (internally displaced persons) (The Guardian, 2014b; Searcey, 2016). In a video 
released in 2014, Human Rights Watch interviewed 30 girls and women who had 
escaped from a BH camp: 
They and many others they saw in the camps were subjected to physical and 
psychological abuse, forced labour; forced participation in military operations 
including carrying ammunition or luring men into ambushes, forced marriage 
to the captors and sexual abuse, including rape,” the report says. “In addition, 
they were made to cook, clean and perform other household chores. Others 
served as porters, carrying the loot stolen by the insurgents from villages and 
towns they had attacked. (Guardian, 2014b) 
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Zenn (2014a:6) sees the kidnapping of the Chibok girls as a turning point because it 
subsequently gave BH further incentive to abduct more girls and women.  For instance, 
in April 2014, an unaccounted number of girls were kidnapped in Dikwa Borno state. 
In June 2014, 40 girls were taken from a village near Chibok, and 45 girls were 
abducted in Wagga, Adamawa state (ibid) in October 2014. Young women and 
teenagers are used as sexual slaves and sex is also used as a means of keeping these 
young females loyal to the group. A nine-year-old girl rescued from the BH camp 
embarked on a hunger strike as she wanted to return to her husband in Sambisa forest 
(Marama, 2016). Moreover, it is argued here that some captured girls partake in 
suicide bombing because of the trauma of sexual abuse and bitter jealousy from other 
BH wives, as well as stigmatism from their hometowns (Motlagh, 2016). Fati, a 
fourteen-year-old who escaped from the BH camp, recalls that:  
They came to us to pick us, and they would ask, ‘Who wants to be a suicide 
bomber?'  The girls would shout, ‘Me, me, me!’" (Swails & McKenzie, 2016)  
Fati's statement indicates the girls’ desperation to be picked for a suicide mission. Fati 
also recalled that most of the abducted girls were eager to be chosen for suicide 
bombing so that they could escape from captivity. Some of the girls who were selected 
for suicide bombings would run to Nigerian soldiers to get help unstrapping the 
explosives they were carrying (Swails & McKenzie, 2016).  
Another form of conscription that has not been given much attention by 
researchers and security experts is the use of young boys in carrying out attacks. This 
was noticed in 2013 particularly during the Benisheikh massacre in Borno state, where 
eyewitnesses testified to having seen children as young as 12 years carrying AK47 
rifles (HRW, 2013). 
Parents also voluntarily offer their children to join BH or to become tools for 
suicide bombing. In December 2014, a thirteen-year-old strapped with explosives was 
arrested in Kano. She confessed that her parents took her to a forest in Gidan Zana, a 
village on the outskirts of Kano city. In her meeting with BH members, she stated that: 
They said, 'Can you do it?' I said, 'No'," [and] yhey said, 'You will go to heaven 
if you do it.' I said, 'No, I can't.' They said they would shoot me or throw me 
into a dungeon. (BBC, 2014c). 
From the above findings, BH’s use of child soldiers mirrors Becker (2009) argument 
that child soldiers are abducted, threatened and abused. It also underscores the 
argument that child soldiers are in abundance, they are cheap to maintain (Dallaire, 
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2011), easily indoctrinated and cost less - especially when they come from a poor 
background (Beber & Blattman, 2013). 
This thesis argues that the stigmatism of female victims by BH-affected 
communities could subject females to shaming and therefore a reluctuance to return 
to their communities and even the possibility of commiting suicide. Moreover, 
possible stigma motivates and drives female victims to carry out attacks. The 
kidnapping of girls by BH is strategic: BH takes girls because they can easily be 
controlled through sexual (intimate) attachment to male members of BH. In June 2016, 
when Nigerian forces invaded the Sambisa Forest they found not only a stockpile of 
arms, but also sexual enhancement drugs (Premium Times, 2016). As mentioned 
before, one of the female victims of BH undertook a hunger strike in order to go back 
to her BH husband. The use of conscription of young girls has the added benefit to BH 
of their being able to use these girls to entice more male recruits. The recruitment of 
women by BH started in 2013/2014 when there was a period of intense pressure on 
BH as key BH leaders and foot soldiers were being killed and captured (this is 
discussed in more detail in chapter six). Hence, it is argued that child soldiers can be 
used to augment foot soldiers in an organisation when there is a decrease in skilled 
fighters. BH uses young girls for suicide bombing because they appear harmless. The 
majority of the previous onslaughts on civilian populations were predominantly 
carried out by men who could be more easily identified by their appearance. The 
culture of wearing a hijab and of women and men not having close contact in public 
spaces or on transport in northern Nigeria such as the Adaidaita Sahu (an ethno-
religious value orientation programme in Kano state) (Barde, 2005) has facilitated the 
use of women for suicide bombing. 
BH’s choice of male child soldiers in combat is indicative of their belief that 
boys have more capacity and fortitude to fight on battlefields than the females, and 
that boys can be more easily detected in public if they are on a suicide bombing 
mission. It is also important to note that all of the known child kidnappings were in 
the Borno Yobe axis and not in Kano or other parts of the North-western state of 
Nigeria where BH once existed. This further indicates that the abduction and 
recruitment of child soldiers can be opportunistic due to their proximity to terrorist 
hideouts or host communities. Although Muslim child soldiers are also abducted, it is 
fair to argue that BH has predominately kidnapped children from non-Muslim and 
non-Kanuri speaking communities. For instance, Chibok town where more than 219 
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girls were abducted has huge numbers of Christians and speakers of the Kibaku 
language (Nossita, 2014).  Targeting non-Muslims and non-Kanuri may have been 
undertaken in order to attack Muslim and Kanuri communities, with the attackers 
perhaps carrying out such attacks as a form of retaliation. Alternatively, attacking non-
Muslim and non-Kanuri territory may be because the conversion of these young 
individuals changes generations. It changes generations by breaking down the fabric 
of these communities by reducing their motivation to fight back.  
5.4.6 Other explanations 
In addition to all the aforementioned forms of recruitment, individuals also join and 
support BH because of fear and international solidarity. In terms of fear, BH has over-
powered Nigerian security forces by invading their barracks and taking the weapons 
of the Nigerian army and police. BH has also captured 21 major towns in Borno, Yobe 
and Adamawa states (THISDAY, 2016a). Hence it is fair to argue that willing and 
aggrieved individuals may either be part of BH for self-protection or to revenge their 
grievances against the state through violence, or be too scared to say no to threats and 
blackmail. 
BH enjoys international and local solidarity. The group employs the temporary 
services of fellow Mujahedeen (Weeraratne, 2015: 13) from countries such as Mali, 
Libya and Chad to engage in major attacks such as the seizure of territories in order to 
establish caliphates (this is discussed further in chapter eight). Locally, BH engages 
the services of non-members such as street hawkers, local artisans and other people in 
the streets to gather information about military operations (Zenn, 2013). It has also 
been discovered by Nigerian security that BH drug people to engage in their campaign. 
This strategy was used in May 2016 when a thirty-year-old was drugged and strapped 
with explosives and directed to bomb Kantin Kwari market of Kano (The Telegraph, 
2016). 
5.5 Chapter conclusions 
This chapter has attempted to explain how BH is structured and organised, and it has 
described the bureaucratic nature of BH and the way in which field operations are 
coordinated. Moreover, it has investigated the internal dynamics of the group 
regarding their internal cohesion. It also has identified factors such as authoritarian 
leadership, internal division, decreasing public sympathy, counter-terrorism, internal 
pressures and a decrease in operational capacity that have altered the organisational 
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structure and spread of BH. Within the broader field of terrorism, these factors could 
be used to explain how the changing nature of terrorist group composition comes about 
and how it affects aspects of their campaign. 
This chapter also contributes to the argument on old and new terrorism. Even 
though BH has the attributes of new terrorism in terms of goals and lethality in 
perpetrating violence, it does not reflect a clear-cut loose organisational structure as 
suggested by the proponents of the new concept of terrorism such as Neuman (2009). 
BH is a hybrid between a cell and a hierarchical structure with the cell being essential 
for the survival of the organisation. Moreover, it has been argued that the structure of 
violent organisations depends on their survival strategy. Chapter six explains the 
implications and causes of the hybrid structure of BH and also argues that BH has 
created a cell structure for survival as a result of not only pressure from the Nigerian 
forces, but also as part of an expansionist agenda.  
This chapter has further challenged the argument espoused by Mitchell (2004) 
about the likelihood of a frosty relationship between the principals and agents of 
violence. It suggests that BH reflects the assumption of the unitary model of RCT and 
in reflection of Hinkkainen (2014), this chapter has argued that both the leaders and 
followers of violent movements have common preferences. Moreover, since violent 
movements are mostly elites fighting for the masses, it is difficult for followers to 
revolt, and so they would rather split and join a more unitary goal. However, it is 
argued that since the leadership of BH has a major influence on the movement, 
followers only divide due to leadership disputes caused by conflict choices related to 
operations and ethnic affiliations. In spite of these internal disputes, BH has shown 
that it is united by the common goal of political Islam.  
This chapter identifies the Kanuri ethnic element of BH’s composition. This 
ethnic element implies that BH uses ethnicity in recruiting its members (chapter eight 
discusses in detail the use of Kanuri ethnicity by BH). Despite this, Nigerian 
authorities seem to overly concentrate on BH’s radical Islam.    
This study has illustrated that BH’s strategy of using child soldiers is 
opportunistic, financially motivated and purely economical in its use to address 
decreasing numbers among its skilled members. It also has highlighted that the use of 
child-soldiers can be effective when they belong to a different religion and background 
to that of the terrorist. In addition, the study has outlined that the use of young girls 
for suicide bombing is effective when they are subjected to trauma and stigma. 
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Because girl recruits have less fortitude to engage in combat, male recruits are engaged 
in combat while the girls engage in suicide attacks. Moreover, female recruits attract 
more male recruits.  
By understanding the group explanation for BH violence, this chapter has 
attempted to answer the research question about how BH is organised and who its 
members are. Moreover, the chapter has also analysed how these members are 
recruited and how the different recruitment strategies affect the group. The majority 
of early studies (Adesoji, 2010 & 2011; Maiangwa et al., 2012; Agbiboa, 2013; 
Hansen & Musa, 2013) on BH have attributed religion and poverty as the main 
narratives and opportunities used by BH for recruitment. However, this chapter argues 
that that the strategies adopted by BH over time are highly dynamic and sophisticated 
(as illustrated in Figure 5.5), and it has identified some of the gaps in the overall 
explanation about the reasons and motivations of people joining BH. Alternatively, it 
suggests that there are multifarious ways in which BH recruit individuals. Moreover, 
this chapter has suggested that over time, BH has applied a broad range of recruitment 
types to sustain its violent campaign. Finally, the chapter has illustrated how BH 
started with recruitment through evangelism and then moved towards other forms of 
recruitment. These other forms of recruitments include, abduction, hypnosis, coercion, 
self-radicalisation/recruitment, fear, tauma, revenge (grievances) and solidarity with 
other international Jihadists. With regards to self-radicalisation, the Nigerian 
authorities’ attention to this appears to be insufficient. Consideration has not been 
giving to how BH’s propaganda through the media gradually radicalises and pushes 
individuals towards joining BH. Furthermore, Nigerian authorities also appear to have 
inadequate knowledge of how their indiscriminate killings influence individuals into 
joining BH. In fact, the consequences of indiscriminate killings make fear, trauma and 
grievances highly pertinent and instrumental in BH’s ability to recruit members.  
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Chapter 6:  State Level Explanation 
This chapter discusses two topics regarding the Nigeria’s counter-terrorism (CT) 
efforts. First, it examines the Nigerian state’s CT strategy and BH’s tactically violent 
responses; second, it assesses whether Nigerian CT is effective or counter-productive.  
According to Lum et al. (2006: 491), CT involves, "prevention and alleviation 
of early risk factors, situational prevention of actual events, or post-event responses." 
(Kula, 2015: 27). In the case of BH, Nigerian CT focuses on a post-event response 
because BH was not perceived as lethal until 2011, resulting in the Nigerian 
government initially underestimating their capacity for violence. The majority of 
studies in the literature on BH (Agbiboa, 2013a; 2013b; Maianguwa 2014) suggest 
that the reaction of the Nigerian state to BH and the eventual killing of Yusuf, the 
founder of the movement, in fact facilitated BH’s eruption of violence. Initially, the 
Nigerian government started with a hard-line approach including the use of military 
action and the use of declared states of emergency, before they included a softer 
approach with the enactment of the National Counter Terrorism Strategy (NACTEST) 
in 2014. Nigeria had no clear-cut CT policies until 2011 when the Terrorism Protection 
Act (TPA) was enacted (later replaced by the 2013 TPA). Moreover, Nigeria had no 
CT strategy until 2014 (NACTEST), with this being revised in 2016. Even with the 
introduction of NACTEST, Nigeria appears to prioritise the use of an aggressive 
approach. State response to terrorist groups is divided into violent and nonviolent 
responses. Violent response refers to military actions that are enforced through 
targeted killings of terrorists, raids or the infiltration of terrorist groups. On the other 
hand, nonviolent responses are non-military defensive approaches that include the use 
of legislation, punishment or technology (Enders & Sandler, 1993). Therefore, this 
chapter will analyse both violent and nonviolent responses to BH by the Nigerian state. 
To understand how BH has responded to Nigerian CT, the strategic model of 
rational choice theory (RCT) has been applied to examine changes in BH’s tactics 
over time. This model is suitable for explaining the ever-changing nature of terrorist 
strategies. The strategic model suggests that terrorism is a strategic use of violence by 
individuals and groups. It sees both terrorist groups and the state as players who seek 
to optimise their goals within existing constraints (Sandler et al., 1983). Sandler et al. 
(1983) argue that a government’s actions determine and are determined by actions, so 
both terrorists and governments act on and in anticipation of each other's actions. In 
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chapter five, different individuals having different preferences, with these being 
secondary to organisational goals, were discussed. Thus BH can be analysed 
strategically as a unitary actor, and this chapter argues that BH is a strategic actor 
because of its attempts to achieve its goals by adapting to the Nigerian government’s 
measures. Furthermore, it argues that both the Nigerian government and BH are 
procedurally rational. This strategic model emanates from Classical Economic Theory 
(Simon, 1995; Abrahams, 2008; Van um, 2015). Moreover, it is concerned with how 
terrorist groups use violence against state forces, officials and civilians in order to 
achieve political concessions (Van Um, 2015). In relation to terrorism, the 
Contemporary Strategic Model is anchored on three assumptions, which stipulate that: 
(1) rational actors have relatively stable and consistent goals;  
(2) actors compare the expected costs and benefits of the options before them;  
(3) actors choose options with the most favourable utility.   
Max Abrahams (2008) criticises these three assumptions of the Contemporary 
Strategic Model, and suggests seven puzzles that contradict its trifold position: 
(1) terrorists will not optimise their goals by attacking civilians;  
(2) terrorism is not a last resort and it is usually difficult for groups to transform into 
non-violent movements;  
(3) terrorists reject policy concessions offered by governments;  
(4) terrorists have unstable political platforms;  
(5) terrorists carry out anonymous attacks, making it difficult for a government to 
make policy concessions;  
(6) terrorist organisations with factions attack each other more than their enemies (i.e. 
governments); 
 (7) terrorist groups resist disbanding regardless to whether they achieve or 
consistently fail to meet their goals.  
This chapter adapts the three assumptions of the contemporary strategic model 
because terrorists’ actions are determined by both their goals and the environment, 
and this thesis would argue that the rationality of terrorists often accounts for their 
changing of strategies targets.   
Acting strategically defines target choices of terrorists. Although some existing 
literature on CT suggests that terrorists’ ideology determines their target types (Drake, 
1998; Engene, 2004), preferences are more likely to have initially been driven by 
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ideology but with an adaptation towards softer targets becaue of constraints CT has 
placed on the group - hence acting strategically.  
Additionally, it is important to look at the target choice of terrorist groups by 
their ability and opportunity to attack particular targets whether these be state forces, 
state representatives or civilians. Hence it is important to explain the logic of BH’s 
campaign of violent response to the Nigerian state through Costly Signalling, as 
argued by Kydd & Walter (2006). This is important because it also highlights the 
additional reasons as to why BH attacks indiscriminately (including civilians and state 
forces). Kydd & Walter (2006) highlight five logics of Costly Signalling. They argue 
that because words are inadequate at conveying a message to a government or 
perceived enemies, violence is used to optimise a terrorist group’s preferred utility. 
Therefore, terrorist attacks are in the form of: 
 (1) attrition to deter enemies from making certain policies;  
(2) intimidation of a population to demonstrate that the terrorists are stronger than the 
government in order to enforce obedience from a population;  
(3) provocation strategy (or “intending to”) to force a government to engage in 
indiscriminate violence which will push citizens towards support of the terrorists;  
(4) spoiling strategy which depicts the moderates on the side of the terrorists as 
untrustworthy in negotiations;  
(5) outbidding strategy as a way of convincing a population that one rival group is 
stronger than another.  
As discussed in chapter five, BH attacks have pushed Nigerian forces to crack down 
on the towns of Bama and Baga, thereby enticing moderates to join BH. Moreover, 
BH also carries out attacks as a message or in response to someone or something. This 
chapter, along with chapter seven, gives more insight into this assertion.   
Studies on CT are divided into two broad arguments. The proponents 
(Mesquita & Dickson, 2007; Jason, 2009) see it as a useful tool for degrading and 
ending terrorist groups. On the other hand, opponents (Byman, 1998; Rosendorff & 
Sandlers, 2004) of this approach assert that terrorists deliberately carry out attacks to 
get public sympathy, and then attract willing recruits due to government reaction. This 
increase in violence can turn moderate individuals into extremists. In a meta-analysis 
of over 20,000 studies conducted by Lum et al., (2006), only seven studies indicate 
that CT is effective in ending terrorist groups. In analysing how terrorism ends, Libicki 
& Jones (2008) studied 268 violent groups in existence between 1968 and 2006. The 
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findings of their study suggest that out of the 268 groups, 43% ended through political 
transition, 40% ended through policing and intelligence, 10% ended because the 
terrorist groups achieved their goals and 7% ended through the use of military force.  
Libicki & Jones (2008) suggest that ending terrorism requires multiple 
approaches. In addition to the factors they studied, giving aid to countries dealing with 
terrorism, imposing economic sanctions on states supporting terrorism, discouraging 
terrorism by hardening targets and engaging in diplomacy are all essential tools for 
countering terrorism. Different countries have different ways of combating terrorism 
depending on the country’s background (Kula & Ciftci, 2015: 27). Moreover, different 
countries have distinctive institutional histories, constraints and histories in relation to 
terrorism. It is therefore imperative to understand the nature of Nigeria’s CT in the 
context of the Nigerian state. Explaining Nigeria’s CT policies helps when evaluating 
the effectiveness of such policies towards BH. Nigeria's CT approach against BH 
largely includes military force, with a lesser amount of a soft approach through the use 
of intelligence, regional and international cooperation and de-radicalisation; thus it is 
possible to compare how effective these different approaches are. Through the use of 
statistics from the GTD (Global Terrorism Database), this chapter gives a descriptive 
analysis of the Nigerian government and BH’s confrontation. 
This study is different from other studies on BH because it examines the case of 
BH in depth to see whether CT impacts on the tactics of BH, as well as how and why 
it might do so. The contribution of this chapter to the study on BH also includes 
anecdotal evidence from local negotiators’ and senior Nigerian government officials’ 
interview data. These officials include those who drafted the NACTEST and can 
therefore account for the government’s perception of strategies being used against BH. 
State level investigation into the BH campaign is critical in understanding the Nigerian 
state’s role in triggering and exasperating radical extremism and violent reactions, as 
well as assessing the effectiveness of CT on BH. It is also important in explaining the 
changing tactics of BH in response to the Nigerian state. This chapter is structured 
under the following themes:  
• Nigeria’s CT legislation and its complexities;  
• NACTEST and the introduction of a softer CT approach;  
• Nigeria and BH as strategic actors;  
• assessment of the effectiveness of CT on BH.  
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In the process of analysing Nigerian CT, this chapter will also highlight how politics 
and links to Nigerian political elites have transformed BH into a full-blown terrorist 
group. The adoption of terror by BH can be likened to Weinberg’s (1991) observation 
about how political parties turn to violence. In the case of BH, it is not the structure of 
a certain political party that has turned to violence, but that some political actors have 
had failed agreements with the group (Falana, 2012).    
6.1 Nigeria’s CT: complexities, policy and strategies  
Why was Nigeria unable to design CT policies until the emergence of BH, in spite of 
the September 2001 resolution 1373 of the United Nations Security Council (UNSC)? 
Following the September 11 Attacks (9/11) in the US, UNSC resolution 1373 
recommended that member states of the UN design domestic laws against terrorism. 
Nigeria was unable to create a timely anti-terrorism law because Nigerian policy 
makers saw terrorism as a new phenomenon. Also, there were political sentiments that 
encumbered the passage of the terrorism bill in both 2005 and 2006 (Sampson & 
Onuoha, 2011: 38).    
Before the emergence of BH, the Nigerian state successfully used military 
action and incarcerations to end two violent extremist movements in the 1970s and 
1980s - the Maitasine and the IMN (Islamic Movement in Nigeria). Given these past 
successes, Nigerian leaders underestimated BH. They saw BH as a violent group that 
could be destroyed quickly through the use of military action, with some participants 
confirming such thinking was common. Participant One (a former top government 
official in a Northern Nigerian state) notes: 
Well to a certain extent there was a degree of mismanagement of the crisis by 
Nigerian security, but this also goes to tell you that Nigerian security is being 
confronted with an unconventional issue. Never in the history of Nigeria or 
any African country have we come into contact with a group that operates like 
BH, and so our soldiers and security operators never envisaged that they would 
be confronted with the things they’ve faced. So, with this new phenomenon, 
of course they have had to update their knowledge by working alongside other 
countries that have had similar experiences. 
According to Participant One, Nigerian soldiers did not receive training on countering 
terrorist groups because BH’s operational style was alien to the Nigerian military. The 
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soldiers specialised in direct combat and they therefore had to be updated in modern 
techniques for countering terrorist groups.  
Similarly, Participant Six (involved in the drafting of the National Counter Terrorism 
Strategy) notes: 
Let me tell you this; the problem actually is the strategy itself, and I can say 
this authoritatively that until very recently - when I say recently I mean as 
recently as early 2014 - there was no documented counter-insurgency strategy 
for the country. I can say this because I participated in the drafting of the 
strategy! You will see that under such circumstances along with no a history 
of dealing with such an insurgency, it was an asymmetrical war and this is not 
the normal kind of thing for us. So I tell you that this initially jolted the military. 
It jolted the military, and the thinking that that you can simply use force was 
counter-productive. It should have been pari passu. 
While Participant One concentrates on the military’s experience, Participant Six, a 
member of the NACTEST Drafting Committee, talks both about the military’s 
experience and Nigeria’s CT. Hence, it is important to note that initially, BH’s violent 
strategies were new to both security forces and Nigerian policy makers. In support of 
the views expressed by Participants One and Six, about 120 Nigerian Police Force 
(NPF) officers were trained by the US Department of State’s Anti-terrorism 
Assistance (ATA) in 2012 in how to detect and detonate IEDs. Customs and 
immigration also received training on how to tackle border security challenges (ibid). 
Furthermore, Participant One (a former top government official in a Northern Nigerian 
state) says: 
In this case, they [Nigerian forces] have to be trained in counter-terrorism and 
then trained in confronting counter-terrorism. I think one needs some time to 
have a very good grasp on how to go about this. Nigerian security is trying to 
minimise casualties in this fight because these people are embedded within our 
communities, so trying to weed them out and fight them puts the communities 
in which they are hiding in danger. So, Nigerian security is being very cautious; 
optimistic, but very cautious. 
 From the account of Participant One, it is fair to infer that initially Nigerian security 
personnel encountered difficulty in identifying BH members within local civilian 
populations. This is true because a combination of local hunters, vigilantees and 
volunteers called the Civilian JTF were formed to assist Nigerian security agencies in 
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identifying and fighting BH members within local communities in the Borno-axis (Fox 
News 2016). The Nigerian state was worried about the risk of killing non-combatant 
civilians, and this is also why security personnel training was being run across the 
Nigerian state. Despite this training, Amnesty International Reports (2015a, 2015b) 
for 2014 and 2015 suggest that unarmed civilians were killed and /or subjected to 
hardship by the Nigerian military. While both Participant One and Six admit that 
countering BH had been difficult and mismanaged, other participants remained silent 
on this issue. Participant One’s statement about minimising casualties indicates that 
there have indeed been indiscriminate killings by Nigerian forces, as confirmed by an 
Amnesty International Report (2015a, 2015b). This may be the reason why the 
participants still indicate their knowledge of aggrieved individuals joining BH because 
of the violent CT approaches of Nigerian forces.       
Due to the Nigerian government’s inadequate knowledge of terrorism, Nigeria 
initially relied on Sections 15 and 46 of the Economic and Financial Crimes 
Commissions (EFCC) Act of 2004 to deal with terrorism before the enactment of their 
own CT policies. Section 15 clearly defines the act of collecting or supporting terrorist 
activities as an act of terrorism. Section 46 sees any act that is inimical to life and 
liberty or any intention or action that causes damage to the public, the environment or 
cultural heritage as being terrorism. Section 46 defines insurrection as terrorism, as 
well as any actions that disrupt the government’s ability to deliver public services. The 
Act also states that sponsorship and support of prohibited activities are criminal acts 
and therefore punishable. Moreover, the Act sees violations of either the criminal or 
penal codes as an offence against the Nigerian state. In the Southern part of Nigeria, 
the criminal code is used in the adjudication of justice, whereas the penal code is 
applicable in Northern Nigeria. Section 46 appears ambiguous because it notes that 
civic protest towards or resistance to governmental policies could be deemed as an act 
of terrorism, with such interpretations possibly leading to human rights abuse as well 
as disproportionate force being used against dissidents. I would argue that this law 
was used to justify the actions of the government against BH during and after several 
clashes between them and Nigerian forces. It is important to point out that the EFCC 
Act was not designed as a CT policy, but rather it was established to fight increasing 
levels of corruption in Nigeria. 
The second reason Nigeria was unable to enact its CT laws on time was 
because after the establishment of the EFCC Act of 2004, there were two attempts in 
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2005 and 2006 to establish CT laws and both were unsuccessful. In 2005, a bill on CT 
could not pass through the second reading of the Nigerian senate as it was rejected by 
the majority of Northern Muslim senators who saw it as anti-Muslim (Country Report 
on Terrorism, 2005). In 2006, another bill was sponsored on the prevention of 
terrorism, but was rejected by both Northern and Southern senators. In this second 
attempt, the senators from the South saw the bill as a bid to criminalise the “just 
struggle” of the Niger-Delta region’s people (Sampson & Onuoha, 2011: 38). The 
Niger-Delta region’s people, otherwise known as the South-south region, see their 
struggle as a fight against under-development, environmental hazards, political 
alienation and a desire for control of their resources.       
The severity of BH violence forced Nigerian lawmakers to enact the TPA 
(Terrorism Protection Act) in 2011, and this new law gave a broader definition of 
terrorism. The major difference in terms of the definition between TPA 2011 and 
Sections 46 of the EFCC Act of 2004 is in Section 1(2) of TPA 2011. This Section 
considers the intended and malicious aim to damage both domestic and international 
individuals and organisations as being terrorism. It interprets kidnapping and the 
seizure of aircraft or any other means of transportation as terrorism. Moreover, it 
charges the manufacturing of weapons for the purpose of such acts as terrorism. 
Additionally, TPA 2011 proscribed organisations from adopting terrorism as it sees 
the support of such groups as terrorism.  
In 2013, TPA 2011 was amended with two main issues necessitating these 
amendments. Firstly, there were growing human rights concerns about how terrorism 
suspects were dealt with (Omolaye-Ajileye, 2015). Section 25 of the TPA 2011 gave 
powers to the National Security Adviser (NSA) and Inspector General of Police (IGP) 
to search and arrest people without a warrant. Section 28 permitted the detention of 
terrorism suspects without access to any individual except for medical reasons. 
Omolaye-Ajileye (2015), a Senior Judge of Kogi State High Court, argued that such 
situations enabled the government to declare any opposition as being terrorism. 
However, section 28 (4) of the 2013 TPA (the current CT Act) stipulates that a suspect: 
… may, on the approval of the Head of the relevant law enforcement agency, 
be placed under house arrest and be monitored by its officers, have no access 
to phones or communication gadgets, and may only speak to counsel after the 
conclusion of the investigation. 
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Moreover, the prosecuting powers that had been given to the NSA and IGP were 
relinquished and given to the Nigerian Attorney General of Federation (AGF) 
(Omolaye-Ajileye, 2015:40). This meant that the AGF under section 30(1) was able 
to apply CT laws when prosecuting suspects. Furthermore, TPA 2011 provided no 
single administrative structure to coordinate the fight against terrorism. The police, 
the military, the Department of State Security (DSS) and other Nigerian security 
outlets were individually trying to combat terrorism. The TPA of 2013 under section 
2(1) empowered the ONSA (Office of the National Security Adviser) to be the national 
coordinating body in the fight against terrorism. This development paved the way for 
a more coherent strategy for combating terrorism. In 2014, Nigeria enacted its first 
ever CT called NACTEST, which Participant Six was involved in drafting. 
6.2 The introduction of NACTEST and the inclusion of a nonviolent 
approach to Nigeria’s CT 
Before the introduction of NACTEST, nonviolent approaches were used to try to halt 
BH attacks. Public places, organisations and buildings such as motor parks, spiritual 
centres, hotels or government buildings used portable bomb detectives to try to prevent 
suicide bombings. As well as military raids, army and police checkpoints were 
stationed within and outside of major cities and villages where BH had attacked. To 
some extent, the use of checkpoints was successful in pre-empting attacks such as the 
8 October 2013 intercepted attacks which were planned to disrupt the Sallah 
celebrations in Kano city (The Herald, 2013). On 13 July 2013, the Nigerian army 
intercepted a fuel tanker in Kebbi state belonging to BH. The gas compartment of the 
truck was loaded with arms and ammunitions (Onuoha, 2013); and on 29 August 2015, 
Abuja airport was targeted by BH (Reuters, 2015). The efforts of the Nigerian forces 
at forestalling attacks extended beyond the introduction of NACTEST However, I 
would argue that even as this strategy yields some amount of success, BH members 
can easily carry out attacks because they use more IEDs in suicide bombings than 
sophisticated military hardware such as grenades and mortar bombs. It is easy for BH 
members to pass through security checkpoints with different IED components, thereby 
rendering such checkpoints ineffective.   
The significant achievement NACTEST brought to Nigerian CT policies was 
the application of intelligence in CT efforts, as well as the introduction of a 
psychological approach. NACTEST seeks to prevent individuals from participating in 
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terrorism, to secure lives and properties and to pre-empt terrorist plans and attacks. 
Additionally, it aims to manage the impact of terrorist attacks and to create a synergy 
among the three tiers of government and civil society organisations (CSOs) in fighting 
terrorism (NACTEST 2014 p. 2-5). NACTEST also involves the Counter Extremism 
and Violence Programme (CVE), which comprises the following four primary issues: 
de-radicalisation of convicted terrorists and accused individuals standing trial; 
government-to-society approach; building of strategic communication for the military 
and other security bodies and identification of the economic causes of terrorism and 
possible solutions. (Premium Times, 2014). NACTEST is the application of a “carrot 
and stick” approach in which both violent and nonviolent methods are applied. But 
more significantly, the introduction of NACTEST has incorporated a better-planned 
soft approach to Nigeria’s CT efforts. NACTEST also provides roles for all the Federal 
Ministries, Departments and Agencies (MDAs), non-governmental organisations 
(NGOs), Faith-based Organisations (FBOs) and influential individuals to be able to 
contribute to the ending of terrorism.  
NACTEST consists of four streams (NACTEST, 2014; Premium Times, 2014). 
Firstly, it seeks to de-radicalise suspected BH members in Nigerian prisons; secondly, 
it includes a broader inter-community counter violent extremism (CVE) programme 
within family, cultural and religious organisations; and thirdly, it focuses on 
communications between military/law enforcement agencies and civilian populations. 
It also seeks to counter the negative civilian perception narrative of law enforcement. 
This has to do with educating people that terrorism is not a part of Islam and that the 
Nigerian law enforcement agencies are not against Islam, with this also focusing on 
maintaining peaceful co-existence between Christians and Muslims. Fourthly, it 
concentrates on economic interventions in the Northeast of Nigeria, which has been 
devastated by government dereliction and BH’s violent campaign, and the Presidential 
Initiative for the Northeast (PINE) Programme, which is designed to rebuild the 
economy of this region (Premium Times, 2014). 
Since the introduction of NACTEST in 2014, there is some evidence of its 
implementation. In an effort to gather reliable data about the identity of Nigerians, in 
2015 the Central Bank of Nigeria (CBN) mandated all commercial banks capture 
customer bio-data (merged with the mobile numbers of customers) through a Bank 
Verification Number (BVN) registration exercise. The BVN registration was followed 
by the de-activation by various telecommunication companies of over 38 million 
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unregistered mobile lines belonging to Nigerians, with the consent of the NSA 
(National Security Adviser) (All Africa 2015). At a regional level, an intelligence 
coordination centre was set-up in Abuja to increase intelligence sharing within 
neighbouring countries in the Lake Chad Basin (ibid). Under the Multi-National Task 
Force, Nigeria established military cooperation with neighbouring countries to combat 
BH (BBC, 2014d). Nigeria also engages in international co-operation against 
terrorism, such as the Trans-Sahara Counter-terrorism Partnership (TSCTP) and 
Islamic Countries Against Terrorism (ISMAT). Furthermore, Nigeria has received 
international support for the further training of security and judicial personnel to 
support the fight against BH. In 2014, the British government trained the Nigerian 
Judicial system in how to deal with terrorism cases (Country Report on Terrorism, 
2014). In relation to the CVE, the ONSA initiated a prison-based de-radicalization 
programme. The programme was designed to train Nigerian Prison Services (NPS) 
officers to, “develop risk assessment and case management tools and writing detailed 
de-radicalisation programme guide and training manual” (Barkindo and Bryans, 2016: 
6). The ONSA’s target was to gradually change the “belief, views, values and attitude” 
(ibid) of prisoners and BH suspects, and not just to disengage them from violence 
(ibid). In an attempt to achieve de-radicalisation, ONSA decided to conduct a pilot 
programme by using the Kuje minimum security prison to set up a facility that 
included a mosque, teaching rooms and sports equipment (ibid).    
Why is ending the BH campaign harder than ending violent movements such 
as Maitasine (decapitating) and IMN (disengaging)? It is because BH is in many ways 
different to these two groups. It also demonstrates the failure on the part of the 
Nigerian lawmakers in making timely and effective policies that would counter BH or 
other forms of terrorism. Moreover, Sections 15 and 46 of the EFCC Act of 2004 did 
not adequately define what constitutes terrorism. Additionally, when the TPA 2011 
emerged, it had few considerations for human rights, which also contributed to the 
radicalisation of individuals. Setting up a coordinating body for combating terrorism 
(ONSA) and the subsequent adoption of NACTEST made Nigeria’s CT more 
organised. 
In August 2016, ONSA reviewed the NACTEST 2014 (Ajayi, 2016). 
NACTEST 2014 only specified the roles of ministries and MDAs, but no special desks 
had been designated within government institutions to coordinate and address 
terrorism issues. The major addition of NACTEST 2016 was that it set up a more 
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organised administrative structure within government institutions to help facilitate 
Nigerian CT efforts. As a result, government institutions each have liaison officers 
who monitor, evaluate and review the efforts of agencies periodically.  
I would argue that NACTEST has not been fully utilised because of the 
Nigerian 2015 presidential elections and the selection of President Muhammadu 
Buhari, a former military ruler, who has a preference for an aggressive approach. 
During his inaugural speech, President Buhari immediately ordered the relocation of 
the Nigerian army control centre from the capital Abuja to Maiduguri in Borno state 
(Premuim Times, 2015d), and promised to end BH within seven months of his 
assumption of office (May 2015 - December 2015) (Nwabughiogu, 2015). 
Approximately 5,000 BH hostages were set free by the Nigerian Army in June 2016 
(Reuters, 2016), and these freed captives were integrated back into their communities 
without undergoing any form of de-radicalisation programme. Added to this, 267 non-
BH individuals being held in an army detention camp were released (Fox News, 2016). 
These people had been mistaken for BH members and were released without any 
apologies or compensation. The following statement of Nigeria’s National Security 
Officer (NSA) supports the argument about the under-utilization of NACTEST: 
The strategy has now been reviewed after two years of working and testing. 
The Office of the National security Adviser, ONSA, is now in full swing to 
implement the reviewed strategy with, of course, the participation and buy-in 
of relevant stakeholders as represented here by MDAs. ONSA has ensured the 
development of NACTEST desks and the appointment of Focal/Liaison 
Officers in MDAs. ONSA expects all MDAs to use these desks to ensure the 
driving of their roles as stated in NACTEST and there will be periodic checks 
and further liaison to enable room for further monitoring and evaluation. 
(Ajayi, 2016) 
The above comment by NSA was on 17 August 2016 during a stakeholders’ meeting 
about the implementation of NACTEST 2016 in Abuja. NSA confirmed that following 
two years of NACTEST testing, the strategy would be implemented in full since it 
appeared productive. I would argue that CVE, de-radicalisation and economic 
intervention aspects of NACTEST may have reduced recruitment to BH (there is need 
for an empirical study to determine this), but it may soon be vitiated by factors such 
as the welfare and safety of the IDPs. These factors include the stealing of food 
donated for the IDPs by individuals, government and organisations (Magu, 2016), rape 
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and sexual exploitation of women in the camps (HRW, 2016) and the attacks on camps 
by BH. The poor welfare of the IDPs together with the 267 non-BH individuals who 
were released from the army detention camp (Fox News, 2016) may be forming a new 
set of aggrieved individuals.  
6.3 Nigerian state versus Boko Haram 
This subsection discussses actions and reactions caused by Nigeria’s CT actions and 
BH violence. It also analyses why BH has changed its tactics in its quest to achieve its 
goals. Additionally, it is important to understand how successful BH has been in 
applying violent tactics to meet its goals. Earlier research on BH (Adesoji, 2010; 2011; 
Maiangwa, 2012; Agbiboa, 2013 a & b) suggests that the use of extreme force by the 
Nigerian government has triggered further violence. However, the way in which BH 
responds to the Nigerian government’s different counter-terrorist strategies has not 
been widely examined. Moreover, existing literature does not give sufficient 
explanation to the evolving tactics of BH. However, Weeraratne (2015:1) noted that 
between 2009 and 2014, BH insurgency increased in, "frequency and severity of 
violence, geographic scope, target selection and tactical maneuvers”. This chapter uses 
the rational choice theory (RCT) to examine the changing strategies of BH and to 
explain the face off between the Nigerian state and BH regarding maximising their 
individual goals. This chapter also discusses BH’s target selection. More broadly, this 
chapter examines BH over time as this is important in understanding the inter-
dependence of BH’s campaign of violence to the government’s CT actions.   
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Table 6.1: Timeline of Nigeria’s violent counter-terrorism actions. 
Counter-terrorism action Dates 
Police crackdowns / clashes July 2009 – 13 June 2011 (23 months) 
Threat by Inspector General of Police 14 June 2011(seven months) 
State of Emergency One 1 Jan – 18 July 2012 (seven months) 
Suspensions of State of Emergency 19 July 2012 – April 2013 (eight months) 
State of Emergency Two; designation of BH 
as a terrorist group by the US 
May – November 2013 (six months) 
Extension of State of Emergency (Third 
Phase) 
November 2013-December 2014 (14 
months) 
Crackdown by Multinational Joint 
Taskforce (MNJTF) 
Indefinite 
 
In 2002, Mohammed Yusuf’s heightened dissatisfaction with the Nigerian secular 
state generated a heated debate between him and his former teacher, Sheik Ja'afar 
Mahmud Adam. Yusuf and his followers left the Alhaji Muhammadu Ndimi Mosque 
in Maiduguri (Weeraratne, 2015; Comolli, 2015) and migrated to Kanama village in 
Yobe state where they formed an isolationist community away from modernity and 
syncretism, which they believe to be sinful and evil (Smith 2015: 77). In late 2003, 
BH had a dispute with the natives of Kanama over fishing rights (Weeraratne, 2015:2; 
Smith, 2015: 77) and this dispute resulted in a faceoff between BH and the Nigerian 
police. In retaliation, BH razed the police station in Kanama (Loimeier, 2012: 150). 
Subsequently, the Nigerian Army raided BH’s hideout and killed numerous BH 
members as well as destroying BH’s settlement (Agbiboa, 2013a). This narrative 
illustrates the action and reaction dynamics between the Nigerian government and BH, 
with Participant Eight (an academic and security consultant who had several contacts 
with BH members) confirming that: 
They are replicating the life of the Prophet in that area, and that is the 
movement. But unfortunately, when you move to the desert you still need to 
eat, so they started encroaching on people’s farms and this was the beginning 
of their confrontation with the police. The owners of these farms asked the 
police to deal with them and the arrival of the police and ensuing arrest of BH 
members resulted in this confrontation with the police. This was what led to 
the confrontations in Kanama, Gaidam and Bimary from late 2003 to 
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December 2004, and then again in early 2005. This began the metamorphosis 
or if you like, the embryonic stage of what is now known as Boko Haram. 
In 2004, BH came out of isolation and started recruiting members and colluding with 
state officials (Smith, 2015: 28-29). However, the event that reignited confrontation 
between the Nigerian state and BH was a clash in February 2009. A large procession 
of BH members on motorbikes were travelling to bury some of their deceased 
members when the Nigerian police stopped them because of their non-compliance 
with the new safety helmet wearing policy imposed on motorcyclists (riders and 
passengers) by the government. The event led to a violent face off during the clash 
with several BH members being killed. In response, in July 2009 there was an uprising 
by BH members in Bauchi state, Northeast Nigeria, with a stockpile of explosives 
being discovered in one of BH’s camps by the Nigerian forces. The violent uprising 
spread to other parts of Borno and Yobe states - geographically close states. It was 
during this period that Yusuf was arrested, detained and then died in detention. 
Yusuf’s death was perceived to be extra-judicial by both BH and the public. After the 
destruction of BH’s camps, the group went underground (Umar, 2012; Mohammed, 
2014; Weeraratne, 2015; Walker, 2016). Some members of the group left Nigeria for 
neighbouring countries within the Lake Chad region. These uprisings and subsequent 
clashes further complicated the conflict between Nigerian forces and BH, with attacks 
and counter-attacks by both sides intensifying, and then with BH joining Al Qaeda.  
I would argue that the most significant reason why BH joined Al Qaeda was 
for the strategic purpose of fighting the Nigerian state. After the Kanama incident, the 
purpose of Yusuf’s exile was to get international support from other global jihadists. 
He then returned to Nigeria to negotiate with the principal political actors in the Borno 
state government about the spread of his ideology. The question this raises is, would 
terrorists apply violence if they had the opportunity to achieve their means through 
peaceful ways? Contrary to the belief that terrorists are mentally abnormal, it is 
appropriate to see terrorists as strategic actors in the application of violence against 
their opponents (i.e. governments). I argue that terrorists apply different strategies, 
including diplomacy in the form of pacification or politics, in order to achieve their 
goals. The ability of Yusuf to take advantage of his connection with Governor Ali 
Modu Sheriff to recruit and radicalise individuals with the aim of spreading BH 
ideology is an example of a rational game of politics. Moreover, political, religious 
and ideological goals often motivate terrorists (Sandler & Arce, 2003). Yusuf’s actions 
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and strategic interactions with both international jihadists and state actors confirm 
Sandler and Arce’s (2003). This argument also shows that there is a mutual preference 
within BH to be guided by political Islam (this argument will be further expanded in 
chapter eight), it also confirms the strategic model’s assumption that terrorists weigh 
up their options before choosing the one(s) that offer optimum utility. Furthermore, it 
is important to have different participants’ accounts of BH using politics as a strategy. 
It is also vital to understand how BH started its violent campaign and how the inter-
dependence of violence between BH and the Nigerian state subsequently played out. 
Participant Four (a member of the former Presidential Committee on BH and senior 
government official) notes:  
These people became militant in their approach with the governor Senator Ali 
Modu Sheriff of Borno state, who was the governor I think from 2003 to 2011. 
What happened is that BH made it clear that they wanted to implement a new 
method of spreading the gospel of Islam, and that they wanted this to happen 
in a militant way. Initially we believe that the Borno state governor did not 
help matters because he used some of these boys politically, to gain political…. 
[support] from them, but not really from them but from people. They are well-
known militants and if the militants don't want you, they go to your ward; they 
go to your place to harass you and the people there. So Ali Sheriff started using 
them and he won his second tenure. They went to him and said, okay, you’ve 
won, so what’s next? As the pressure mounted on him, he gave the role of 
Commissionership to some of them, including even an in-law of the late Yusuf. 
After this, they were still not satisfied and there was then mounting pressure 
on getting government patronage…They started spreading not only in Borno 
but were coming to parts of Yobe of course, the Adamawa axis and not only 
that, but also Kano - another base for them to reach out with their gospel... and 
of course recruiting young members. 
Participant Four’s account is more direct than that of Participant Three (a member of 
the former Presidential Committee on BH and expert in conflict negotiation). 
Participant Four connects the beginning of BH’s violence to BH’s disagreement with 
Ali Modu Sheriff, the former governor of Borno state (2003-2011), who used BH 
members as political thugs to win the governorship seat of Borno state.  
Participant Five (member of the erstwhile committee of the drafting of the present 
constitution of Nigeria) notes: 
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Like I said before, there were some groups that were political and they found 
some accommodation and collaboration with the group [BH]. In the process, 
the political class could not afford or accept, particularly in the zones in which 
they dominate, a situation in which they could bring [the] whole Islamisation 
to a region and therefore bring conflict. They may have been partners but it 
became impossible to satisfy the political motives of Boko Haram, and 
therefore they have grown apart. It is not unexpected that they grew apart when 
they started doing all sorts of things, with BH still having questions as to how 
and why Muhammed Yusuf died in detention. 
Participant Five gives a similar account to that of Participants Three and Four. This 
Participant infers that BH thought that they could achieve their goal of establishing an 
Islamic state through collaboration with some political actors (e.g. Ali Modu Sheriff). 
However, the political actors were unable to support BH’s goal and BH remained 
dissatisfied with the death of Mohammed Yusuf, the founder of BH, while in detention. 
Participant Seven (a media practitioner and conflict negotiator within Nigeria) 
suggests that: 
You will find that during political electioneering, people tend to form groups 
around themselves… to intimidate their opponents. [They] also mobilise 
support sometimes even to intimidate voters to vote for them. There are 
rumours and I think there is some truth to them as there is valid evidence to 
suggest that part of the people that form Boko Haram are actually part of 
ECOMOG which was formed by the former governor, Governor Sheriff. He 
formed ECOMOG to intimidate or to use in most cities in Northern Nigeria in 
Gombe, Karekusa or Suka. 
Participant Seven confirms that such politics of thuggery are a common feature of 
Nigerian politics. He states that BH members were part of ECOMOG’s political thugs 
who Ali Modu Sheriff formed to enable him to capture the gubernatorial seat of Borno 
state. This Participant gave examples of other violent political groups in Gombe and 
Bauchi states of the Northeast.   
Participant Eight (an academic and security consultant who had several contacts with 
BH members) comments:  
Don’t forget that there were particular groups of Boko Haram that were created 
as political wings of a political party or of a particular elite individual. These 
groups have found succour and engagement in the activities of the rank and 
 144 
file of Boko Haram and those that have ‘infiltrated’ Boko Haram, are basically 
the ones at the helm of affairs of Boko Haram. They are the ones referred to as 
ECOMOG and so these are the issues. 
Participant Eight’s statement about ECOMOG is similar to that of Participant Seven. 
Their statements suggest that some members of BH are mixed in with other 
belligerents in order to be a part of the ECOMOG group. 
Anecdotal evidence suggests that Governor Ali Modu Sheriff was sponsoring 
BH (African Spotlight, 2016). Other opinions suggest that he used BH as political 
thugs to win elections but then failed to keep his promise of establishing the group’s 
desire for strict Shariah law, instead using force to decapitate the group (Falana, 2012). 
Although the Nigerian courts have not proved these allegations, there are reasons to 
infer that Governor Sheriff had an agreement with BH. Firstly, the comments of 
Participants Three, Four, Five, Seven and Eight add weight to these allegations. 
Secondly, Buji Foi, a disciple of Yusuf, was one of the major financiers of BH in its 
early stages (Walker, 2012: 4) and was also a Commissioner of Religious Affairs in 
Borno state under Governor Sheriff until the Nigerian Police killed him. Foi might 
have been in Sheriff’s government to represent Yusuf’s interest. Thirdly, the Report 
of the Presidential Committee on the Security Challenges in the North under the 
Chairmanship of Ambassador Usman Galtimari suggests that BH violence erupted 
because of heightened political thuggery. The Committee recommended that the 
governments of Borno, Bauchi and Gombe state resolve their issues with various 
violent political groups in their individual states politically (Abah, 2012). These three 
states were affected by the violent activities of ECOMOG (Borno), Sara suka (Bauchi) 
and ‘Yan kalare (Gombe) political thugs (Abah, 2012). Both Sara suka and ‘Yan 
kalare groups were disintegrated successfully through negotiations after the elections. 
However, when force was applied to disintegrate BH, the group subsequently became 
violent. The attempts to erode BH mirror Weinberg’s (1991) suggestion that shocking 
events or deviation from goals make aggrieved individuals turn to the path of violence. 
The “betrayal” of Mohammed Yusuf by Ali Modu Sheriff also underscores one of the 
assumptions of the strategic models - that terrorism is the last resort. Moreover, the 
“betrayal” of Mohammed Yusuf debunks Abrahams’ (2006) criticism of the rational 
model in which he argues that terrorism is not the last resort.   
A fact agreed by most scholars was that BH went underground after the death 
of their leader Mohammed Yusuf in 2009 (Walker, 2012; Loimeier, 2012; Umar, 
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2012). This was a strategy by BH to reinforce itself against Nigerian forces. BH 
likened this approach to Prophet Mohammed’s Hijra (migration) from Mecca to 
Medina in 622 CE when the Prophet was targeted for assassination (Mohammed 2014). 
This was in fact the same strategy the Taliban adopted when the United States (US) 
invaded Afghanistan after the September 11 Attacks (9/11) in the US. The Taliban 
migrated to Pakistan for refuge and to re-enforce itself against the Afghanistan state. 
In 2010, BH started a new phase of war against Nigeria. It began with armed 
confrontation. BH created a cell structure organisation which is a typical tactic of so-
called new terrorist groups. In such a structure, top leadership enjoys longevity 
because the arrest of a member of a cell only leads to its collapse and not the collapse 
of the whole movement (Neumann, 2009:1). In the case of BH, the cell system was 
also to ensure widespread movement and division of labour in the group, as well as to 
divide the attention of Nigerian security agents. These tactics of dividing attention 
may be the reason why Participant Nine (retired Nigerian Army General) asserts that: 
But as I have always said, the Boko Haram issue is in a different dimension 
with regards to different groups coming in …. They borrow the name Boko 
Haram so that they can cover their own identity and that is why we cannot say 
where the command centre of BH is. This is where the leadership are based 
who say this is what we want and this is what we don’t want. 
With regards to Participant Nine’s comment about the clandestine use of cells by BH, 
the researcher would argue that the resurgence of BH in 2010 marked the beginning 
of difficulty for Nigerian authorities in understanding the logic of BH. Moreover, it 
also highlights the implications of having forced BH into exile in the wilderness. Even 
though the participants do not suggest a specific year when BH’s adoption of terrorist 
methods became incomprehensible to them, they admit that BH’s campaign of 
violence was unclear to them initially.  In the early stages after Yusuf’s death, BH 
focused on revenging the loss of its leader. Its major target choice was the Nigerian 
police and Nigerian prisons (Adesoji, 2010; Mohammed, 2014; Zenn, 2014). They 
attacked prisons to rescue incarcerated members from the clashes before and after 
2009. Other targeted individuals were people the BH accused of collaborating with 
Nigerian forces to fight them and destroy their properties, or sometimes those who did 
not share their ideology (Adamu, 2012: 86). In September 2010, BH freed over 700 
prisoners (Adamu, 2012: 87) by invading Bauchi prison. This attack was significant 
to BH because it greatly added to their population as well as being Shekau’s first 
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successful outing. During the assault they shared two leaflets with the “terrified 
residents” (Adamu, 2012:87). The message on the first page stated that, “Jama’atu 
Alhlissunnah lidda’awati wal jihad is not Boko Haram.” This suggests that they did 
not want to be identified by the name BH but would rather be called “Jama’atu 
Alhlissunnah lidda’awati wal jihad”. The second page of the leaflet said that: 
Everyone can attest to the fact that since we started our activities about eight 
to nine years ago, we have never molested anyone. We only preach that it is 
forbidden to follow any path contrary to what Allah through his Messenger 
[Prophet Mohammed] commands us to follow. You are all witness to the 
sudden attacks on us in our mosques during early dawn prayers by this 
oppressive government, and to the shooting and killing and arrest of our 
members. And there are among our Muslims brothers, those who act as agents 
of the government and point us out for the government forces to kill or arrest. 
This serves as a general notice to all: fighting this government is mandatory 
for everyone. Whoever refuses this will be accountable to Allah. For us, we 
would rather die than fail Allah on the account of our deeds. Whoever can, join 
us; if not, shut up, for it does not concern you. Leave us alone, and watch what 
transpires. (Adamu, 2014: 87) 
The group used this message to justify their violent attack on the prison as well as to 
make a threat. The group’s comment about “watch[ing] what transpires” suggested 
more retaliation for the crackdown on its members by the Nigerian government.  
On 14 June 2011, the Inspector General Police (IGP) threatened BH, saying, 
“Boko Haram days are numbered” (Isaac, 2011). Two days later, BH responded with 
its first suicide bombing in Nigeria. The bomb detonated in front of the Nigerian Police 
Force (NPF) headquarters in Abuja. The bomb was an attempt to assassinate the IGP 
(ibid). The bombing of the United Nations (UN) building in Abuja on the 26 of June 
2011 followed this attack. The attack on the UN building was significant because it 
took place during the period of Ramadan. BH chose the Ramadan period in order to 
increase its growing support. The statement of the IGP and the reaction of BH can be 
seen as a strategic game between terrorists and government with “each side issu(ing) 
threats and promises to gain strategic advantage” (Sandler & Acre, 2003: 1). Moreover, 
BH’s response reflects the Attrition Strategy suggested by Kydd & Walter (2006), 
whereby terrorists attack to show that they are stronger than a government. The 
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targeting of the UN building was a deliberate act by BH to gain both local and 
international attention.   
BH’s campaign of violence increased further when the Nigerian government 
declared a state of emergency. The state of emergency involved the deployment of a 
joint force involving all state security agencies. The military performed the primary 
function of combating BH members.  
The state of emergency happened in two stages. Firstly, the Nigerian 
government declared a state of emergency in 15 LGA’s of Borno and Yobe (Northeast) 
as well as Niger and Plateau (Northcentral) states from 31 December 2011 to 18 July 
2012 (The Report, 2012: 21). During this period, the Nigerian military went in search 
of BH with Baga LGA being suspected of harbouring BH members. Consequently, 
the Nigerian army launched a crackdown in Baga town of Borno state with over 200 
civilians being killed and several houses being burnt down by the Nigerian army 
(Nossita, 2013). I would argue that the presence of BH in Baga provoked the Nigerian 
army to engage in indiscriminate violence. Similarly, there was another crackdown in 
Bama where close to 600 people were killed. The Baga and Bama onslaughts by the 
Nigerian Army motivated aggrieved individuals to join BH (see chapter five). Perhaps 
the Nigerian forces engaged in indiscriminate violence because of their inability to 
identify BH members within civilian populations, but the ensuing backlash simply 
benefited BH.  
The second stage in the state of emergency was in April 2013, after BH 
rejected an amnesty offer from the Nigerian government (BBC, 2013b). Although a 
six-month state of emergency had been declared in May 2013 in the whole of 
Adamawa, Borno and Yobe states, it was later extended to November 2013 (Campbell, 
2014: 13). The state of emergency was accompanied by growing international 
concerns about the increased threat of BH. The affected states are border states where 
BH had easy access to other neighbouring countries. The states are also Kanuri states 
where BH had vast numbers of members.  
In 2012, BH joined AQIM (Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb), MUJAO 
(Movement for the Oneness of Jihad in West Africa) and Ansaru to fight in Northern 
Mali. In 2013, BH’s increased atrocities, connections to Al Qaeda affiliates and 
kidnapping of Westerners made the US designate BH a terrorist group. This action 
was followed by renewed efforts by the Nigerian government to stop the financing of 
BH. As a result, BH devised more ways of self-sustenance. There were allegations 
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that BH was engaging in bank robberies and extortion (Zenn, 2014a), and that two 
state governors paid the group on a monthly basis to prevent their states from being 
attacked (Agbiboa, 2013a). There were also suspicions that BH was engaging in both 
drug and human trafficking across the West African region (Onuoha & Ezirim, 2013). 
In May 2014, Shekau justified the abduction of captives, saying, "God instructed me 
to sell them; they are his properties, and I will carry out his instructions" (BBC, 2014e). 
The kidnapping of young girls was also used as a source of raising money. Although 
the abduction of young women started in 2013, the abduction of the Chibok girls 
became a turning point of this strategy (Zenn, 2014).  
Blockades on the external financing of BH may to some extent have been 
ineffective because the group devised new methods of funding itself. Additionally, 
BH has invaded military and police barracks such as the Giwa and Gwoza barracks to 
equip its members with more weapons. In addition to the seizure of military weapons, 
this action was designed to show the government as the weaker side, to gain more 
supporters, and to get willing as well as forced recruits to join them (see chapter five) 
There are anecdotal accounts that while the world and Nigeria focused its attention on 
rescuing the Chibok girls, BH engaged in the silent abduction of young boys. Wall 
Street Journal writers Hinshaw & Parkinson (2016) reported that over 10,000 boys 
were kidnapped and trained in isolated villages close to Cameroon. 15 young boys 
who escaped from a camp told of how they were indoctrinated and taught how to fight 
in battles (ibid).    
In December 2014, renewed military action was taken against BH by MNJTF 
(Multi National Joint Task Force). This action led to a decline in BH’s operational 
capacity and more Nigerian territories were subsequently reclaimed. However, the 
actions of MNJTF also triggered a spillover of violence in territories within the Lake 
Chad area, with frequent attacks in the Bosso and Diffa regions of the Republic of 
Niger and Mellia region of Chad (UN News Centre, 2016). Since the spread of BH 
has been reduced, BH has increased its attacks on soft targets and particularly on IDPs. 
The choice of attacking soft targets is either an indication of the decline in the power 
of the terrorists or a move to hurt the government. Additionally, the increased attacks 
on civilian populations are a message to civilians that BH is strong and the government 
is weak. This makes the civilian population fear and support BH, especially as the 
civilians are trapped with BH violence on one side and the brute force of the Nigerian 
army on the other side. (Amnesty International, 2015a; 2015b). More so, it illustrates 
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Kydd & Walter’s (2006) argument that terrorists carry out attacks as a form of 
intimidating civilians in order to gain their obedience. 
In August 2016, BH made a strategic attempt to regroup and reinforce. On 4 
August 2016, newly emerged BH leader Abu Musab al-Barnawi declared that his new 
agenda was to target Christians and churches and to exclude non-BH Muslims from 
future attacks (Ogbeche, 2016). On 14 August 2016, BH released a video. A man with 
a mask representing Abu Musab al-Barnawi appeared in the video together with over 
20 Chibok girls. The leader blamed the Nigerian government for killing some of the 
Chibok girls and said: 
We don't want to do anything with these girls; our demand remains the same. 
We want the government to release our fighters who have been in detention 
for ages; otherwise, we will never release these girls. (Blair, 2016) 
In the footage, the masked man detaches a mini clip microphone from his body and 
asks one of the girls called Maida Yakubu to speak to her parents and the Nigerian 
government. Maida’s message was: 
Oh you, my people and our parents, you just have to please come to our rescue. 
We are suffering here, the aircraft has come to bombard us and have killed 
many of us. Some are wounded. Every day we are in pain and suffering, so are 
our babies. Please go and beg the government of Nigeria to release the 
members of our abductors so that they can free us and let us come home. We 
are really suffering, there is no food to eat or no good water to drink here. 
(Fenton, 2016) 
Abu Musab al-Barnawi’s avowed attacks on Christians is an attempt to whittle down 
Shekau’s legitimacy, which has been criticised for indiscriminate killings and running 
a more criminal than puritan movement. This decision was made to reignite public 
support for BH. Moreover, Abu Musab al-Barnawi’s video with the Chibok girls was 
to prove to both Nigeria and the world that he is in a position of authority and that the 
Shekau-led faction lacks legitimacy. There is evidence that the girls with Abu Musab 
al-Barnawi were the Chibok girls because Samuel Yaga, father of one of the girls, told 
BBC Hausa that he saw his daughter in the video (BBC, 2016). CT efforts may have 
led to the weakening of the top echelons of BH, but BH effectively used the video to 
trigger public pressure against the government so that they could get their members 
freed. Abu Musab al-Barnawi’s demand for the release of incarcerated BH leaders was 
significant not only for the rejuvenation of the movement, but in gaining the critical 
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loyalty of key leaders such as Kabiru Sokoto, Khalid Al-Barnawi and Ali Konduga, 
who are Al-Qaeda trained. Similarly, Shekau’s major mission during his assumption 
of leadership was the Bauchi jailbreak, which freed over 700 BH members (Walker, 
2016). Because BH had been weakened, Abu Musab al-Barnawi decided to apply a 
more subtle approach where BH would have fewer constraints. The video also served 
as a distraction to the government and could have facilitated the relocation of BH 
without pressure from the Nigerian forces. The Daily Trust, a widely-read Northern 
Nigerian newspaper, confirmed anecdotal evidence that BH was relocating from 
Sambisa Forest in the Northeast to Burra Forest of the North West. Burra Forest is a 
vast forest connecting to areas such as Sambisa, Dansadau, Falgore Game Reserve and 
Birnin Gwari in Kaduna State. It also has borders with Bauchi, Gombe, Yobe, 
Adamawa, Borno, and Jigawa States (Daily Trust, 2016). In reaction to pressure by 
civil society groups, human rights organisations and in particular the 
“#BringBackOurGirls” (BBOG) group, the Nigerian government accepted the 
demands of BH (Today, 2016). In October 2016, the Nigerian government released 
four unnamed members of BH in exchange for 21 of the Chibok girls. The swap was 
mediated by the Red Cross and the Swiss government (France 24, 2016).  
Terrorists are therefore calculative in forcing a government to either grant 
political concessions or to act in a particular way. BH’s demand for a prisoner swap 
underscores two of the assumptions of the Strategic Model, which suggest that 
terrorists weigh up the costs and benefits of different options and then choose the 
option with the optimal expected results. The swap may seem like a short-term goal 
but it is significant to the group in achieving its long-term goals.      
Using data from the GTD, Figure 6.1 below illustrates some of the major 
events or CT actions that have either triggered or exasperated attacks by BH.    
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Figure 6. 1: Intensity of violent responses by Boko Haram to state counter-
terrorism 
 
Additionally, the figure above illustrates the severity of the BH violence in reaction to 
the Nigerian CT. In response to different police crackdowns and face offs, 469 people 
were killed as a result of BH attacks in the space of 23 months (July 2009 - 13 June 
2011). After the threat by the IGP on 14 of June 2011, approximately 239 people were 
killed up until December 2011 (seven months). Even though the number of casualties 
reduced, the threat of the IGP led to the first BH orchestrated suicide bombing in 
Nigeria. Subsequently, other atrocities such as the bombing of the UN office and the 
THISDAY Newspaper House may have influenced Nigeria’s decision to adopt the 
first stage of a state of emergency.  
The first state of emergency in 15 LGAs lasted seven months (1 January 2012 
- 18 July 2012) and 782 people were killed. After the suspension of the first state of 
emergency, BH killed 785 people within eight months (19 July 2012 - April 2013). 
The ferocity of the attacks and the involvement of BH in the conflict in Mali in 2012, 
as well as growing international linkages of BH to other jihadists across Nigeria, made 
the Nigerian government declare another six-month state of emergency (May 2013 - 
November 2013), which also coincided with the US designating BH as a terrorist 
group. During this period, 1,087 people were killed. This rise in the number of 
casualties facilitated the elongation of the state of emergency in November 2013 with 
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no timeframe having been given for this renewal. Altogether, 6,650 killings were 
recorded up to December 2014 when the MNJTF then launched a military campaign 
against BH. Since the engagement of the MNJTF, BH has killed 6,991 people. The 
trend in Table 6.1 shows that BH has become more deadly and over time, their lethality 
might have been exasperated further by state actions taken against it. 
6.4 Assessment of the effectiveness and efficiency of Nigeria’s 
counter terrorism approach on Boko Haram 
Arjun & Scott (2013) suggest that CT is effective when it stops terrorist goals. More 
specifically, CT efficiency can be measured when CT policies prevent and eliminate, 
“terrorist groups at a reasonable cost that is in proportion to the size of the terrorist 
groups” (p.448) while at the same time halting a group from realising its goals. BH’s 
primary organisational goal is to establish an Islamic state, and it was successful in 
capturing 21 out of 65 territories (Local Government Areas) in the border states of 
Adamawa, Borno and Yobe. However, Nigerian forces have subsequently recaptured 
these. The costs of this are over two million people having been displaced and an 
estimated 40,000 people having been killed by both BH and the Nigerian forces, with 
billions of dollars having been spent so far to eliminate a group of over 50,000 
members. Despite the resources allocated and the grievous consequences of these 
events, BH ideology appears unwavering and the group continues to attract willing 
recruits. Billions of dollars have been spent fighting BH (The Cable, 2014) and 
Nigerian forces have killed more than 1,200 innocent people. In addition, 20,000 
people have been arbitrarily arrested with at least 7,000 having died in military 
detention centres (Amnesty International 2015a). BH has killed over 20,000 people, 
and about 2.7 million individuals have been displaced, with some settling in 
neighbouring countries and others in other Northern states of Nigeria (Reuters, 2016). 
Some studies on BH attribute BH’s radicalisation and violence to Nigeria’s CT 
strategy (Agbiboa, 2013 a & b). All these narratives are important in understanding 
the effectiveness of Nigerian CT strategies. It is not helpful to classify BH completely 
as case evidence of a negative or positive consequence of CT because the timing and 
application of such policies were late and problematic. The complexity of the Nigerian 
government did not allow for proper legislation or implementation of CT policies. BH 
has been empowered with the ideology of violent jihadism since 2002 and is referred 
to as the Nigerian Taliban. The Nigerian state did not envisage Al Qaeda’s ideological 
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spread or global network expansion, and so no policies were designed to counter BH’s 
violent extremism until 2014. Apart from the government’s inadequate 
comprehension of the BH phenomenon, the military action in Kanama and the 
subsequent onslaught against BH emboldened Yusuf and his disciples to embark on a 
long-term plan to execute its goal of establishing Shariah law. The clash in Kanama 
came at the point when BH was in a period of radicalisation. The action of the Nigerian 
government at that time mirrors Feridun & Shabaz’s (2010) claim that governments 
often use aggressive approaches in fighting oppositional groups rather than addressing 
the root causes of the violence.     
Lum et al (2006) posit that, “output effectiveness, outcome effectiveness and 
impact effectiveness” (p.3) are important in measuring the effectiveness of CT. Output 
effectiveness refers to the execution and compliance with CT policies by agents of the 
state. Outcome effectiveness is the short-term effect of CT policies on terrorist 
activities such as financing and recruitment. This usually depends on the behaviour of 
security agents implementing such policies or on the targeted group. Impact 
effectiveness is the result of long-term objectives of CT policies in decimating or 
ending terrorism. As noted, from the beginning of the rise of BH, the Nigerian state 
was not prepared to fight, Nigerian lawmakers were politically divided and most of 
Nigeria’s CT policies were initiated after BH had become a fully-fledged terrorist 
group. Moreover, the complexities of Nigerian CT laws also facilitated BH’s 
campaign of violence. Apart from these factors, both Presidents Jonathan and Buhari 
appear to have had insufficient knowledge of or a lack of strategy for combating BH. 
President Goodluck Jonathan (Nigeria’s President during the maturing stages of BH) 
had no clear understanding of the BH phenomenon and on three occasions offered 
different opinions on it. In January 2012, he said that BH had supporters within the 
government and the security forces (Mark, 2012; Aliyu et al., 2015); in June 2012, he 
stated that BH was a “faceless” (unknown leadership) organisation, while in February 
2015 he described BH as a global phenomenon not peculiar to Nigeria alone (Premium 
Times, 2015c). Insufficient knowledge within President Jonathan’s government was 
accompanied by insufficient military capacity to contain BH. This weakness was as a 
result of corruption in the military (Vanguard, 2016), insufficient weapons to fight BH 
and the alleged infiltration of the Nigerian army by BH. In February 2014, Governor 
Kashim Shattima of Borno state and successor of Ali Modu Sheriff said: 
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Boko Haram are better armed and are better motivated than our own troops. 
Given the present state of affairs, it is absolutely impossible for us to defeat 
Boko Haram. (Reuters, 2014)  
BH has been tactically efficient in overcoming all the Nigerian government’s 
blockades on its sources of funding and weapons. It has invaded military barracks 
where it has seized vast numbers of arms and also has engaged in kidnappings for 
ransom. In addition, the Nigerian state’s military approach has encouraged the 
recruitment and radicalisation of individuals to BH (as discussed in chapter five). On 
a positive note, the Nigerian government were able to reduce the strength and spread 
of BH from parts of Northern Nigeria to the Borno axis (a BH stronghold), especially 
following the December 2014 renewed multi-national military task force.  
President Buhari’s declaration to end BH within seven months and his claim 
to have, “technically defeated” BH (Nwabughiogu, 2015) shows that his government 
conflated both the insurgent and motivational aspects of BH. Clarifying these two 
aspects is important. Firstly, the insurgency is the physical annexation of Nigeria as 
well as an attack on the Nigerian state; and secondly, the motivational aspects are the 
beliefs, values and goals of BH.     
6.5 Chapter Conclusions 
The narrative about the changing tactics of BH shows BH as a strategic actor that 
knows how to optimise its goals in different situations. First, BH members enjoyed 
companionship in the wilderness (Kanama) before relocating to Maiduguri to attract 
more followers. Afterwards, the leadership of BH entered into an agreement that 
would have allowed them to achieve their goal without constraints. BH agreement 
with Ali Modu Sheriff at its embryonic stage shows that terrorist groups can apply 
diplomatic means to achieve political goals. After the group was unable to achieve its 
goal through an agreement, they targeted communities with violence and when they 
were overpowered, reorganised themselves. The violent path BH took reflects the 
theoretical assumption that groups use terror as a last resort. Hence it negates the 
argument of Abrahams (2008) about terrorism not being the last resort. Moreover, it 
highlights the turning point or linkage of political movements into violent movements. 
With the release of 700 of their captured members in 2010, BH had engaged 
in significant propaganda efforts to get public support. In 2010, BH tactics and 
strategies along with the implications of forcing them into exile in the wilderness, 
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became too complex for Nigerian officials to understand. BH fought a war of attrition 
through which they weakened Nigerian forces by invading their barracks and gaining 
access to military intelligence. BH was also tactically self-reliant in sustaining its 
violent campaign with weapons and funding. While BH was invading military 
barracks and suppressing the military might of Nigerian forces, they also targeted 
civilians indiscriminately. This was a strategy they adopted to make people join them 
out of fear. This forceful recruitment by BH facilitated the annexation of Nigerian 
territories. Even though BH is yet to achieve its ultimate goal, it has achieved some 
instrumental goals regarding public support, willing recruitment, funding and media 
attention. This indicates that BH attacks both civilian and state representatives to 
weaken the Nigerian government and intimidate civilian populations. 
The exchange of the Chibok girls for prisoners was a well-calculated action by 
BH to get its incarcerated members released through bargaining. The four freed 
members of BH may seem numerically small when compared to the first prison break 
in 2011 in which 700 BH members were released. Even though the identity of the four 
members is unknown to the public, I would argue that these individuals possess 
exceptional skills and influence and this was why BH sought their release.   
BH switched its loyalty to IS for tactical purposes. Its allegiance to IS is tactical 
because political Islam guides both IS and Al Qaeda. The tactics of BH are a form of 
sophisticated warfare because it does not only apply brute force, but also deceit, spying 
and intelligence. 
Regarding theoretical contributions, I argue that BH case evidence mirrors the 
three assumptions of the rational choice model because the group initially wanted a 
peaceful transition from a secular to a Sharia state. BH seems to weigh up most of its 
options before it carries out attacks, and then selects targets strategically to gain 
optimal utility. Even though Abrahams (2008) argues through his seven puzzles that 
the three assumptions of the Strategic Model are too simplistic, his arguments do not 
hold for BH. 
From the foregone analysis, BH reflects four of the five principles of the 
Strategic Logics of Costly Signalling, as argued by Kydd & Walter (2006). These are 
attrition, intimidation, provocation and spoiling, but not outbidding where each 
splinter terrorist group uses violence as competition to display their supremacy to the 
public. Chapter four indicates that political Islam bonds BH splinter groups, and that 
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such groups often unite themselves to commit atrocities against civilians and state 
representatives.   
This study has highlighted the weakness of Nigeria’s approach in curbing the 
violence of BH. Following the argument by Lum et al. (2006: 491), prevention and 
alleviation of early risk factors could have assisted in curtailing the radicalisation 
process of BH. The Kanama clash and subsequent crackdowns on BH by Nigerian 
forces could not prevent actual situational events that helped generate grievances. BH 
was a small radicalised group, and dangerous politics and the use of state paraphernalia 
of violence assisted in transforming this group into a terrorist group. Moreover, the 
inability of state actors to understand and efficiently resolve the BH debacle enabled 
the group to perpetrate atrocities. It is also fair to argue that corruption and human 
rights abuses are some of the factors that mitigate against the success of Nigeria’s CT 
efforts. Moreover, the combination of soft approaches such as dialogue and the use of 
force made by the Nigerian government appear deceptive to BH. The group may also 
be skeptical of any ceasefire agreement with the Nigerian government because of its 
previous experience with the government through Ali Modu Sheriff. Another lesson 
to be learned is that the level of BH violence increases simultaneously as a result of 
changing government action againsts the group. While the Nigerian government’s 
actions led to the sophistication of the group, its collaboration with the international 
community has helped reduce the strength and spread of BH. 
Even though this is a case study and the findings cannot be generalised as such, 
this study of BH shows that apart from countries having a different approaches 
towards fighting terrorism (depending on their background) (Kula, 2015: 27), 
distinctive institutional history and constraints as well as insufficient knowledge about 
terrorism can make CT counter-productive. Additionally, the division of political 
elites can delay and impede the establishment of an effective and efficient CT as 
highligted before the enactment of the Nigerian CT. Moreover, the lack of a well-
planned and comprehensive CT can complicate the fight against terrorism. 
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Chapter 7: Sub-National Level 
The previous chapter examined the implications of Nigerian counter-terrorism (CT) 
on Boko Haram (BH) with both BH and the Nigerian state as rational actors, and the 
action(s) of one triggering the reaction(s) of the other. Moreover, chapter six discussed 
how BH responds to Nigerian CT, and in this chapter the severity of BH activities 
precipitated in three specific border states will be evaluated. This chapter discusses 
the determinants of BH target selection and seeks to explain the variation in the 
frequency of violence at a sub-national level. It conducts a comparative analysis of 
three states in the Northeast region of Nigeria that have been most affected by the 
activities of BH. This chapter is important because it highlights the targeting behaviour 
of BH. Understanding BH target selection and frequencies of BH violence is important 
because it also highlights the reason for the intensity of BH violence. 
This chapter begins by outlining the similarities between the three states of 
Adamawa, Borno and Yobe. It then studies possible explanations for the variation of 
BH attack patterns across these three states, with the last section of this chapter 
discussing the findings. 
Different scholars give different accounts of how terrorists choose their targets 
and terrorist groups vary in their choices. They choose who their constituents and 
enemies are, and as such they target their enemies and avoid their constituents. Who 
their constituents and enemies are depends on the group; for example, for separatist 
groups, their constituents would likely be their ethnic kin whereas for leftist groups, 
their constituents might be everyone except the representatives of a perceived fascist 
capitalist state (Nemeth, 2010). With regards to BH, their constituents are Muslims 
who think like they do, and their enemy is the state and non-BH individuals.  
Some studies argue that religion determines the target selection of BH (Adesoji, 
2010 & 2011; Loimier, 2012; Agbiboa, 2013a & 2013b), but this does not explain the 
variation within BH’s target type frequencies. BH targets individuals based on four 
reasons: first, they target those they see as idolaters, that is those who support 
secularism and democracy, and BH believes that Christians are the major facilitators 
of secularism (DCCN, 2009: 3); second, they attack any perceived agents of Western 
education and Westernisation; third, they kill people working for an un-Islamic 
government; and fourth, they target any Muslim leaders who call them Kharijites. BH 
objects strongly to being called this, especially by Islamic scholars (ulama) in the three 
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regions they target (Mohammed, 2014:11) as it is calling them ‘rebellious Muslims’. 
The states with the highest number of Kanuri people such as Borno and Yobe have 
experienced the highest percentage of BH incidences, with this being because Salafist 
values are strongly connected to the Kanuri tribe (Pieri & Zenn, 2016).  
Internal or external factors could influence the target selection by violent 
groups. Internal factors could include ideology, grievances and organisational 
dynamics; external factors could include terrorist environments, tactical choices and a 
group’s inability to differentiate between enemies and non-enemies (Nemeth, 2010).  
Proponents of the internal factors of ideology or religious belief argue that 
these influence targeting by violent movements most especially in areas that do not 
hold the same ideologies or beliefs as the group (Drake, 1998; Engene, 2004). 
Furthermore, Juegensmeyer (2003) argues that extremists target areas which they 
believe are dominated by ‘agents of evil’, and that this condemnation of individuals 
or dehumanisation of people as kafirs creates a sense of moral duty to maim or kill. 
This argument also suggests that a terrorist group will not target members of its own 
ethnic group. For instance, this thesis would argue that the Hutus will attack the Tutsis, 
but not members of the Hutu ethnic group. Interestingly, although BH attacks areas 
with individuals who do not share their ideology, BH also targets individuals from 
their Kanuri ethnic group in BH’s epicentre - Borno state - which is home to a large 
number of Kanuris.   
The role of grievances in terrorist target selection is due to political or 
economic grievances, or the killing of a group’s members by military forces (Nemeth, 
2010). Goodwin (2006) argues that certain areas could also be targeted because actions 
taken by the region offend the terrorists. Therefore, a strained relationship between 
terrorists and the communities they live in also determines target selection. Political 
grievances may determine terrorist targeting, especially when mixed with ideology. 
However, economic reasons are insufficient in explaining the BH phenomenon 
because since the emergence of the group, it has not been internally divided on 
economic grounds, but instead on ethnic and political principles (Zenn, 2014a). 
Moreover, BH attacks do not appear to be targeting solely for economic purposes. 
Strategic logic is an important factor in determining terrorist targets when 
examining the internal factors that can influence terrorist targeting. Because terrorist 
capacity to strike is constrained by factors such as capability, resources and counter 
terrorism (CT), they often select the easiest target (Sandler et al., 1983). Additionally, 
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terrorists target areas where they can maximise their goals of getting media attention 
and communicating to both a government and its citizens (Kydd & Walter, 2006). 
Moreover, terrorist goals could be immediate, for example demanding the release of 
members from prison or kidnapping civilians for ransoms. The changing logic and 
strategy of BH has been extensively discussed in chapter six, as BH appears to weigh 
up the cost of their options in order to choose the most beneficial one. Findley (2008) 
suggests that violent groups target different regions because of a power disparity 
between terrorists and the government, and he argues that because of imbalances in 
power, terrorists tend to shift their power from one region to the other.  
Nemeth (2010) uses the bargaining model to suggest that terrorist choice of 
targeting depends on the nature of a government, public support and group-
environmental factors, and that all these factors can work individually or congruently. 
Nemeth (2010) concludes that violent movements use targeting to achieve their goals 
as well as to survive in the environment in which they live.   
Ideology is an important determinant of BH target selection, for example the 
rejection of Western education and secularism. Ideology plays a vital role in giving 
identity to BH, thereby creating a constituency of individuals who are motivated by 
dogmatic belief. Such dogmatic belief not only justifies violence, but also determines 
who the targets are. Drake (1998: 78) emphasises that ideology inspires and guides 
terrorists on how they interpret the actions of people and institutions, with these 
actions possibly being related to government or individual action against terrorists. 
Since most of the literature on BH agrees that religion plays a critical role in 
BH’s target choices, what explanations are there for the variation in the frequencies of 
BH target patterns? To answer this question, this chapter argues that differences in 
BH’s target patterns across the region are determined by BH’s capability to attack. 
Moreover, it can be argued that, if a group cannot target hard targets such as diplomats, 
planes or presidents (Sandler et al., 1983; Kydd & Walter, 2006), then they will target 
soft targets, i.e. civilians. This chapter contributes to the broader argument on BH by 
further asserting the argument of chapter six (from a sub-national perspective) that BH 
is a strategic actor that weighs up the cost and benefits of its actions before acting.  
This chapter uses the Most Similar System Design (MSSD) in assessing BH’s 
targeting variation. MSSD is used to identify the determinants for BH’s targeting 
differences within similar regions, for example in the Adamawa, Borno and Yobe 
states of the Northeast region. MSSD is usually applied to compare two to five cases 
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that have similar attributes such as size, population, economy, ideology or climate 
(Landman, 2003: 405 &406). When there is variation in the dependent variable, it is 
easier to identify what might determine such differences when the units are otherwise 
similar. The expectation is that the outcome of the discussion using the control variable 
will match the dependent variable of interest, given how similar the compared units 
are. The dependent variables include the number of attacks across target types while 
control variable refers to BH’s ability to attack. This chapter seeks to explain the 
variation in the frequencies of target pattern of BH, and it is proposed that the 
differences in each of BH’s target patterns across Adamawa, Borno and Yobe are 
determined by BH’s capability to attack. Therefore, this chapter adopts a comparative 
approach in order to address this question. 
This study applies attack data from the Global Terrorism Database (GTD) to 
outline variation in target type frequencies. GTD is an open source database with 
150,000 recorded incidents including information on targets, casualties, weapon-types, 
major terrorist groups and individuals from around the world between 1970 and 2015. 
For this chapter, BH attacks between 2009 and 2015 are included as 2009 was the first 
year in which the group appeared in the dataset. 
7.1 Similarities between cases 
There are several similarities between Adamawa, Borno and Yobe. These three states 
are similar in population size, ethnic composition, geographical location, military 
presence, religion and ideology, and these similarities are discussed in more detail 
below.  
Figure 7.1 illustrates the proximity of Yobe, Borno and Adamawa states to 
each other, and also shows the closeness of these states to Nigeria’s neighbouring 
countries. Table 7.1 outlines other similarities and indicators between these states such 
as population size, land size, poverty, unemployment and adult literacy levels. The 
indicators in Table 7.1 were obtained from the National Bureau of statistics (NBS). 
The NBS is Nigeria’s official agency that collects and publishes statistics about 
different Nigerian indicators. The statistics used is this chapter were collected between 
2006 and 2011. There is not enough statistical data available about the indicators 
between 2009 and 2015. However, the ones used for analysis in this chapter are 
important because they reflect the early stages of BH’s campaign of violence. They 
are relevant to show how similar these states are, and even though it is not possible to 
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look at the whole of BH’s campaign, it is worth considering that many of the indicators 
may only slowly change over time.   
Figure 7.1: Map of Nigeria showing the proximities of Adamawa, Borno, and 
Yobe to each other (created with QGIS software) 
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Table 7.2: Similarities and deprivation indicators between Adamawa, Borno 
and Yobe (statistics data of the Nigerian Bureau of Statistics, sourced from 
Knoema website)  
Features and indicators of deprivations Adamawa Borno Yobe 
Population size (2006 census) 3,178,950 4,171,104 2,321,339 
Land mass (land area in square kilometres) 38,700.0 72,609.0 46,609.0 
Percentage of people living on a dollar or less 
per day in 2010 
74.3 55.1 68.9 
Percentage of unemployed in 2011 33.8 29.1 35.6 
Percentage of adult literacy in any language 
in 2010 
73.3 58.6 48.9 
 
Figure 7.1 and Table 7.2 are important because they clearly illustrate pertinent 
indicators of each of these three states in the Sahel region. The Sahel region is a bio-
geographical zone with semi-arid lands. Countries such as Algeria, Mali, Mauritania, 
Niger, Chad and Cameroon are also part of the Sahel region. A number of territories 
in these countries share similar cultures, religions and ideologies, as well as 
comparable standards of living (see chapter eight). Geographically, Adamawa, Borno 
and Yobe are border states that share boundaries with Cameroon, Chad and Niger. 
Yobe shares a boundary with the Niger Republic through Machena and Geidam Local 
Government Areas (LGAs). Borno is connected to Chad through Balge LGA, while 
Adamawa shares a boundary with Northern Cameroon Mubi LGA. As indicated in 
Figure 7.1, these states are all in the Sahel region and their close proximity to each 
other enables BH to operate within the Lake Chad region easily (see chapter eight for 
further details).  
Adamawa, Borno and Yobe states combined have a population of circa. 
9,671,393 people (2006, National Census of Nigeria). Borno has the highest 
population with a population of circa. 4,171,104 inhabitants and the largest land mass, 
this being 72,609.0 square kilometres (km2). Borno is the Kanuri tribe’s homeland. It 
has spread beyond its Nigerian borders and is regarded by some as the precursor state 
of Islam in Nigeria (further details below). Adamawa is the second most populated 
state of the three with circa. 3,178,950 people and the least land mass, this being 
38,700.0 square kilometres km2. Yobe is the least populated of these three states with 
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an approximate population of 2,321,000 people and the second largest land mass, this 
being 46,609.0 km2. There is a further difference between Borno and the other two 
states stemming from an administrative division by the Nigerian federal government. 
Yobe was created out of Borno (Mark, 2015), with the old Gongola state having been 
divided into Adamawa and Taraba states (Tukur & Barde, 2014).    
These three states have similar levels of deprivation and standards of living. 
74.3% of the Adamawa, 55.1% of the Borno and 68.9% of the Yobe populations lived 
on a dollar or less a day in 2010. In 2011, Borno had the lowest rate of unemployment 
at 29.1%, while Adamawa was at 33.8% and Yobe at 35.6%. In terms of literacy rates 
in all their languages, Adamawa’s was estimated to be 73.3%, Borno 58.6% and Yobe 
68.9%, and these are similar when compared to non-border states of Nigeria (literacy 
in language implies the ability of an individual to speak and write in a particular 
language).  
In addition to a similar geography and structural factors, these states also have 
close ethnic ties. Some of the Eastern parts of Adamawa were part of the Kanem-
Bornu Empire (Barkindo, 1985), and Kanuri dialects are spoken across this state 
(Barkindo, 1985). The majority of the population of Adamawa are from the Fulani 
ethnic group (Mustapha, 2006: 11). Borno state is the epicentre of BH violence in the 
Northeast. It is significant to the history of the Kanem-Bornu Empire and is widely 
regarded as the homeland of the Kanuri people (Louis, 1973). However, Borno is not 
solely Kanuris, and there are other minority indigenous tribes there such as the Marghi 
and Baburbura who occupy the southern part of the state (FFP, 2015). Although there 
are no accurate statistics about the overall number of Kanuris, Borno and Yobe have 
the highest number of the Kanuris, with the tribe making up 4% of the Nigerian 
population (West African Gateway, 2012). The Kanuris are mostly Muslims of the 
Salafist sect and they pride themselves on being the precursor of Islam in Nigeria, 
dating back to the Kanem-Bornu Empire of the 11th century (Pieri & Zenn, 2016). 
Islam first came to Nigeria through this region before the Usman dan Fodio jihad of 
the 19th century (ibid), and Nigerian Muslims widely regard dan Fodio as the reformer 
(Mujadid) who established Islam in Nigeria (Isa, 2010). However, a great number of 
Kanuris claim Islam had been flourishing long before dan Fodio (Barkindo, 2016).  
The second highest Kanuri-populated state in Nigeria is Yobe, which was 
carved out of Borno state in 1992 (Mark, 2015). Apart from its close geographical 
proximity, Yobe also has significant ethnic ties with Borno. Yobe had a significant 
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influence on the Kanem-Bornu Empire through Ngazargamu, which was one of the 
capitals of the Kanem-Bornu Empire. Ngazargamu was highly influential until it was 
captured in the 19th century during dan Fodio’s jihad. 
Islamic ideology is a significant feature within Borno, Yobe and Adamawa 
states. Vast numbers of the Kanuri population belong to the Salafist ideology with the 
Salafist or Sunni ideology being the dominant brand of Islam in Northeast Nigeria. 
This historic background has enabled the emergence and growth of a radical strand of 
Salafism in the region (Onuaha, 2012). Although BH membership includes many 
Kanuris, it also has members from other tribes of the 19 Northern States of Nigeria 
(Onuaha, 2012; Barkindo, 2016). It is important to note that BH is a mix of different 
tribes and Borno is regarded as a centre of Islamic civilisation. Participant Five 
(member of the erstwhile committee of the drafting of the present constitution of 
Nigeria) in his interview suggests that: 
My own reading of the situation is that the Nigerian platform and in fact the 
platform on which Islam came to Nigeria and West Africa via the Kanem-
Bornu Empire was Sunnist, so virtually every person that grew up in that axis 
is essentially Sunnist. 
Participant Five is suggesting that regardless of the tribes of the people within the 
Borno axis, people share a common Salafists ideology. In this context, Participant Five 
may also be referring to the radical strand of Sunnist ideology. 
Another commonality between the three states is their military presence. 
Although the Nigerian Joint Task Force (JTF) is responsible for fighting BH (Global 
Security, 2016), the Joint Military Task Force is saddled with the primary 
responsibility of combating BH (Country Report on Terrorism). The declaration of 
states of emergency in 2012 and 2013 increased the number of military activities 
against BH (ibid). In 2013, seven infantry divisions were formed with their 
headquarters being in Maiduguri. In these new divisions, Adamawa remained as a 
brigade, Yobe was upgraded from a battalion to a brigade, and 900 soldiers were added 
to the divisions (Global Security, 2016). Although there are no publicly available 
figures about the number of troops in each of these three states, the military formation 
in them suggests that the number of military outlets is similar.  
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7.2 Variation in frequency of target types in Adamawa, Borno and 
Yobe states 
This section outlines similar BH targets and then quantifies and explains the variation 
in the frequencies of target patterns by the group. The statistics of BH incidences 
between 2009 and 2015 from the GTD are used to enable explanations about the 
differences in BH’s frequencies of target type across Adamawa, Borno and Yobe to 
be drawn. The section argues that the variation in the number of attacks on target type 
is dependent upon BH’s capability to attack. Thus, this section firstly explains why 
one area suffers more attacks than another; secondly, it explains the nature of BH 
attacks on different targets; and thirdly, it highlights reasons for the disparity in target 
types across the aforementioned states. The statement below by Participant Four (a 
member of the former Presidential Committee on BH and senior government official) 
suggests that the states of Adamawa, Borno and Yobe have suffered the most from 
BH attacks since the onset of BH’s campaign of violence. He suggests that: 
The most vulnerable states then and up to now have been the North-Eastern 
states, and particularly Borno, comprising about 23 local governments or 
thereabouts, Yobe, with about 15 or 18 local governments or thereabouts, and 
then Adamawa, part of which is also affected. 
The Participant is suggesting that BH have had the capacity to attack the 23 local 
government agencies (LGAs) in Borno, and the 15 - 18 in Yobe state since the start of 
BH violence. The Participant did not specify the number of LGAs in Adamawa.  
Between 2009 and 2015, BH carried out a total of 1,851 attacks across Nigeria. 
Adamawa experienced 139 (7.50%) attacks, Yobe 238 (12.9%) and Borno (55.86%) 
the highest number of incidences - 1,034 attacks. A total of 231 (12.48%) attacks were 
carried out in Northwest and North-central Nigeria while 202 (10.91%) incidences 
occurred outside of Nigerian borders. It is important to note that one attack can be 
aimed at multiple targets, for instance in the 22nd March 2013 attack of Ganye LGA 
in Adamawa state, BH attacked banks, taverns and prisons, killing 25 civilians. 
Therefore, the number of total attacks in a region differs from targeting, meaning that 
Adamawa experienced 139 attacks with these attacks aiming at 166 targets. Borno 
suffered 1,034 attacks with 1,143 targets, and 238 attacks with 271 targets were carried 
out in Yobe. According to GTD, BH has 16 target types, and these are noted in Table 
7.2 below.   
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Table 7. 3: Percentages and number of Boko Haram attacks on different target 
types (data obtained from the GTD) 
 Percentage & (number) of attacks in each state 
Targets Adamawa Borno Yobe 
Airports/aviation - 0 (1) - 
Business 6(10)                 4 (42) 8 (21) 
Educational institutions 1(2)                   4 (43) 10 (26) 
Food & water  - - 0 (1) 
Government / diplomatic - 
 
0 (1) 
Government (general) 10(16) 7.5 (82) 11 (31) 
Journalists/media - 0 (1) 0 (0) 
Military 7(12) 11 (128) 9 (25) 
NGOs - 0 (2)  - 
Police 10(16) 8 (89) 19 (51) 
Citizens & private property 52(87) 54 (594) 25 (67) 
Religious figures & institutions 7(11) 6.5 (76) 9 (25) 
Terrorists/non-state actors - 1 (17) 0 (1) 
Telecommunications 2(4) 2 (18) 3 (8) 
Transportation 2(4) 1 (15) 3 (7) 
Violent political parties 1(2) 0 (2) 1 (2) 
Others 1(1) 0 (3) 1 (2) 
Unknown 1(1) 3 (30) 1 (3) 
 Total 100(166)               100(1,143) 100(271)               
 
For the purposes of this study, the targets in Table 7.3 are classified into four 
categories (see Table 7.3 below). Firstly, all government forces as well as mercenaries 
are classified as ‘state forces’. This category encompasses the military, police and 
terrorists/non-state actors. The terrorists/non-state actors incorporate BH attacks 
against the Civilian JTF, a group of local hunters and volunteers that assist state forces 
in combating BH. Secondly, government buildings, agencies and non-military 
personnel are all classified under ‘government buildings and non-military officials’. 
These categorised targets include airports/aviation owned by the government, 
diplomatic branches of the government and the government more generally. Political 
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parties are also included because attacks have targeted political party offices and 
officials who form governments either at a federal, state or LGA level. Thirdly, all 
targets on religion and ideology are grouped together as ‘education/religious figures 
and institutions’. These targets include religious figures and institutions as well as 
educational institutions. Fourthly, citizens, private property and businesses are all 
classified under ‘citizens and private property’. These targets include 
telecommunications, transportation, citizens and private property, non-governmental 
organisations (NGOs), food and water, journalists, the media and businesses. Other 
attacks that are suspected to have been BH attacks or have had no casualties recorded 
are categorised under ‘others’. In grouping the targets, government buildings and non-
officials could have been grouped with state forces because they are all representatives 
of the government; however, they are grouped with non-military government officials. 
Additionally, the categorisation of these attack types does not truncate the 
explanations about the target types in Table 7.2. For example, under the state forces 
categorisation in Yobe, out of 271 incidences, 51 (19%) attacks targeted the police 
while 25 (9%) were directed towards the military. The categorisations used give 
consideration to such disparities.  
Table 7.4: Percentages of attacks in each target types across Adamawa, Borno 
and Yobe states 
 
Percentages and (number) of attacks for 
each target type in each state 
Targets Adamawa Borno Yobe 
People and private property 63 (105) 55 (672) 38 (104) 
State forces 17 (28) 19 (234) 28 (77) 
Education/religious figures and institutions 8 (13) 16 (119) 19 (51) 
Government buildings and non-military officials 11 (18) 7 (85) 13 (34) 
Others 1 (2) 3 (33) 2 (5) 
Total percentages and numbers of attacks 100 (166) 100 (1,143)       100 (271)  
 
Table 7.4 shows that Borno has suffered the most attacks, followed by Yobe and then 
Adamawa. Statistics on BH incidences suggest that states close to countries with weak 
CT have fewer incidences of BH. For instance, Adamawa has had fewer incidences 
among the three states being discussed (Borno and Yobe), while Cameroon has had 
more attacks (128) than the Niger (46) and Chad Republics (28). The CT measures 
within these countries are important because they have helped destabilise BH’s safety 
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net.  Borno has had more attacks because the Chad Republic has stronger CT measures 
than the other countries in the Lake Chad region (see chapter eight for further details 
on the spillover of terror). Table 7.3 shows that Borno has the highest number of 
attacks, thereby making it the epicentre of BH activities because of its significance not 
only within Islamic civilisation, but also that it is the homeland of the Kanuri. 
Moreover, BH’s radicalisation and campaign of violence erupted from Borno and as 
such, this enabled BH to establish a caliphate. Similarly, Yobe has had the second 
highest number of incidences because it is the second most significant area for the 
Kanuris and for Islamic civilisation (Barkindo, 2016). The below comment of 
Participant Five (member of the erstwhile committee of the drafting of the present 
constitution of Nigeria) also supports this argument, with him suggesting that: 
Somehow along the line, Borno in the Northeast assumes, and correctly too, 
that they are the precursors of Islam in Nigeria and probably in West Africa 
and that the emergence of the Fulani jihad in the 19th century is far more recent 
history. And probably if we understand this history, there may also be a context 
in which we might say that Boko Haram has emerged to assert a dominance or 
a relevance of Islam in Nigeria and probably West Africa. 
With this statement, Participant Five is attempting to explain why BH is trying to 
dominate the Kanuri homeland of Borno. Yobe is the second most BH affected state 
because it was previously a significant administrative centre within the Kanem-Bornu 
Empire (Barkindo, 2016), with this altering with the formation of the Nigerian state. 
The Nigerian government carved out Yobe state for administrative reasons. 
Table 7.4 above illustrates that the attacks in Yobe were evenly distributed 
across all targets, and this can be attributed to the number of Nigerian forces deployed 
to each state. Yobe has less of a military presence than Adamawa and Borno (more 
details about this are included in the State Forces Section).  
The nature of BH attacks is intriguing. Although the group may have a primary 
target in mind when carrying out attacks, there are instances when an attack affects 
more than one target. For instance, on 23rd of April, BH killed both civilians and 
members of the Nigerian forces in Marte LGA of Borno state. Additionally, business 
centres, government officials and police were attacked on 24th, April 2012 in Damaturu 
Yobe state (GTD). The percentages and number of attacks for each target types are 
discussed below.
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7.2.1 People and private property 
The highest number of incidences are related to attacks on people and private property. 
In the early stages of BH, its major targets were Nigerian forces and government 
representatives, but subsequently the group has focused on multiple targets for 
strategic reasons. As noted in chapters five and six, attacks on civilians were to capture 
Nigerian territories and conscript people into the group, which was a sign of BH being 
weakened by Nigerian forces. People and private property experienced the most 
frequent attacks with there being 105 (65%) people and property attacks out of 166 
attacks in Adamawa, 672 (55%) out of 1,143 in Borno and 104 (38%) out of 271 in 
Yobe, with the percentage of attacks varying within each state. The paragraphs below 
highlight the major differences and similarities in these targets. 
The nature of attacks in Adamawa was slightly different from Borno and Yobe 
because most major areas attacked were border towns which are highly commercial in 
nature. Such towns include Mahai, Madagali, Song and Mubi. Although Mubi was 
one of the commercial LGAs of Adamawa (Yola, 2014), it can be argued that 
consecutive BH threats have scared business people and that the ultimatum given by 
BH to the Igbos may have reduced economic activity within the region (Yola, 2014).  
 Because Borno is the epicentre of BH activities, it has more complicated 
reasons for attacks on its people and private property. Firstly, Borno has more border 
towns than the other states; secondly, its brand of Islam is appealing because of the 
history of the Kanem-Bornu Empire; and thirdly, BH has overpowered Nigerian forces 
in several battles as well as raided military barracks such as Giwa, Gwoza Monguno 
and Bama (Ekott, 2015). These successes seem to motivate BH to attack more civilians 
with the attacks being a strategy for forcing individuals to support BH. Alternatively, 
the ability of BH to forcibly capture Nigerian territories suggests that civilians are 
likely to be targeted.  The weakening of BH in 2015 by the Multi-National Joint Task 
Force (MNJT) and the JTF encouraged BH to focus its targets on civilians, and this 
could be why several Internally Displaced Camps (IDPs) in Maiduguri were attacked 
(Fox News 2016).  
In Yobe state, BH carried out direct attacks on businesses such as pubs and 
taverns. There were also two incidences in which the attacks involved multiple targets 
including businesses (GTD). I would argue that both ideology and strategy motivated 
these attacks. Ideologically, BH regards places such as hotels and taverns as places 
that promote idolatry (Mohammed, 2014). Strategically, it can be argued that these 
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attacks were a strategy to promote the propaganda that BH is destroying the ‘Western 
capitalist system’ most particularly in an area that has been affected by Islamism  
Despite the aforementioned differences, these states share similar reasons as 
to why people and private property suffer more attacks than other target types. Borno 
has suffered the capture of more of its territory (14) with BH siezing four border towns 
in Adamawa including Mubi, Madagali, Michika and Maiha LGAs, and capturing the 
towns of Buni Yadi and Bara in Yobe. (The Guardian, 2014). A further point to argue 
is that the targeting of telecommunication intallations and transportation is for 
strategic reasons, i.e. to get public attention. 
7.2.2 State forces 
The attack on state forces is the second highest target within all three states being 
discussed. Adamawa experienced 28 (17%) out of 166 attacks, Borno experienced 234 
(19%) out of 1,143 and Yobe 77 (28%) out of 271 incidences. In raw numbers, Borno 
suffered more attacks than Adamawa and Yobe combined.  
There are several reasons for the differences in the frequencies of attacks across these 
three states. Boko Haram violence started in the Borno-Yobe axis and at that time, the 
major targets of BH were the police (Agbiboa, 2013a). After the group came back 
from exile in 2010, they expanded and created cells across these states (Walker, 2016). 
By May 2011, the group was moving between Borno and Yobe as a form of tactical 
manoeuvring. As such, they had clashes with the police in Yobe and by August 2011, 
the group had battled with the military in Song LGA of Adamawa. Because of BH’s 
level of sophistication, the Nigerian government deployed more soldiers to Borno, 
which was a hotbed of BH. Because the Nigerian forces were not well-equipped nor 
well-informed about fighting terrorism, BH had sufficient capacity to overpower them. 
This is evidenced by the raiding of different military establishments in Borno such as 
Giwa and Gwoza barracks (Ekott, 2015). However, it is interesting to note that before 
2013 when the 7th Infantry Division was formed, Adamawa had a brigade and had 
more soldiers than Yobe. Yobe had a battalion as its main military structure (Global 
Security, 2016), but BH attacked more military and police in Yobe than Adamawa (77 
times compared to 28). It is argued that this could also be possible because of BH’s 
ability to manoeuvre between Borno and Yobe as this facilitates their ability to attack 
more security forces. Added to this, Yobe has close proximity to Borno and Adamawa 
and so the deployment of state forces is likely to affect Yobe  
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It is important to note that attacks on state forces vary significantly between 
the military and the police as targets. Because the military was saddled with the 
primary responsibility of combating BH, it had numerous installations across 
Adamawa, Yobe and particularly in Borno state that BH could target, with there being 
a great deal of difference between incidences against the police and the military. In 
Adamawa, 16 (10%) attacks were carried against the police and 12 (7%) against the 
military out of 166 attacks (see Table 7.2). In Yobe, out of 271 attacks, 51 (19%) were 
carried out against the police and 25 (9%) against the military. This can be connected 
to the Kanama and subsequent clashes between the Nigerian police and BH in Yobe 
at the early stages of BH’s development (Walker, 2016). Secondly, these figures may 
be attributable to low military deployment in Yobe state compared to that of Adamawa 
and Borno. This means that the police supplemented the Nigerian military in securing 
Yobe state and as such, this increased the chances of the police being targeted. These 
reasons may also suggest that BH sees the police as more of any enemy than the 
military or that the police might be perceived as an easy target.    
7.2.3 Education/religious figures and institutions 
Education and religion are low as targets in all BH attacks across Adamawa, Borno 
and Yobe. Out of a total number of 166 incidences, 13 (8%) attacks targeted education 
and religious figures and institutions in Adamawa; Borno suffered 199 (16%) out of 
1,143 attacks, and Yobe experienced 51(19%) out of 271 attacks. Borno and Yobe 
tended to have similar percentages when compared to Adamawa and this difference is 
discussed below. 
Targeting of educational institutions is a strategy to destroy Western education 
and encourage the spread of BH ideology, especially in the Borno and Yobe axis. 
Moreover, Yobe is the second most populated Kanuri state and that is why it is the 
second most attacked area. It is argued that such attacks are an approach by BH to get 
more public support from those who oppose Western values or education within the 
Borno-Yobe axis, as the region is perceived to be the precursor of Islam. 
In similar fashion, BH spreads its attacks on religious centres and figures 
across the three states being discussed. In 2010 BH went into exile until August 2010 
(Walker, 2016). It had carried out three attacks in Maiduguri (Borno) with the first 
being at the house of a senior Islamic cleric, Sheikh Bashir Mustapha (GTD), in 
October 2009. The other two targeted the Church of Christ and the Baptist church in 
December 2009 in Maiduguri (ibid). In 2011, the number of BH incidences increased 
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because of its renewed campaign of violence against the Nigerian state, with the 
number of incidences of attacking churches and Islamic preachers also increasing, as 
they were suspected of collaborating with the government against BH (HRW Report, 
2012: 52). The preaching by non-BH Islamic clerics against BH ideology may also 
have decreased out of fear because BH targets clerics who criticise its ideology (BBC, 
2011b). I would argue that the attacks on religious figures and institutions are vital for 
BH to spread its ideology, as well as to counter any other version of Islam that could 
hinder the spread of radical Islam. More so, Borno state is the most targeted state 
because of its significance in the spread of Islam in Nigeria, with Participant Eight (an 
academic and security consultant who had several contacts with BH members) 
affirming that: 
Islam came to Borno before any other part of Nigeria because of the greatness 
of the Kanem-Bornu Empire and the Sefawa Dynasty which embraced Islam 
in the early, I think 13th or 14th century. So, Islam was in the Borno Empire, 
and of course in the North, Islam existed..., Borno was a very significant centre 
for Islamic proselytisation and education as a result of its long history of Islam. 
Participant Eight suggests that since the 13th or 14th century, Borno has been a centre 
for Islamic evangelism. It is this kind of thinking that makes BH want to destroy 
ideologies contrary to its belief. I would argue that Adamawa has had the least 
religious attacks because the ultimatum (Reuters, 2012) that BH gave to Christians 
and Igbo settlers may have yielded a result, with anecdotal evidence suggesting that 
some individuals have left the Mubi Maiha and Yola towns of Adamawa (Reuters, 
2012). The attacks on religious leaders and institutions subsequently reduced across 
the states because the Nigerian government deployed security personnel to guard 
places of worships (HRW Report, 2012: 58) and support the security guards at worship 
centres. Secondly, worship centres began using metal detectors in their entrances 
(BBC, 2012) and vehicles were not permitted to park in the premises of worship 
centres to reduce the risk of explosions. 
7.2.4 Government buildings and non-military officials 
In the number of targets across states, government and non-military officials have 
experienced the least number of attacks. Adamawa had 18 (11%) out of 166, Borno 
experienced 85 (7%) out of 1,143 and Yobe 34 (13%) out of 271 attacks. These were 
directed at government buildings and personnel, but are less significant because BH 
targeted state officials in its embryonic stages. State officials and government property 
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in Borno were attacked in the early stages of BH formation because the group felt 
betrayed by the senior government officials in Borno state (see chapter six). 
7.2.5 Other incidences 
There are several attacks that are suspected to have been BH attacks with some of 
these having had no casualties. This implies that the targets for which the attacks were 
meant remain uncertain. Adamawa experienced 2 (1%), Borno suffered 33 (3%) and 
Yobe was affected by 5 (3%) such incidences. 
7.3 Discussion and conclusions 
This chapter examined the reasons for the differences in target frequencies across 
Adamawa, Borno and Yobe, the three most affected BH states. Using MSSD, the 
chapter hypothesised that BH’s capability to attack is responsible for the variation in 
the frequency of BH target patterns. Some similarities between these states were 
identified and these included geographic factors, deprivation levels, ethnic 
composition, religion and similar military attacks. The findings of this chapter 
demonstrate that Adamawa has less deprivation (demonstrated in Table 1) compared 
to the other two states. However, it appears that the state with the highest number of 
Kanuris experienced more attacks. Moreover, the number of attacks on different target 
types in each state is in ranking order of states with high Kanuri populations, i.e. states 
with more Kanuri suffer more attacks. In all target types, Borno is the biggest state 
and it has the highest incidences (1,143), followed by Yobe (271) and then Adamawa 
state (166). This does not suggest that BH has a Kanuri agenda, but instead that BH 
uses both ethnic and religious narratives in its campaign of violence. This argument 
reflects the arguments of Barkindo (2016) and Zenn & Pieri (2016) that there was an 
attempt by BH to establish an ultra-Islamic and Kanuri homeland. Moreover, it can be 
argued that the quest for this agenda may be the reason why Shekau is biased in giving 
Kanuri members of BH preferential treatment (Zenn, 2014b) (as argued in chapter 
four).  
Geographical location also plays a significant role. States close to countries 
with weaker CT experience fewer attacks. Borno has had more attacks because the 
Chad Republic has the strongest CT, with Yobe being the second most affected by 
attacks because Niger is the second strongest country in terms of CT. Adamawa is the 
least affected because Cameroon has the weakest CT (More details in chapter eight). 
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In terms of the variation of frequency in target types, different reasons were 
outlined as explanations for these disparities. Regarding the number of attacks against 
state forces, the weak nature of the Nigerian forces enabled BH to carry out raids on 
military installations. Government buildings and non-military officials suffered more 
attacks because at some point (2009/2011) BH felt that senior government official in 
Borno had broken their promises. With regards to people and private property, the 
attacks in Adamawa state were more business-targeted because the border towns of 
Mubi, Madagali, and Mahai were commercial in nature. In Borno state, attacks were 
directed on civilians first as a way of instilling fear to encourage possible recruitment 
and second, because of the weakness of BH. With regards to education/religious 
figures and institutions, the narrative of Islam and rejection of Western values or 
education within the Borno-Yobe axis explains why Adamawa has suffered less 
attacks. The breakdown of attacks in Yobe state suggests that the variation of attacks 
in different target types was more than in Adamawa and Borno. This can be attributed 
to a number of reasons including a lesser military presence compared to the other states, 
as well as grievances with the police. 
In conclusion, I would argue that in most cases of targeting, BH do not target 
their constituents; they target those who do not share their ideology. These targets 
include both civilians and state forces. As such, the discussion in this chapter agrees 
that dogmatic belief contributes to the logic of BH’s target selection. BH is a group of 
ideologues that classifies the society in which they live into believers, non-believers 
(kafirs) and ‘traitors’ within Islam who collaborate with kafirs. It is this kind of 
classification that explains the frequency in targeting state forces, government 
buildings and non-military officials, people and private property and 
education/religious figures and institutions. However, this classification means that 
degrees of ethno-religious background may influence the variation in targeting. This 
suggests that targets of historical significance to ethnicity and religion tend to be 
targeted more frequently because of the terrorists’ quest for ethno-religious revival. 
The variation of terrorist attacks in different targets can also be attributed to strategic 
logic where terrorists attack because of their capability. 
The next chapter discusses international levels of explanation about BH. It 
highlights the spill-over of violence from Nigeria through the previously discussed 
three border states to Cameroon, Chad and the Niger Republics. Finally, both chapters 
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seven and eight illustrate the nature of BH activities between neighbouring countries 
in the Lake Chad region.  
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Chapter 8: International Influences  
The previous chapter examined the three Nigerian states most affected by BH. These 
states share borders with Nigeria’s neighbours within the Lake Chad region and as 
noted in chapter seven, Borno state has close proximity to the Chad Republic, the 
Niger Republic shares borders with Yobe state and Adamawa shares boundaries with 
the Republic of Cameroon. Chapter seven also explained how these three states and 
their neighbouring countries are connected by the Kanem-Bornu Empire. This 
geographic proximity is often cited as an explanation for the spillover of violence to 
these countries; however, this is arguably overly simplistic, and it would appear that 
this spillover of violence is actually quite complex and involves multi-dimensional 
factors. This chapter therefore seeks to examine this complexity by firstly, discussing 
international factors that import Islamic radicalism to Nigeria; secondly, by examining 
international factors that motivate the linkage of BH to violent extremists as well as 
factors that facilitate BH. In terms of linkage, it is noteworthy that it is difficult to 
highlight direct resource transfer (arms and funds) from international jihadists such as 
Al Qaeda and Islamic State (IS) because BH is a resource-wealthy group that engages 
in robbery, ransom and raids on military barracks to obtain weapons (2014a). Another 
challenge in identifying such resource transfer is the porous borders between Nigeria 
and countries in the Lake Chad region (2014a).  However, this chapter draws attention 
to the linkage between international Jihadist from a symbolic perpective. Thirdly, this 
chapter highlights factors responsible for the spillover of violence from Nigerian 
territories to countries neighbouring Nigeria. In order to understand the complexity of 
BH and the spillover of the group’s violence to outside of Nigeria, as well as to engage 
in a discussion about this, a review of previous studies on similar spillovers is 
important as this case study may either refute or confirm some of these. 
BH’s ideological perspective can be argued to be indicative of the spread of 
global Salafist jihadism. The narrative of terrorism has changed remarkably since the 
beginning of the 21st century, particularly with the bombing of the World Trade Centre 
in the US (9/11) and the rise of Al Qaeda. The wave of global jihadism since then has 
received increasing attention, with a significant number of studies focusing on Al 
Qaeda (Gunaratna, 2003; Cottee, 2010; Sageman, 2004; 2008). After 9/11, a wave of 
radical Islamism and terrorism spread globally to the Middle East, Western Europe 
and Africa, with both Al Qaeda and IS waging attacks on Western Europe. Even 
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though there had been a history of radical Islam in Africa (sub-Saharan Africa and the 
Maghreb), civil wars involving governments fighting conventional rebel armies were 
the more common type of conflict. However, in 2009/2010 the nature of political 
violence changed from civil wars to religious terrorism (Forest & Giroux, 2011), 
particularly with the rise of groups such as AQIM, Boko Haram, al-Shabaab and 
Ansaru. A significant number of studies exist about Al-Qaeda and the spread of 
Salafist jihadi, and Sageman (2004; 2008) provides insight into the network of the 
Salafist jihadists. Sageman’s (2008) analysis on the evolution of the radical Salafist 
movement highlights how an emasculated Al-Qaeda in Afghanistan formed a loose 
network across different continents or regions in international arenas such as the 
Middle East, Europe and Africa. He found that kinship and friendship facilitate the 
spread of such networks (2004). Additionally, he suggests that the radicalisation of 
individuals happens on a collective platform where individuals meet as friends and 
comrades and then agree on a shared ideological position. Furthermore, Sageman 
(2004) explains how a Salafist jihadist can become a node or branch of the Al-Qaeda 
system through the “bunch of guys” theory. This theory suggests that a Salafi jihadist 
is part of a movement of exiles alienated from their communities who choose to live 
in isolation from their host communities while enjoying each other’s companionship, 
which increases the rejection of their society of origin. Such isolation and friendships 
ultimately lead to radicalisation and violence in solidarity with jihadist ideology. 
Moreover, the “bunch of guys” theory also suggests that the way in which small 
jihadist groups join larger jihadist movements is based on a bottom-up approach, and 
not the opposite (Sageman, 2004; 2008).  BH’s relocation to the wilderness in Kanama, 
their adoption of a violent strategy and their subsequent linkage to Al-Qaeda (and 
more recently IS) reflects Sageman’s (2004) explanation, but with regards to BH, the 
“bunch of guys” theory appears insufficient to explain the radicalisation process of a 
collective of individuals and in particular, collective radicalisation. Already, the 
history of radical Islam in Northern Nigeria is providing a fertile ground for the 
mobilisation of BH recruits or members.   
There has been a wave of Islamic radicalisation across Northern Nigeria both 
in the 9th the 19th centuries during the Kanem Bornu Empire and Usman dan Fodio 
jihad respectively (Alao, 2013). There have also been significant religious crises such 
as the Bulunkutu, Kaduna and Jos crises, and the emergence of radical Islamic 
movements such as the Maitatsine and the IMN. As such, the Northern region has 
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been most affected by radical Islam with the spread of Al-Qaeda or IS being linkable 
to BH’s internationalisation. This is because already radicalised individuals in Nigeria 
were further inspired by the tactics and religious motivation of other international 
radical Islamic movements. 
Prevailing studies on the spillover of terror mainly focus on factors such as 
external interventions (Addison & Murshed, 2005), weak neighbouring states (Bosker 
& de Ree, 2009) and government/terrorist capabilities (Buhaug, 2009). Other 
arguments include the movement of refugees (Salehyan & Gleditsch, 2006), the media 
(Salvatore, 2011) and ethnic links (Braha, 2002). The most discussed factor is external 
support or intervention, with studies suggesting that violence might spillover to a 
third-party country due to its support of a warring faction that might include 
government and/or anti-state militias (Addison & Murshed, 2005; Beardsley, 2011). 
Proponents of this argument posit that such interventions increase both the expansion 
and duration of violence across boundaries within and outside of conflict zones. In 
addition, violent groups may perceive foreign intervention as an additional enemy 
(Tony & Mushed, 2002). External interventions by a country are often influenced by 
a government’s fear of the influx of neighbouring conflict into its territory. Such fear 
makes countries more proactive in defending their territories by fighting terrorists 
from countries outside of their borders, but such actions in themselves can further 
encourage a spillover of violence (Danneman & Ritterer, 2013). Additionally, military 
support or other contributions from countries fighting terrorists across their borders 
can in some cases have a negative effect, with the intervening countries experiencing 
the growth of extremism back home. For instance, Western nations are now facing 
homegrown extremists because of their participation in the international fight against 
radical Islam. With regards to the implications of this on countries rendering external 
support, the studies of Cole & Cole (2009) suggest that young British jihadists can 
become motivated to fight against the United Kingdom, even though this is their own 
country. In contrast to this, other arguments suggest that multilateral interventions in 
a conflict zone can end existing tensions (Byman & Pollack, 2007). However, other 
scholars such as Richard (1994) posit that the argument on whether external 
interventions expand or resolve conflicts depends on their timing. Timing in this case 
refers to a mutually hurting stalemate, i.e. a stage in a conflict when either of the 
warring parties will sustain further losses if they proceed with violence. Moreover, 
stalemate arises when both warring parties reach a point in a conflict where they have 
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no chances of winning and continuing the war will ultimately result in grave 
consequences for both warring parties. 
Some studies suggest that weak and unstable government facilitates a spillover 
of conflict (Bosker & de Ree, 2009). This issue of state fragility is a common feature 
in Africa where there are examples of political instability. Bosker & de Ree (2009) 
suggest that the proximity of one country to another enables an easy flow of conflict 
from one region to another, which is how the Lake Chad region has contributed to the 
growth of BH. It is further suggested that porous borders across regions facilitate the 
weakening of already fragile states (Atzili, 2007).  
A further factor that influences a spillover of violence is the capabilities of 
both a government and terrorists. The inability of state forces of a host state to supress 
terrorist incursions enables a spillover of violence (Buhaug, 2009), and the movement 
of refugees into host states can also be a cause of spillover of violence. Scholars such 
as Salehyan & Gleditsch (2006) argue that in contrast to the conventional thinking that 
refugee movement is an outcome of violence, refugee migration in itself can be a 
factor for the transnationalisation of violence. They argue that refugee movement 
expands rebel networks, spreads ideology and competes for economic situations that 
will in the long run create conflict. Similarly, Danneman & Ritterer (2013) also 
suggest that refugee camps can serve as recruitment grounds for rebels.  
The media also plays a motivational role in the spillover of conflict. Some 
studies suggest that it could be influential most directly through social media 
(Salvatore, 2011), with Khondker (2011) suggesting that the media helps instigate the 
violence of individuals within neighbouring countries over time.  
A final factor for the spread of violence can be ethnic linkages. These can 
spread conflict across borders through the solidarity between citizens of different 
countries who belong to a common culture or ancestral lineage (Braha, 2002).    
This chapter consists of three sections. The first section explores the influx and 
spread of Islamic radicalism to Nigeria from a historical perspective. The section 
illustrates how external factors and events within Nigeria influenced the radicalisation 
of BH. The second section highlights how international factors have motivated and 
increased the capability of BH. Then the third section looks at the numerous factors 
that have contributed to the spillover of violence yo outside Nigeria - particularly in 
the Republics of Cameroon, Chad and Niger. The third section uses different 
arguments from the literature about spillovers of violence to examine how BH’s 
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campaign of violence has affected Nigeria’s neighbouring countries. As highlighted 
above, the major debates in the literature about spillovers of violence include factors 
such as external interventions, weak neighbouring states and government/terrorist 
capabilities. Other factors include the media and ethnic links. 
8.1 Radicalisation of BH: combinations of state, regional and 
international narratives 
This section explains the diffusion of Islamic radicalisation into Nigeria and how it 
has laid a foundation for different types of religious violent movements, including BH. 
It also discusses how these external factors have combined with events within Nigeria 
to radicalise BH. The effect of the radicalisation of Islam in Nigeria has manifested 
itself through inter-sectarian conflict, inter-religious violence or terrorism (Adesoji, 
2010; Loimeier, 2012). This section focuses on how it has manifested itself through 
group terrorism, especially with regards to BH. The section illustrates how 
international factors mixed with local grievances have snowballed into BH violence. 
The majority of previous studies have traced the radicalisation of Islam in Nigeria 
from an internal perspective, but have focussed less on the international factors that 
have influenced such internal ideology.  
This section looks at international major events and how they are reflected in 
Nigeria. It looks at connections between the Fula jihad and the Usman dan Fodio jihad, 
as well as the emergence of the Mahdiyya movement in the 19th century. Secondly, it 
analyses the impact of Muhammed Marwa’s (a Cameroonian) ideology that gave rise 
to the Maitatsine movement of the 1970s in Nigeria. Thirdly, it discusses the impact 
of the fragmentation of the Islamic Brotherhood in Nigeria and the 1979 Iranian 
Revolution. These events motivated radicalism through the Islamic Movement of 
Nigeria (IMN) in the 1980s. Lastly, it discusses the impact of 9/11 and the prominence 
of Osama Bin Laden in Nigeria. 
Previous studies on BH trace the history of Islamic radicalism in Nigeria to 
either the Usman dan Fodio jihad of 1900 (Isa 2010) or the Islamic Movement of 
Nigeria (IMN) in the 1980s. Although some historians argue that the dan Fodio jihad 
installed a “just society” (Paden, 2008; Isa, 2010), it did in fact use violence to 
establish a theocratic system of governance in Northern Nigeria. However, it is 
essential to pin the motivation of the dan Fodio jihad to the Fula (Fulani) jihads in 
West Africa and particularly in Futa Bundu (in Senegal), Futa Tooro (Southern 
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Mauritania and Northern Senegal) and Fouta Djallon (the Republic of Guinea) 
(Hunwicks, 1960; Hill 2009). The dan Fodio jihad also inspired the jihads in Mali (the 
Masina and Toucouleur Empires) (ibid). The Fulani jihads existed between the 17th 
and 19th centuries until the era of colonialism (Isa, 2010: 6). In line with previous 
arguments about the rise of radical Islam in Nigeria (Hunwicks, 1960; Hill 2009), I 
would argue that the Qadiriyya (Salafist ideology: Abdul-Qadir Gilani’s school of 
thought) militant movement (under the leadership of dan Fodio) introduced radical 
Islam to Nigeria. Even though the jihad established non-violent Islamic movements, 
it inspired other violent movements such as the Mahdiyya, the Maitatsine and the 
Shiite movements in the 1980s, as well as Boko Haram.  
After the dan Fodio era, the Mahdiyya movement from Sudan (Paden, 
1973:170) and became an offshoot of the dan Fodio jihad. The Mahdiyya movement 
did not last long because the British colonial authorities swiftly curtailed it (Isa, 2010). 
Even though the Maitasine movement was not a Salafist movement, it was inspired 
by dan Fodio’s philosophy of Mujaddid (reformer; explained in chapter four) (Adesoji, 
2011). After the departure of the British, Nigeria witnessed the birth of two Islamic 
radical groups - Maitatsine and the IMN. The founder of the Maitatsine movement, 
Mohammed Marwa (a Cameroonian and resident of Nigeria), established the 
movement in Northern Nigeria because of the established background for Islamic 
radicalism there. The IMN was an umbrella organisation of the Shiites in Nigeria, and 
it broke away from the Islamic Brotherhood Movement in Nigeria during the 1980s. 
The Iranian Revolution of 1979 inspired the radicalisation of the IMN, and they 
engaged in clashes with the Nigerian government. 
It is also argued that IMN significantly influenced present radicalisation in 
Nigeria (Isa, 2010; Adesoji, 2011). In concurrence with Loimeier (2012), I would 
argue that the theological disputes and violent clashes between the Yan Izala Salafist 
movement and other sects of Islam (Shiites and Sufis) have contributed to the 
radicalisation of individuals in Northern Nigeria. The internal conflict within Islam 
leading to this radicalisation is a reflection of the global Islamic schism between 
Sunnis and Shiites, because both the Muslim Brotherhood and Shiites are global 
movements that seek to spread their ideologies, particularly around the Middle East, 
sub-Saharan Africa and Maghreb. All these events and movements (from the dan 
Fodio jihad to BH) have a common rhetoric: fighting an un-Islamic state (i.e. the 
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Nigerian secular state) and the establishment of a state guided by the injunctions of 
Islam.  
Aside from the common language radical Islamic movements adopt, they have 
different interpretations and motivations about the way in which they intend to achieve 
their goals. The Usman dan Fodio jihad captured several territories and established a 
caliphate in Sokoto, which is still symbolic and influential to the Islamic umma 
(community) in Nigeria. The Mahdiyya movement was a continuation of the dan Fodio 
agenda. The Maitatsine movement and the IMN of the 1980s shared a similar ideology 
of fighting westernisation, but had different theological interpretations. Marwa (the 
founder of Maitatsine) saw himself as a reformer and a prophet (Adesoji, 2011), and 
the IMN was a Shiite-oriented movement influenced by the Iranian Revolution of 1979. 
It is important, therefore, to note that these events and movements facilitated by global 
dynamism provided a fertile ground for the radicalisation of individuals across 
Northern Nigeria before the advent of BH. Participant Seven (a media practitioner and 
conflict negotiator within Nigeria) confirms that international factors such as the 
Iranian Revolution of 1979 and then Al-Qaeda have influenced the radicalisation of 
BH:  
Radicalism started, or Islamism was fuelled, actually by events outside of this 
country. By the turn of the 1980s, that is between 1979 and 1980…, the Iranian 
Revolution had taken place and from there you start to see the influence of the 
Shiites. First, … the Shia led by El-Zazzky started striking targets and then 
before you knew it, in Zaria and in Kano, and they became massive in 
these areas. They were influenced first by international events. As… time went 
on, organisations like Al- Qaeda and al-Shabaab and whatever, started 
showing Muslims that they could do more. They could do more by fighting so-
called Western civilisation and Christianity by embarking on terrorism, armed 
conflict and the radicalisation of Islam in Nigeria. This was partly influenced 
by external developments.  
Participant Seven is explaining the impact of global Islamic radicalism within Nigeria 
and how global dynamism propelled the radicalisation of BH. The Participant further 
suggests that millennial terrorist groups such as Al-Qaeda and al-Shabaab have 
emboldened BH and made them believe that they can realise their ideological 
objectives.   
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Significantly, 9/11 in 2001 and the rise to global prominence of Osama Bin 
Laden renewed levels of radicalisation in Northern Nigeria. It also motivated several 
groups to turn to violence. The advent of Bin Laden motivated BH and came as an 
awakening to its members, who then became known as the Nigerian Taliban (see 
chapter six). This name was significant because Mohammed Yusuf saw Bin Laden as 
his mentor. Apart from the role of Bin Laden, BH is to some extent a reflection of the 
increasing influence of ideologies of popular radical Islamic figures. Modern militant 
Islam takes its ideological motivation from four charismatic figures: al-Banna, Sayyid 
Mawdudi, Sayyid Qutb and Ayatollah Khomeini (Kepel 2002: 5). The concept of 
Mujaddid is also a contributory factor to the radicalisation and militancy of Islamist 
groups. Islamic theologians and jurists such as Al Ghazali, Abdul-Qadir Gilani, Ibn-
e-Arabi, Ibn Taymiyya and Osama Bin Laden are regarded as Mujaddid. (Weimann 
2015; Flannery 2015:102) (see chapter four for further details). I would argue that the 
radicalisation of Islamist groups in Nigeria is also a reflection of the thoughts of some 
of these Islamic jurists and theologians. The Qadiriyya movement under dan Fodio 
was conceived out of the thinking of Abdul-Qadir Gilani, while Khomeini motivated 
the Shiite movement. BH is theologically driven by the jurisprudence of Ibn Taymiyya 
and is politically and practically motivated by Bin Laden. The argument about the role 
of charismatic figures is not to generalise Islam within the same notion of radical Islam, 
but rather to more appropriately treat BH as a sub-culture of Salafist ideology (Cottee, 
2010; Witorowicz, 2006). 
BH is a millennial terrorist group as a result of 9/11 and the subsequent spread 
of Al-Qaeda ideology. Gregg (2014: 40) suggests that the tripod of apocalyptic, 
theocratic and religious cleansing goals motivates millennial terrorist groups. These 
goals are reflected in BH’s desire to replace the Nigerian secular state with Sharia law. 
Furthermore, these goals do not work alone; they are supported by “real world threats 
and internal disputes” (Mayer, 2001 Gregg, 2014: 40). In the case of BH, local 
grievances that have emanated from clashes with the Nigerian state as well as local 
Islamic rivalry have contributed to the heightened radicalisation of BH into a violent 
movement. Aside from the aforementioned explanations of the international dynamics 
of radical Islam, it is more appropriate to contextualise BH within the existing wave 
of global Salafist jihadism. I would therefore posit that the religious and political 
ideologies of Ibn Taymiyya and Bin Laden are the fulcrum and guiding principles of 
BH. 
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Figure 8.1: Factors responsible for the radicalisation of Boko Haram 
 
Figure 8.1 above illustrates how different international factors as well as local 
grievances and Islamic rivalry have led to the radicalisation of BH. Local grievances 
became the turning point for BH radicalisation, and such grievances include clashes 
between BH and locals and the police in Kanama. Other grievances include the so-
called betrayal of BH by political actors within Borno state, arguments and internal 
disputes within Islam and the killing of Yusuf. It is important to note that even without 
local grievances, Northern Nigeria was already radicalised and this had manifested 
itself in previous religious crises (Adesoji, 2010); however, in the case of BH, local 
grievances have been a key factor to radicalisation. 
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Understanding the narrative of BH radicalisation gives additional explanation 
as to why it was easy for BH to join the global Salafist movement (Al-Qaeda / IS). 
Moreover, such explanation helps with understanding why BH leaders went into exile 
and sought further training, motivation and support. In BH’s initial stages, the exiles 
Mohammed Yusuf, Mamman Nur, Khalid al-Barnawi, and other leaders served as an 
important meeting point between BH and Al-Qaeda. I would argue that this meeting 
between BH and Al-Qaeda was motivated by both ideology as well as the desire to 
fight back against the Nigerian state. This assertion is also supported by Participant 
Ten (a former lawmaker and attorney general) who notes that:  
It’s simply a brotherhood, it’s simply a solidarity of brotherhood in distress. 
They [BH] have a common faith that we [Nigerians] no longer belong to the 
same common wealth. 
Participant Ten is suggesting that since BH members feel that the Nigerian state does 
not accept their ideology, they need to find support from groups across Nigeria who 
do share it. Similarly, Participant Five (member of the erstwhile committee of the 
drafting of the present constitution of Nigeria) suggests that: 
Radical Islamic groups across the world are related in terms of ideas, ideas in 
trying to predominate the societies they find themselves in is a general one. 
But then there are others that are related in terms of sect understanding, and 
that is why it’s easier to link Boko Haram with ISIL as they can relate easily 
to each other. So you find the situation in which all radicalised groups are 
essentially meant to arrive at some point contextually, and what we are saying 
is that in the context of Nigeria, the groups are concerned about how they can 
move the Islamic faith [radical Islam] forward in terms of establishing an 
influence regionally and finally nationally. 
Participant Five also believes that ideology bonds radical Islamic groups within an 
international context. As such, the desire to unite towards strengthening and spreading 
ideology allows for an easy connection between BH and other radical Salafist groups 
such as IS and Al-Qaeda. The argument of Participants Five and Ten relates to BH’s 
expansionist agenda of capturing more Nigerian territories and targeting other 
countries within the Lake Chad region.  
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8.2 Opportunities for violent extremism 
The previous section outlined the international factors that have led to the 
radicalisation of BH. This section highlights international factors that have facilitated 
the growth of BH. These factors include international terrorist groups such as the 
Taliban, Al-Qaeda and IS. Other factors include the ‘international war on terror’ and 
major international events such as the killings of Saddam Hussein and Muammar 
Ghaddafi.   
Numerous studies suggest that BH has connections with international jihadist 
groups such as Al-Qaeda and IS across the region. However, it is important to examine 
the reasons why BH switched its loyalty from the former to the latter, bearing in mind 
that both Al-Qaeda and IS are guided by the same ideology of political Islam that is in 
turn guided by the theology of radical Salafism. Initially, BH identified with Taliban 
ideology even before the Taliban expanded its movement to Sub-Saharan Africa. 
When the Al-Qaeda network spread to the North and West of Africa, BH saw it as an 
opportunity to connect with Al-Qaeda to realise its agenda of establishing a Sharia 
state in Nigeria. The network of Al-Qaeda spread across Africa through movements 
such as AQIM, Al-Mourabitoun, Ansar Dine and al-Shabaab. It also spread via Al-
Qaeda loyalists in West Africa cooperating with each other, for instance Al-
Mourabitoun’s leader Mokhtar Belmokhtar had connections with BH’s Nur and 
Khalid al Barnawi (Zenn 2014b). In 2012, BH also participated alongside the 
Movement for Unity and Jihad in West Africa (MUJAO) in Northern Mali (ibid). 
Participant Three (a member of the former Presidential Committee on BH and expert 
in conflict negotiation) confirms that: 
… and at a point in time, Boko Haram didn’t hide it. They confirmed to us that 
they had sent their people for training under Al-Qaeda. Al-Qaeda then said that 
they were training people from Boko Haram and also al-Shabaab. Some went 
to Somalia and some of them from Somalia went to Al-Qaeda. So they... share 
the same vision of theology so morally, [they draw] inspiration… from one 
another, [as well as] financially. Certainly, they have some... funding that 
comes not only from within, but a lot probably from outside. That is why if 
you remember, that the [Nigerian] President said that the sources of such funds 
must be identified and blocked so that they would not have access to these. So 
yes, financially, they have that motivation so as long as the financial source 
flows; it keeps them on and then... physically they have a lot of arms that are 
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sent to them … and they are also being trained in using these arms and they 
find ways [of] bringing them into… Nigeria. 
From the discussions of the Presidential Committee on BH, Participant Three is 
suggesting that BH has both ideological and physical connections with international 
and regional militant Islamists, and that BH enjoys support for training and funding. 
Similar to Participant Ten (a former Lawmaker and Attorney General), Participant 
Three sees BH’s interactions as those of solidarity or brotherhood cooperation.  
In support of Participant Three (former member of the Presidential Committee on 
Boko Haram and Conflict Analyst), Participant One (a former top government official 
in a Northern Nigerian state) says: 
It is evident from their modus operandi that they operate like other groups 
outside and some of their... activities are sophisticated and beyond the local 
knowledge of those people we tag as Boko Haram. They are technically highly 
sophisticated, and that is why they can manufacture Improvised Explosive 
Devices by themselves; and that is why they can adapt certain weapons and 
make them more sophisticated and more powerful than the conventional 
weapons our army uses ... I think they have learned such things from 
sophisticated terror groups outside. They get their funding also more from 
those groups than locally, and this is very dangerous. 
There is a marginal difference between the statements of participants One and Three. 
Participant Three suggests that the connection between BH and international terror 
groups is more material in terms of funding and weapons; whereas Participant One 
sees BH as a group that can generate funds locally (probably within Nigeria) and 
manufacture weapons such as IEDs with the help it gets from international terror 
groups. Regardless of these differences of oppinions, what is pertinent is that both 
accounts suggest a connection between BH and terror groups outside of Nigeria.  The 
claim by Participant One about the sophistication of BH is important in the 
understanding of one of the physical (tactical) reasons as to why BH interacts with 
takfiri (a takfiri is a Muslim who accuses other Muslims of apostasy) groups across 
Nigeria. BH’s external relationship with such groups is strategic. From a strategic 
perspective, I would argue that just as states cooperate with each in the international 
system, ideologically-bonded groups work with each other not just for the spread or 
defending of their ideologies, but for survival. Moreover, such groups have a high 
sense of solidarity. Training, funding and volunteering as mercenaries in each other’s 
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conflict suggests that all such jihadist groups across international boundaries are 
united in the same goal of spreading a common ideology, with local narratives largely 
determining the variation of attacks across their selected targets as well as their 
evolving tactics.  
In 2014, BH declared its allegiance to IS. This declaration was received with 
great scepticism among security experts. However, in 2015 Ahmed Al Assir, a key IS 
official, was arrested by the Lebanese authorities while he was on his way to Nigeria 
(Odunsi, 2015). Moreover, in August 2016, IS announced the new leader of BH, to 
which Shekau protested (Ogbeche, 2016). I argue that the reason BH switched its 
allegiance from Al-Qaeda to IS was strategic – a view shared by Participant Seven 
(author and Conflict Analyst) who notes: 
Yeah, I think they must be also financially [connected] because we heard, and 
we have been hearing that they are now calling themselves ISIS in West Africa, 
Islamic State in West Africa, so they... apparently have been benefiting from a 
lot of sponsorship and arms shipments from other countries. 
There are further arguments also suggesting that BH’s switch of loyalty from Al-
Qaeda to IS was strategic. Firstly, Al-Qaeda and its affiliates in Africa had been 
decimated; secondly, other BH factions had more connections to Al-Qaeda than 
Shekau; thirdly, Shekau’s desire to capture Nigerian territories coincided with the 
2014 expansionist agenda of IS; and fourthly, several groups in Africa had defected 
from Al-Qaeda to IS, especially in Libya (Lister, 2016). 
Another opportunity for BH violence was the international war on terrorism. 
The decimation of Al-Qaeda and its affiliates (ibid) as well as the blockade of its 
funding and incarceration of its key leaders (Lister, 2016) forced BH and other groups 
to join IS as it had more operational capacity than Al-Qaeda. In 2015, Al-Qaeda 
launched a series of attacks in West Africa including the attacks on Radisson Blu and 
Splendid Hotels in Ouagadougou and Bamako respectively. These attacks signified 
Al-Qaeda’s desire to woo more supporters from IS. In contrast, the global war on 
terrorism and the weakening of Al-Qaeda forced BH to look inwards for self-
sustenance, which is why it engaged in attacks on banks and military barracks within 
Nigeria to support its operations (Zenn, 2014a), and then declared its allegiance to IS. 
The adverse impact of international politics and in particular the fall of the 
Saddam Hussein and Muammar Gaddafi regimes, facilitated an increase in extremism 
and the operational power of BH. Furthermore, the invasion of Iraq and the Syrian 
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conflict not only created regional tension in the Middle East, but also contributed to 
the birth of IS. Some accounts suggest that the death of Saddam Hussein created a 
political power vacuum that could not be managed by his successor. Other analysts 
believe that political alienation and grievances related to Saddam Hussein’s death 
snowballed into the birth of IS (Harris, 2014). Saddam Hussein’s death provided an 
opportunity for the rise of IS, with the fall of Muammar Gaddafi’s government 
providing a safe haven for IS members and its affiliates to operate across Africa. The 
fall of Muammar Gaddafi additionally created anarchy in Libya (Danahar 2013), and 
I would argue that this, as well as the breakdown of the disarmament programme in 
Libya (Chivvis & Martini, 2014), contributed to the smooth flow of weapons across 
North and Sub-Saharan Africa countries. Moreover, the situation in Libya provided a 
smooth transition for IS to then establish it as the centre for coordinating its activities. 
8.3 Spillover to neighbouring countries   
The previous section highlights how international factors strengthened BH and it also 
gave an account of the internationalisation of BH. This section discusses six different 
factors that enabled the spillover of BH’s violence to the Republics of Cameroon, 
Chad and Niger. These factors include historical ties and geographical proximity, 
similar narratives of Islam, regional instability, geographical features, external 
intervention and the media. The role of the media is discussed under the advancement 
of technology because of BH’s preference for it. In order to understand the reason for 
this spillover, it is important to establish the historical ties and geographical proximity 
between these countries and Nigeria. These ties and geographical proximity illustrate 
that Nigeria and these neighbouring countries are the same region regardless of the 
borders of each country. The spillover of violence has been determined by a similar 
narrative within Islam and Kanuri ethnic identity in the Lake Chad region, the spread 
of Al-Qaeda and the global expansionist agenda of IS in 2014, with political instability 
around the Lake Chad region also attributable to this diffusion of violence. This 
section argues that geographical features such as the Mandara Mountain and Sambisa 
Forest are contributory factors to the spread of BH violence, as well as the role of the 
advancement of technology in the spread of BH violence across different regions – 
thereby also fostering IS expansionism. How external intervention has triggered BH 
violence is discussed, statistical data from the Global Terrorism Database (GTD) have 
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been applied to illustrate the implications of the spillover of BH violence to countries 
in the Lake Chad region.    
8.3.1 Historical ties and geographical proximity 
Before the advent of colonial rule and the 1914 amalgamation of the Southern and 
Northern protectorates into a country called Nigeria, Islam experienced a remarkable 
spread across the West African region, especially in the 8th and 19th centuries. Islam 
spread widely as a result of sub-Saharan trade across the region (Hill, 2009). These 
factors created porous borders across the countries in the region with a resulting 
smooth flow of people, goods and services. The free flow of individuals across borders 
also encouraged social integration within countries. Participant Nine (a retired General 
in the Nigerian Army) analysed the role of Islam and migration on contemporary 
Borno society, and suggests that:  
There is another fact you should know… if you go to Borno, Maiduguri in 
particular, [out of] virtually… ten families, you will find out that at least five 
or six of those families have relations in Cameroon, Niger or Chad. There are 
inter-marriages - and what caused this? Most of the Islamic clerics that came 
when Islam came then stayed in Nigeria and they came from Chad and 
Cameroon. [They came] as teachers you know, and these people had children. 
Participant Nine is suggesting that because of how Islam flourished, individuals from 
the Republics of Chad, Cameroon and Niger migrated to Nigeria as teachers. Such 
individuals established themselves within Nigerian society through marriage, and 
Participant Nine also suggests that there were inter-marriages among people within 
the Lake Chad region. Such inter-marriages bonded communities from different 
countries. Participant Nine suggests that these conditions make it easier for individuals 
from neighbouring countries in the Lake Chad region to come to Borno state in Nigeria 
for a better standard of living, and also to the Northern part of Nigeria (this is discussed 
further below). Moreover, this social integration was supported by Nigeria with these 
countries being bound by a common religion and culture, given the history of the 
Kanem-Bornu Empire that encompassed border towns between Nigeria, North-eastern 
Nigeria, the Republic of Chad, Eastern Niger, Northern Cameroon and Southern Libya 
(Barth, 1858; Hill, 2010). 
 Additionally, the influence of the history of the Kanem-Bornu Empire on the 
expansion of BH has played a significant role in the spillover of BH’s violence. BH 
has exploited the history of the Kanuri ethnic group not only to recruit, but to expand 
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its influence across Nigeria’s neighbouring countries in the Lake Chad region. The 
Kanem-Bornu Empire (8th-19th century) was founded in Kanem (between Tripoli and 
Lake Chad region), in the north-east of Lake Chad during the 8th century (Bobboyi, 
1992; Levtzion, 2000). It existed under the rulership of different kings (Mai; Kanuri 
language) of the Muslim Sayfawa dynasty (Barkindo, 2016), and the Sayfawa dynasty 
was regarded as the greatest power in the region (ibid). Under the Sayfawa dynasty, 
the Kanem Empire expanded to west of Lake Chad in the 14th century, and the king’s 
court was moved to Bornu while it maintained control of Kanem (Bondarev, 2005). 
The Sayfawas established a new capital at Birnin Gazargamo in present-day Yobe 
state, Nigeria (Barkindo, 2016). Birnin Gazargamo developed into a prominent hub 
for Islamic learning and it attracted scholars from the Sudan and North Africa 
(Bobboyi, 1992).  
 The Kanem-Bornu Empire was penetrated by Islamic and Arabic influences, 
and its trans-Sahara trade routes facilitated such influences (Hunwick and O’Fahey 
1995). Under Mai Idris Alauma (1564-96) of the ruling Sayfuwa dynasty, who took 
the title Amir al-Mu’minin (Commander of the Faithful), the Empire flourished and 
reached its peak. Mai Idris Alauma enforced Islam as the official religion of the 
Empire (Levtzion, 2000; Barkindo 2016), and this created a theocratic state with an 
Islamic identity. Barkindo (2016) suggests that the Kanem-Bornu Empire became 
characterised by its mixture of Islam and Kanuri ethnic identity and that Islam, Kanuri 
and Arabic became the languages of commerce. Under Mai Idris Alauma, the Empire 
further expanded through military conquest, trade and diplomatic relations with other 
Muslim states. The Empire occupied Cameroon, Chad, Niger and Nigeria, as well as 
the Kwararafa kingdom in the Middle Belt region (Northcentral) of Nigeria (Barkindo, 
2016). 
  During the 17th century, the Empire controlled trans-Saharan trade routes. It 
established garrisons for its security and had pacts with rulers in North Africa (Barth, 
1858).  Additionally, in 1852 the British monarch, Queen Victoria, signed a treaty 
with the ‘Sovereign Kingdom of Borno to enable her to trade without barriers and 
difficulties’ (Kirk-Greene, 1959: 335; Barkindo, 2016). 
 In 1846, the Kanem-Bornu Empire under the Sayfawa dynasty rule was 
conquered by Muhammad al-Kanemi, and Kukawa became the new capital (Brenner, 
1971).  The conquest established the al-Kanemi dynasty, which still reigns as the 
ruling dynasty in Borno state. However, the al-Kanemi rule almost ended, having been 
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weakened in 1893 by the Rabeh Fadlallah invasion (Cohen, 1967). Rabeh was a 
Muslim warrior and slave trader belonging to the old Funj Sultanate of Sinnar in 
present-day Sudan (Cohen, 1967). France rejected the invasion in defence of its ally 
(the ruling al-Kanemi). To the surprise of the Kanuri population of Kanem-Bornu, the 
British government supported Rabeh. In 1901 Rabeh was killed by French forces at 
Gubja, and his death left the Empire without a ruler (Mukhtar, 2000; Barkindo, 2016). 
The Kanem-Bornu territory was then shared between France, Britain and Germany 
(Barkindo, 2016).  
 BH uses this history to create a narrative that facilitates its ideology and 
campaign of violence. The group argues that the Kanem-Bornu Empire (9th - 19th) 
was the definition of an ‘ideal’ state as characterised by Islam, that was not distorted 
by the corruption, idolatry and other forms of un-Islamic practices that are supported 
by Westerners through education and secularism (Barkindo, 2016). The group 
compliments the Sayfawa for expanding and promoting Islam, and condemns the al-
Kanemis for colluding with Western ‘infidels’. BH also notes that partitioning the 
Kanem-Bornu territories to Cameroon, Chad, Niger and Nigeria as being disastrous 
for Muslims within the Lake Chad region (Barkindo, 2016).  
 BH links the history of Kanem-Bornu to the broad history of Islam. The group 
asserts that the Prophet Mohammed established an Islamic state in Medina through 
Sharia, and that Sharia ensures justice and equality (Mohammed, 2014). It further 
argues that Islam eventually spread through the Ottoman Empire, but the West scuttled 
the Empire in 1924 using Atatürk, the founder of modern Turkey (Barkindo, 2016). 
With this narrative, BH implies that Islam, as founded by the Prophet Mohammed, 
ensures justice and equality and that it flourished in the Ottoman Empire, but then the 
West collaborated with Atatürk to destroy it. Moreover, BH asserts that similar 
Western conspiracy was also applied to destroy the Kanem-Borno Empire, which was 
a flourishing Islamic state. BH argues that Islam in the region is also being eclipsed 
by Western civilisation through Judaeo-Christian values, democracy and education.  
 It is misleading to associate the Kanuri ethnic group in its entirety to BH. 
However, it is undeniable that BH uses Kanuri ethnic identity to facilitate its objectives, 
and that BH’s exploitation of the Kanem-Bornu narrative is supported by the Lake 
Chad region’s cultural environment (Barkindo, 2016). The region is highly populated 
with ethnic Kanuris who also occupy other countries including Cameroon, Chad, 
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Niger and Nigeria. In other words, the Kanuri ethnic group is spread across territories 
beyond those of colonial creation.  
 The majority of BH recruits are Kanuri. Along the Lake Chad region, BH uses 
the Kanuri language for recruitment and mobilisation (International Crisis Group, 
2017b), and the language is instrumental in the movement of arms across the region 
(ibid). Furthermore, as a means of exploiting the Kanuri identity, in 2013 BH sent 
threatening letters to Kanuri soldiers warning them not to fight for the Nigerian 
government as they would be killed (Barkindo, 2016). 
 The instrumentalisation of Kanuri history by BH is strategically important for 
the expansion of BH to other countries in the Lake Chad for two reasons. First, Kanuri 
is intertwined with Islam and BH, thereby making it easy for BH to promote its 
ideology. Second, the researcher argues that because BH identifed the role of the West 
(Britain, France and Germany) in the ‘destruction’ of the flourishing Islamic and 
Kanuri state, this has elicited a sense of nationalism, especially with regards to the 
reclaimation of the former Empire.  
8.3.2 Similar narratives of Islam 
The arrival of Al-Qaeda along with the spread of global Salafist jihadism created a 
new narrative of radical Salafism in the region. Individuals from countries sharing 
similar views with BH were willing and able to support BH because of geographical 
proximity and a pre-existing history of cultural fluidity. Nigeria is arguably a big 
power in West Africa both economically and politically. It is one of the most 
influential countries in Africa, with human and natural resources that attract people 
from other countries. Additionally, Nigeria has influential Muslim clerics such 
Ibrahim El-Zazaky, Dahiru Bauchi Albani Zaria, Kabiru Gombe who are recognised 
internationally, and these clerics also cross-national boundaries to evangelise. These 
multifarious factors put Nigeria in a different leadership position from those driven by 
political, economic and religious goals. They have provided a background that has 
propelled BH forward and therefore attracted individuals to it within the region. I 
would argue that this background has also been instrumental to the connection 
between BH and IS. BH’s status as a province of IS in West Africa is the mandate that 
has enabled BH to spread Salafist ideology through campaigns of violence within 
countries, particularly neighbouring ones where they have historical ties. Moreover, 
this status highlights the severity of BH attacks in Cameroon, Chad and Niger in 2014 
(see Table 8.1 on external interventions against BH), and I would argue that BH’s 
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adoption of the expansionist agenda of IS in 2014 (Lister, 2016) was responsible for 
both the seizure of Nigerian territories and the intensity of attacks in the Republics of 
Cameroon, Chad and Niger 
8.3.3 Regional instability 
Another factor that has contributed to the spillover of violence is regional instability 
with notably, the political instability in Chad and Niger during the 1980s and 1990s 
having facilitated an influx of violent and non-violent individuals. Northern Nigeria 
became a refuge for people fleeing war-torn countries, and historical ties of religion, 
ethnicity and inter-marriages facilitated this migration. Consequently, unaccounted for 
numbers of nationals across the region migrated to Nigeria. Climate change has also 
been a contributory factor as the Republics of Chad and Niger have more arid lands 
than Nigeria. Political instability in the Republic of Chad started in 1965, but during 
the 1980s and 1990s, the power tussle between Presidents Habre and Deby deeply 
divided the country and forced many Chadians out of their country (CRS report, 2008).   
Participant Nine (a retired General in the Nigerian Army) confirmed that: 
We knew Nigeria used to be attacked by foreigners…, there used to be some 
banditry by foreigners within Nigerian territories, by foreigners in the early to 
the middle of the 1980s. Nigeria had to task its military to push those people 
back. Unfortunately, when those people left, there were a lot of them who 
really wanted to join not as mercenaries [but] as members of the armed forces 
of North African countries. As Nigeria was grappling with the issue of Boko 
Haram up to 2011, when these countries due to the Arab Spring broke up, 
people from different neighbouring countries such as the Republics of Chad, 
Cameroon and Niger, along with even some from Nigeria, joined the armed 
forces or even the rebel groups and left those places with their arms. When 
they left with their arms, they couldn’t go to Europe; if they had stayed in their 
countries, there would have been nothing for them there. So I believe that 
elements of these people might have trickled into the border areas of Nigeria 
and the Republics of Cameroon, Chad and Niger, and may have infiltrated 
through those borders to commit some of these [crimes]. 
Participant Nine is suggesting that the political crises of the 1980s may have made 
some of the rebel forces from the Republics of Chad, Niger and Cameroon engage in 
armed banditry in Nigeria for economic purposes, with some of the rebels (including 
Nigerians) joining military forces in Northern Africa. Participant Nine suggests that 
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the Arab Uprising forced some of these elements to come to Nigeria with their 
weapons. This suggestion is supported by a statement from the Nigerian Chief of 
Army Staff (CAS), who notes that: 
While the Boko Haram [insurgency] can be said to have started in Nigeria, by 
and large as at today, I can say that almost 60 per cent of the insurgents are 
from our neighbouring countries. (Buratai, 2016) 
The claims by both Participant Nine and the Nigerian CAS suggest that there are 
individuals with weapons at their disposal because of the instability of the Middle East 
and Nigeria’s neighbouring countries, and that such individuals find Nigeria 
conducive to commiting crimes. 
8.3.4 Geographical features 
In addition to historical ties, religion and political instability, geographical features 
also facilitate the spillover of violence. The arid desert terrain that stretches from the 
countries in the Lake Chad region to the Borno/Yobe axis provides easy manoeuvring 
opportunities for militants. This terrain also contributes to BH tactical operations, 
particularly around Nigeria’s border with the Republic of Niger. Sambisa Forest 
provides a buffer and major hideout for BH militants and is thus strategic to BH 
operational activities. It has proximity to other BH dominated towns such as 
Askira/Uba, Jere, Damboa and Konduga, with its border being close to the Ngadda 
River, one of the tributaries to Lake Chad. Sambisa also stretches to Gwoza Hill 
(Mandara Mountain), which is close to the Nigeria-Cameroon border. Mandara 
Mountain and Sambisa Forest along the Nigerian-Cameroon border may be an 
explanation as to why Cameroon suffers more BH attacks than the Republics of Chad 
and Niger (see Table 8.1). For BH, this geographical location is ideal and in 2014, BH 
made Gwoza its caliphate.  
8.3.5 Technological advances 
Media technology plays a role in BH spillover and has done so even prior to the 
escalation of BH violence. Audio and visual materials containing the radical preaching 
of clerics were circulating across Nigeria and border towns of countries close by, with 
such messages preaching the need to abhor westernisation and unite in order to 
facilitate the revival of Islam through radicalism (Loimeier, 2012). I would argue that 
the spillover of violence to countries neighbouring Nigeria was also triggered by 
solidarity for BH among radicalised individuals from these countries fighting against 
their own governments in retaliation for ‘interfering’ in the regional war against BH.  
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With social media, information travels exceptionally fast and this may have 
provided BH with a medium to spread its propaganda (as discussed in chapter five). 
Moreover, there is evidence to suggest that BH connects with other international terror 
groups via the Internet. In 2015, the allegiance of BH to IS was announced through 
Afriqiyah, a jihadist website connected to IS (Omojuwa, 2015; Lister, 2015). 
Furthermore, the announcement of Abu Musab al-Barnawi as the new leader of BH in 
2016 came via the official newspaper of IS, al-Nabaa (Associated Press, 2016). This 
illustrates how instrumental advance technology has been in the coordination of BH 
activities and foreign terrorist groups. Moreover, these connections imply that IS and 
BH have both used the advance technology to promote their expansionist agenda 
across the three countries being discussed from the Lake Chad region.    
8.3.6 External intervention 
The slow intervention of the Republics of Cameroon, Chad and Niger to the regional 
security threat posed by BH may have facilitated the growth of BH’s campaign of 
violence across the Lake Chad region. There was also variation in the number of 
attacks across these countries because of the different dynamics within these countries. 
Initially, countries neighbouring Nigeria were not involved in the fight against BH and 
their non-intervention could have been that they saw BH as being a Nigerian problem. 
In addition, the Republic of Cameroon was slow to respond to the threat of BH because 
of its long-standing political disputes and ‘cold war’ with Nigeria (International Crisis 
Group, 2017a). Before the diffusion of BH violence to the Republic of Cameroon, far 
Northern Cameroon was already a fertile ground for BH violence because the area 
contains border towns. Additionally, a report by the International Crises Group (2016) 
suggests that not only does this region have more deprivation than other parts of the 
Republic of Cameroon, there is also increasing evangelism of radical Islam. Added to 
this, it was noted that the Kanuris in the region were being stigmatised and accused of 
being BH members (Crises Group, 2016).  
Another additional factor related to the initial lack of external intervention by 
Nigeria’s immediate neighbours was the high crime rates on the borders, and BH took 
advantage of this to indoctrinate individuals and store their stockpiled weapons in the 
region (ibid). The efforts of the Cameroonian government to then get rid off BH’s 
stockpiled weapons triggered BH’s violence in the region in 2013 (ibid).     
The Republic of Niger was a safe haven for BH before 2012. In 2009, some 
members of BH went into exile in the Republic of Niger because of the crack down 
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by Nigerian forces on its members, and the group then stockpiled weapons, fuel and 
food there (International Crisis Group, 2017a). Anecdotal evidence suggests that the 
government of the Republic of Niger had a non-aggression pact with the group. 
However, BH’s growing preaching and recruitment across the Diffa region along with 
its support for jihadists in the 2012 Mali conflict became of concern to the Nigerien 
government, who worried that BH could escalate its campaign of violence in the 
Republic of Niger. As a result, Nigerien forces started gathering information and then 
arresting BH members in 2013 (ibid). A senior Nigerien government commented that: 
Many officials believed they [Nigerien authorities] should focus on gathering 
intelligence and maintaining public order rather than mobilising the military 
against Boko Haram. (International Crisis Group, 2017a). 
This comment suggests that the government of the Republic of Niger were mindful 
that taking military action against BH could escalate violence in their country. 
However, BH reacted to the arrests in 2013 with two attacks (GTD). BH attacks in the 
Republic of Niger then became even more severe after the Nigerien government 
decided to take full military action against BH (International Crisis Group, 2017a). 
The Republic of Chad’s government’s excessive use of force explains why BH 
sustained its attacks in that country. There were specific factors that underpinned the 
actions and responses of BH and the Chadian government. BH exploited both human 
and geographical features for recruitment and tactical manoeuvring in the Republic of 
Chad as it had historical ties to the Kanuri ethnic group and the Kanem-Bornu Empire, 
which BH exploited. An International Crisis Group’s (2017b) interview with a 
Chadian of Kanuri descent confirmed this exploitation when the interviewee said they 
enjoyed the preaching of BH at its early stages because, “It did us good to hear the 
word of God in our own language.” 
Another reason for the face-off between the Chadian government and BH was 
BH’s continued raiding and looting of traders in Chadian territories (International 
Crisis Group, 2017b). When comparing the Republic of Chad to that of Niger, the 
Republic of Chad has stronger CT, and its CT approach is mainly based on the use of 
military force. Interestingly, it experienced only one BH attack in 2014 compared to 
multiple attacks in 2015. This rise was because of increasing BH attacks on traders, 
and I would argue that because BH needed to sustain itself economically and stockpile 
food and fuel as it had been under constant attack in the Republics of Niger and then 
Chad. In addition to this, the excessiveness of the Republic of Chad’s CT combined 
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with its decision to join the MNJTF (Multinational Joint Task Force) also increased 
the number of BH incidences in the country. 
From a broader perspective, BH expanded its violence to Nigeria’s 
neighbouring countries not only for tactical and financial reasons, but also for 
ideological and ethnic support. With regards to tactical reasons, BH used Mandara 
Mountain, Sambisa forest and the desert areas close to Machenna and Geidam as 
hideouts. In sourcing finance, the group received funding from affluent individuals in 
the form of ‘charities’ (Zenn, 2014b), and because the group had a significant number 
of members from the Kanuri language, it drew support from across different countries. 
These factors are what led the governments of Nigeria’s neighbouring countries to 
carry out proactive actions to pre-empt the group from spreading within its territories. 
The pre-emptive measures involved taking decisive steps against BH through military 
cooperation between the Republics of Cameroon, Chad and Benin and Nigeria under 
the umbrella of MNJTF (Multi-national Joint Task Force). The Republic of Benin 
appeared not to be so affected by the spillover of BH bviolence ecause of its greater 
geographical distance to Northeast Nigeria. In addition, the Republic of Benin has no 
historical ties with the Kanem-Bornu Empire, which the Republics of Cameroon and 
Niger share with Nigeria. The continued intervention of the aforementioned countries 
was followed by more BH attacks in them and in January 2015, Shekau confirmed the 
group’s desire to increase its attacks in neighbouring countries in response to their 
taking part in the MNJTF (BBC, 2015b). Following Shekau’s threat, the intensity of 
attacks increased notably by 2015 and Table 8.1 below shows the number of casualties 
and attacks by BH outside the borders of Nigeria from 2013 to 2015.  
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Table 8.1: Boko Haram's attacks outside of Nigeria 
 
2013 
Attacks     Casualties 
2014 
Attacks          Casualties 
2015 
Attacks            Casualties 
Cameroon 2 - 55 839 71 927 
Chad - - 1 6 27 322 
Niger - - 5 - 41 663 
Total 2 - 61 845 139 1,912 
Table 8.1 notes the number of attacks and casualties resulting from BH’s campaign of 
violence across the Republics of Cameroon, Chad and Niger between 2013 and 2015. 
When the violence of the group spilled outside of Nigerian territory between 2013 and 
2015, a total of 202 attacks were carried out across these three countries, with a total 
of 2,757 casualties having been orchestrated by BH. Between 2013 and 2015, the 
Republic of Cameroon suffered 128 attacks with 1,766 casualties; the Republic of 
Chad experienced 28 attacks and 328 casualties, and the Republic of Niger suffered 
45 attacks and 663 casualties. Interestingly, Table 8.1 illustrates that in all of these 
countries, BH violence increases each year. Below is an explanation for the increase 
and variation of violence across these three countries. 
In the Republic of Cameroon, BH’s first attack was in Dabanga village where 
they abducted a French family who were later released after payment of a ransom 
(GTD, Zenn 2014a). I would argue that this source of money contributed to more 
frequent attacks in Cameroon, for example in February 2013, French citizens were 
kidnapped in Waza park in Cameroon while on holiday, and BH released them for the 
sum of US$3.15 million, which was paid by the French and Cameroonian governments 
(Zenn, 2014: 8). The number of BH attacks increased in 2014 because of the 
Cameroonian government’s decisive action in dismantling BH’s weapon stockpiles 
and addressing criminal activities such as kidnapping (International Crises Group, 
2016). In 2014, BH intensified its violence and demanded a ransom for the release of 
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the abducted Vice Prime Minister of Cameroon and the Emir of Kolofata, but it 
remains unknown as to whether the Cameroonian government made payment to BH 
(Etahoben, 2014). It is argued that as BH lost some of its income sources, it resorted 
to ransom money as an alternative source of revenue. Thus, the intensity of and 
increase in BH violence in 2015 was as a result of weak unilateral actions by countries 
in the Lake Chad region. 
The first BH attack in Chadian territory was in Dubuwa village in 2014. The 
Dubuwa attack was a small-scale one, with further more deadly attacks being carried 
out in 2015. The Ngouboua attack of February 2015 signified the severity of the BH 
threat in the Republic of Chad (BBC, 2015c). The attack was significant because it 
appeared to be in reprisal for the January crackdown on BH by the MNJTF. Apart 
from the relative effectiveness of Chadian CT in reducing the intensity of BH violence, 
the Republic of Chad shares the smallest border with Nigeria through Balge (a town 
within Borno state), where BH experienced resistance from and battles with local 
hunters and vigilantes. BH was forced to retreat in the Kala-Balge battle of May 2014 
with more than 200 BH members being killed by local hunters and vigilantes (BBC, 
2014f). Although Balge was later captured by BH, I would argue that its resistance to 
BH reduced the influx of attacks into the Republic of Chad. 
BH launched its first attack in the Republic of Niger in 2014 and in 2015 it 
attacked Bosso (a town in the Diffa region) where more than 100 people died (GTD). 
There is vast arid land between the Republic of Niger and Nigeria that is greater than 
the Republic of Chad, with the boundary between Niger and Nigeria being the second 
largest in landmass in comparison to Cameroon and Chad. Out of the three countries, 
the Republic of Chad has the strongest military force and the intensity of BH violence 
in 2015 in Nigerien territories was reduced by the Chadian forces, with Chadian forces 
launching a massive crackdown on BH in February 2015 within Nigerian and 
Cameroonian territories. Additionally, Chadian forces reclaimed the Nigerian 
territories of Baga, Damask, Dikwa, Malam Fatori and Ngala from BH. This 
crackdown was seen as a turning point with regards to regional cooperation against 
BH (LWJ, 2015). However, it is important to note that the MNJTF crackdown in 2015 
on BH triggered a sharp increase in BH violence in Nigeria’s neighbouring countries. 
 201 
8.4 Discussion/conclusion 
This section summarises and discusses the findings of this chapter. It explains the 
implications of BH activities and the slow intervention of the Republics of Cameroon, 
Chad and Niger in comparison to Nigeria’s CT. Finally, it links the chapter’s findings 
to the broader debate in the literature regarding the spillover of violence in order to 
highlight the complexity of BH. 
To understand international influences on BH, it is important to understand the 
background of radical Islam within the region. The existence of different movements 
across Nigerian boundaries at various times in history means that it is possible to 
penetrate Nigeria because of local dynamics, for instance the Fula jihad moved into 
Nigeria because of the “corrupt and un-Islamic” society that existed in the 19th century. 
Moreover, the Mahdiyya movement then came to maintain the structures of the dan 
Fodio jihad as well as to fight colonial domination. The 1979 Iranian Revolution 
influenced the Shiite movement in the 1980s and 1990s in fighting westernisation, and 
this coincided with heated debate among Nigerian Muslims about capitalism, 
socialism and the need to make Sharia law a part of Nigerian law (Isa, 2010). BH thus 
emerged at a time when there was strong global radical Salafist revivalism and 
ideological expansionism, with local grievances and a radicalised background 
providing fertile conditions for the emergence and growth of BH. Although, the 
evolution of BH reflects the theoretical account of Sageman (2004; 2008) that BH 
became an isolationist movement and connected with Al-Qaeda gradually, it differs 
on the issue of collective radicalisation. The history of Islamic radicalism sets the 
background for easy mobilisation of individuals into violence. Additionally, it is fair 
to argue that international terrorist groups can also provide inspiration to local 
movements. IS replaced Al-Qaeda as the deadliest international terror group within 
only half a decade. While BH pledged allegiance to IS for survival purposes, it became 
inspired by the IS expansionist agenda in 2014, and this has coincided with factors 
that have led to the spillover of violence across Nigerian borders. 
This chapter also examined international factors that have influenced the 
growth and expansion of BH within the Lake Chad region. The chapter highlighted 
three international factors in particular, with these including international terrorist 
groups such as the Taliban, Al-Qaeda and IS, the international war on terror, 
international politics and major events such as the killings of Saddam Hussein and 
Muammar Ghaddafi. BH is ideologically motivated and affiliated with international 
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terrorist groups with the killing of Saddam Hussein contributing to the emergence and 
growth of IS. The killing of Muammar Ghaddafi encouraged the influx of IS to Africa, 
with the weak nature of the Libyan state allowing IS to establish regional provinces in 
Africa, including those of BH. BH was inspired by the declaration of a global 
expansionist agenda by IS, and this is reflected in its capture of Nigerian territories 
and its subsequent allegiance to IS in 2015. The effect of this allegiance on BH is that 
it was renamed the Islamic State in West African Province (ISWAP), and I would 
argue that this has increased BH’s desire and mandate to expand into Nigeria’s 
neighbouring countries. 
Multiple factors have contributed to the spillover of BH to other countries in 
the Lake Chad region. Among these factors, historical ties and the close proximity of 
Nigeria to countries in the Lake Chad region plays an important role, with shared 
history along with the movement of people thereby rendering international boundaries 
less important. Moreover, a diffusion of conflict penetrates different countries because 
of similar religious beliefs, and this has made it easier to spread radical ideology 
influenced by Al-Qaeda and IS through the ranks of BH. Added to this, a long-standing 
history of political instability around the Lake Chad region has swelled the diffusion 
of BH violence because of the availability of weapons and trained fighters who have 
survived other political violence. Furthermore, geographical features in the Lake Chad 
region such as Mandara Mountain and the Sambisa Forest have provided buffer zones 
for BH and helped them in tactical manoeuvring, while the advance technology has 
been instrumental in encouraging the spread of BH violence across different regions 
by helping spread its radical ideology and connection to IS. This has thereby facilitated 
BH expansion into Nigeria’s neighbouring countries. Finally, the chapter has 
identified international intervention as being a major triggering factor in BH violence 
in the Republics of Cameroon, Chad and Niger. 
Apart from the multiple broader factors that have been instrumental in the 
spillover of violence to the Republics of Cameroon, Chad and Niger, each of these 
countries has its own unique factors that have determined the intensity of violence in 
their territories. The Republic of Cameroon appears to be the weakest among the three 
because of its loose border, which BH took advantage of to stockpile weapons. The 
group was then triggered to violence when the Cameroonian government attempted to 
dismantle these stockpiles of weapons. Cameroon has more deprived border towns 
being more likely to support and join BH for economic reasons. The targeting of the 
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Republic of Cameroon was also motivated by economic purposes and such activities 
there have included kidnapping and human trafficking (Zenn, 2014a; International 
Crisis Group, 2016). The frequency of violence in the Republic of Chad was also 
determined by economic reasons with these being related to BH’s sustainability as it 
uses crime such as the raiding and looting of local traders. The severity of attacks in 
the Republic of Chad was because BH had carried out reprisal attacks in response to 
the strong military campaign by the Chadian government against it. The intensity of 
attacks in the Republic of Niger was determined by the Nigerien government’s 
resistance in allowing BH to continue to stockpile its weapons, food and fuel in their 
country. Aside from these specific differences, the increase in violence in all of these 
countries in 2014 was determined by their individual military actions against BH, and 
in 2015, BH’s attacks in these countries rose because of military cooperation by 
countries in the Lake Chad region through the MNJTF.  
One of the implications of BH activities in Nigeria’s neighbouring countries is 
the limiting of the effectiveness of Nigeria’s military campaign against BH. Although 
Nigeria failed to unilaterally resolve the BH crisis before it escalated, its neighbours’ 
slow responses to counter BH activities in their territories also contributed to the 
strength of BH. For example, the Nigerien government’s slow action against BH 
allowed BH to use its country as a depot to store food, fuel, and weapons that it then 
used to sustain its fight against Nigeria. Weak border security in the Republic of 
Cameroon allowed BH to manoeuvre across the region and carry out kidnappings in 
order to finance the group. In contrast, the Republic of Chad appeared to have been 
more decisive in curbing BH with the Chadian forces helping to reduce the BH 
violence within the Lake Chad region in 2015 (International Crises Group, 2017b). 
With regards to the broader literature about spillover of violence, BH is a 
complex case that reflects multifarious argument about violence spillover. Arguably, 
no single argument can be used to explain the spillover of BH violence beyond 
Nigerian borders. With regards to external intervention, Danneman & Ritterer (2013) 
argue that the fear of conflict spreading into neighbouring countries makes 
neighbouring countries more proactive, but this is different in the case of BH. For 
instance, Nigerien authorities allowed BH activities in some of its regions for some 
time (Crises International Group, 2017a), and this may be attributable to the fear that 
taking military action against BH would result in BH violence spreading more widely. 
Contrary to Danneman & Ritterer (2013), BH’s overspill illustrates that because of 
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fear, countries may in fact initially overlook the activities of violent groups in their 
countries so that they are spared from their violence, with other neighbouring countries 
intervening or taking military action in the face of what they perceive as eminent 
danger. Similarly, Tony & Mushed (2002) see the military intervention of Nigeria’s 
neighbouring countries and especially the MNJTF, as an additional problem given 
Shekau’s declaration that more attacks are to be expected in these countries (BBC, 
2015b). Furthermore, the spillover of BH into Nigeria’s neighbouring countries can 
also be attributed to poor timing of interventions in carrying out both unilateral and 
multilateral decisions against BH when the group was increasing its territories outside 
of Nigeria. In spite of poor timing, the expansion of BH could have been reduced 
unilaterally by Nigeria during the early stages of the group’s development (see chapter 
six), and in fact Collier et al., (2004) argue that effective unilateral action is capable 
of stopping the spillover of violence to other countries. 
Weak states and political stability are also attributable to the spillover of 
violence to Nigeria’s neighbouring states (Bosker & de Ree, 2009), as too are porous 
borders (Atzili, 2007). An empirical evaluation of BH suggests that a long history of 
political instability in the Lake Chad region has enabled the circulation of weapons 
and trained combatants that can easily become tools for different forms of violence, 
including that of BH. Moreover, BH reflects the arguments of ethnic links (Braha, 
2011) and the media (Khondker, 2011) as important factors in contributing to the 
spillover of violence. Kanuri influences have helped in the recruitment of more 
individuals for BH, and media technology has been instrumental in the radicalisation 
of individuals across countries in the Lake Chad region, as well as connecting BH with 
IS. This has resulted in the expansion, promotion, spread and mandate of the group 
across Nigeria, thereby implying that media technology is key to the 
internationalisation of a violent movement. 
In conclusion, this chapter suggests that a spillover of violence depends on the 
background from which a group emerges. The background could include a 
combination of historical ties (both religious and ethnic), geography, ideological 
motivation and physical support from international ideological groups (Al-Qaeda and 
IS), political dynamics, CT and multilateral military action. 
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Chapter 9: Conclusions 
The previous chapter discussed the last level of analysis used within this thesis. This 
chapter now draws together all the previous chapters by highlighting the findings and 
contribution of this research, as well as its policy implications. In addition, this chapter 
assesses the utility of all the levels of analysis used in this thesis, with these having 
been used to underpin discussions about the distinct aspects of BH behaviour over 
time. 
This thesis began by noting that previous studies of BH have primarily focused 
on the causes and consequences of BH terrorism. Most BH scholars agree that the 
group escalated because of the extra-judicial killing of the founder of the movement 
by Nigerian forces, and that BH seeks to impose an ultra-orthodox version of Islam in 
Nigeria (Barkindo, 2016). However, BH was radicalised before the death of its leader. 
Moreover, the transnationalisation of BH has been underestimated, with BH having 
transformed from a small isolationist movement to a far larger and deadlier group.  
This study posed two questions: first, it asked how and why BH matured into 
a fully blown terrorist group; and secondly, it asked about the external and internal 
factors that have influenced the development of BH. The arguments presented in 
response note that other studies are overly simplistic in explaining the behaviour of 
BH over time, and that a more systematic approach was required deploying different 
levels of analysis to provide a more robust explanation as to the development of BH. 
These units of analysis formed the framework for chapters four to eight of this thesis. 
Moreover, these levels of analysis were used rigorously with the additional 
incorporation of semi-structured elite interviews with senior government officials, 
local negotiators and experts on BH. The interviews make this thesis distinctive to 
other studies because they are indicative of a level of access to state officials that is 
not easily obtained. The interviews provide information about the thinking of state 
officials in relation to BH, and thus reveal more detailed as well as new information 
about BH.  
This chapter is divided into four sections. The first section outlines the findings 
of this research and the second highlights policy implications of the research. The third 
section identifies avenues for further research, and the fourth highlights how a multi-
level analysis of BH contributes to the body of literature and knowledge about this 
group. It is important to note that even though the findings of this research cannot be 
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generalised, aspects can be used to inform future studies on terrorism generally, as 
well as the Nigerian government’s future policy decisions. The findings of this 
research can also be used to help reduce common misconceptions about BH among 
Nigerians, bearing in mind that BH’s campaign of violence has deeply divided 
Nigerians across both sub-national and religious lines.  
9.1 Findings 
One of the major contributions of this thesis to the literature on BH is the finding that 
BH is a rational actor using strategic logic to achieve its goals. The longitudinal 
approach used in this study indicates how BH has transformed over time. This 
subsection highlights key events about the evolution of BH, as well as emphasing the 
attributes of BH as a strategic actor. 
 Mohammed Yusuf founded BH in 2002 (Loimeier 2012; Mohammed 2014), 
In 2002, Yusuf had an acrimonious dispute with his former teacher, Sheik Ja'afar 
Mahmud Adam about the secular nature of the Nigerian state. Yusuf and his followers 
left Maiduguri (Comolli, 2015) and settled in Kanama village in Yobe state where they 
formed an isolationist group that was not a part of a secular society as they percieved 
these as being sinful (Smith 2015). 
 In 2003, BH had disagreements with Kanama natives over fishing rights 
(Smith, 2015). This dispute transcended into a faceoff between BH and the Nigerian 
police (Loimeier, 2012). Yusuf subsequently engaged in violent confrontations with 
the Nigerian authorities (Agbiboa, 2013a), and then fled to Saudi Arabia for safety 
(Mohammed, 2013). He returned in 2004 after negotiations with senior government 
officials from the Borno State government (African Spotlight, 2016). 
On return from exile, Yusuf revived and spread his ideology through preaching. 
Yusuf mobilised economically-disadvantaged and individuals enticed with his 
ideological arguments. His activities caused a renewed confrontation with the 
Nigerian forces led to the 2009 BH popular uprising, his arrest and then subsequent 
killing by Nigerian forces.  
After the death of Yusuf in 2009, Mamman Nur, who was third-in-command 
in BH, took over as interim leader. Nur and the majority of BH members could not 
contain the pressure of the Nigerian forces and went into exile. Shekau emerged as 
leader. Shekau spent half of the decade (2010-2015) as the leader of BH and his tenure 
transformed BH into a more lethal group. In September 2010, BH staged a comeback 
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by attacking Bauchi prison to free BH members being held in custody (Adamu, 2012). 
The Bauchi jailbreak was Shekau’s first successful outing as a leader and was 
significant in that over 700 BH members were freed (Adamu, 2012).  
 Increased BH attacks elicited great concern within security agencies. On 14 
June 2011, the Inspector General Police (IGP) threatened BH by declaring that, “Boko 
Haram days are numbered” (Isaac, 2011). Two days later, BH reacted with its first 
suicide bombing in Nigeria. The bomb exploded in front of the Nigerian Police Force 
(NPF) headquarters in Abuja, with this being an attempt to assassinate the IGP (ibid).  
The resurgence of BH enabled it to spread across ten states across Northern 
Nigerian. In reaction to BH’s increased campaign of violence, the Nigerian 
government declared a state of emergency. The state of emergency empowered the 
military with the primary task of combating BH members and it was declared in two 
phases: the first was in Borno and Yobe (Northeast) as well as Niger and Plateau 
(Northcentral) states from 31 December 2011 to 18 July 2012 (The Report, 2012). The 
second phase of the state of emergency was declared in April 2013 (BBC, 2013b). A 
six-month state of emergency was enforced in May 2013 in the whole of Adamawa, 
Borno and Yobe states, and was extended to November 2013 (Campbell, 2014). The 
state of emergency was also in response to increasing international apprehension about 
the growing threat of BH especially in 2012, when BH joined AQIM (Al Qaeda in the 
Islamic Maghreb), MUJAO (Movement for the Oneness of Jihad in West Africa) to 
fight the French-led military offensive in Northern Mali. Additionally, BH also 
elicited further international concern that resulted in the United States (US) 
designating it as a terrorist group in 2013 (Zenn, 2014b). 
Furthermore, the Nigerian government prohibited any form of BH financing 
(Zenn, 2014a). However, this financial blockade was ineffective because BH devised 
different ways of sustaining its campaign through for example, bank robberies and 
extortion (Zenn, 2014a). It engaged in drug and human trafficking across West Africa 
(Onuoha & Ezirim, 2013). BH adopted a further tactics including the kidnapping of 
individuals, especially girls. The abduction of girls in the town of Chibok in 2014 
became a milestone in BH’s operation. This millstone became efficient for BH as a 
means of gaining money from ransom (Zenn 2014b), source for suicide bombing (ibid) 
and also for marriage to BH recruits. Furthermore, BH raid military barracks to gain 
access to weapons, and they invaded Giwa, Gwoza Monguno and Bama barracks 
(Ekott, 2015). By gaining access to military equipment, BH became lethally strong, 
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and this helped in supporting their violent campaign and emboldening them to seize 
21 territories of the Nigerian state.  
The seizure of the above noted territories was supported by the expansionist 
agenda of IS. This agenda was declared in 2014 with it being a quest to widen the 
spread of IS from Iraq, Syria, Iran and the Levant in an attempt to globalise IS (Roggio, 
2014). BH switched its loyalty from Al Qaeda to IS in 2014. Al-Qaeda and IS hold 
similar radical Salafist ideologies, but BH switched loyalty to IS because they were 
growing in strength, with this switch of allegiance being possible to attribute to the 
decimation of Al-Qaeda and its affiliates across Africa (Zenn, 2014b).   
In 2015, a military action was launched against BH by a Multi-National Joint 
Task Force (MNJTF) which decreased BH’s operational capacity and resulted in the 
reclamation of Nigerian territories (LWJ, 2015). However, the MNJTF’s action 
contributed to a spillover of violence within Lake Chad region (Republics of Chad, 
Cameroon and Cameroon) (UN News Centre, 2016). Additionally, the effect of the 
MNJTF further motivated BH to increasingly exploit the Kanuri identity to recruit 
members across the Lake Chad region (International Crisis Group, 2016; 2017a; 
2017b). 
 This thesis has demonstrated that through its evolution and behaviour BH has 
reflected the three major assumptions of the strategic model of the rational choice 
theory (RCT). These assumptions suggest that: (1) rational actors have relatively 
stable and consistent goals; (2) actors compare the expected costs and benefits of the 
options before them; (3) actors choose options with the most favourable utility.    
The different stages of BH’s evolution reflect the group as being a strategic 
actor. First, after the Kanama incident and the subsequent exile of Yusuf, Yusuf 
established international support from other global jihadists. Yusuf’s return to Nigeria 
and his ability to negotiate with political actors in the Borno state government gave 
him the opportunity to spread his ideology without constrain. Yusuf’s ability to reach 
an agreement with the Borno state political actors poses the question as to whether 
terrorists will adopt violence if they have space to achieve their goals through peaceful 
means. It can be argued that terrorists incorporate different strategies, including 
diplomacy in the form of pacification or politics, to achieve their goals. Yusuf’s 
decision to use his connections with Governor Ali Modu Sheriff to recruit and 
radicalise individuals as well as expanding BH’s ideology is a rational game of politics; 
thus terrorist goals are motivated by political, religious and ideological factors 
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(Sandler & Arce, 2003). Additionally, Mohammed Yusuf’s actions mirror the strategic 
model’s assumption that terrorists weigh up their options before choosing the one(s) 
that gives optimum utility. The “perfidy” of Mohammed Yusuf by Ali Modu Sheriff 
also accentuates an assumption of the strategic model about the use of terrorism as last 
resort.  
Second, BH is a rational actor because it chooses options that have the most 
favourable utility, as well as comparing the expected costs and benefits of the options 
before it. The 2010 Bauchi jailbreak in which over 700 hundred members of BH were 
freed, signifies that BH choose an option that would increase its capacity to operate. 
However, the killing of BH members by the Nigerian forces as well as the prohibition 
of the financing of BH made the group adopt a costless approach to achieving its goals. 
Firstly, the group adopted criminal methods to fund itself such as bank robbery, 
kidnapping for ransom and drug trafficking. Secondly, because the group found that 
suicide bombing and the use of radicalised girls had few constraints, they orchestrated 
suicide attacks on soft-targets, especially in places where there were lots of civilians 
such as markets, mosques and churches. Furthermore, the 2016 attempt by BH to 
reinforce itself was different from the Bauchi jailbreak in terms of cost, with the 
Bauchi jailbreak using firepower instead of propaganda and ransom. BH used 
propaganda to pressure the government via the public in order to gain concessions, 
and BH then collected its ransom to free its captives and have its members released.   
Thirdly, BH’s target selection suggests that BH uses violence for strategic 
purposes and as a means of communication. For instance, the attack on the IGP was a 
response to a threat to BH as well as a sign to show that the group is stronger than the 
Nigerian government. Additionally, the assaults on civilian populations are a message 
to civilians also to show that BH is stronger than the government, and these are 
attempts by BH to gain support from civilians populations through the use of  fear. 
This is observable with the civilians in the Borno-Yobe axis who were caught between 
BH violence and the brute force of the Nigerian army (Amnesty International, 2015a; 
2015b). As argued by Kydd & Walter (2006), terrorists’ attacks on a civilian 
population are aimed at intimidating civilians in order to gain their obedience.  
When considering the above in a broader perspective, BH’s presence in rural 
and wilderness areas is a strategy with favourable utility. It is central for the group’s 
emergence, survival and use of tactics. BH has shown its desire to stay in urban areas 
by establishing a mosque in Maiduguri, the Markaz Ibn Taymiyyah (Walker, 2016), 
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and creating clandestine cells (START Report 2014). However, the group went 
underground after the 2009 uprising to its safe havens in rural and wilderness areas in 
border regions around the Lake Chad region, while still indicating its quest to spread 
across major cities in Northern Nigeria. This is evident in BH’s expansion of its 
branches and cells. BH spread in seven more Nigerian states apart from Adamawa, 
Borno and Yobe states (START Report 2014), with the implications of this 
asymmetrical approach and clandestiny creating a complex situation for the Nigerian 
forces when trying to fight the group. This may also be the reason why Participant 
One (a former top government official in a Northern Nigerian state) admits that, 
“Nigerian security is being confronted with an unconventional issue.” Moreover, this 
has also contributed to the spread of BH across Cameroon, Chad and Niger 
(International Crisis Group, 2016; 2017a; 2017b).  
One of the assumptions of the strategic model is that rational actors have 
relatively stable and consistent goals. This is true with BH because regardless of the 
group’s Kanuri ethnic identity members, it still maintains its goal of spreading radical 
Salafist ideology. As demonstrated in this thesis, the use of violence by BH is 
instrumental, but the group’s aim is to promote the spread of radical Salafist ideology. 
This goal began with Mohammed Yusuf and has been fostered by his successors and 
followers.  
This thesis finds that BH is a rational group that adopts a strategic use of 
violence, but that Nigerian policy makers and senior government officials were 
initially unaware of the BH tactics and so did not appreciate the rationality of BH. 
First, Nigerian lawmakers were politically divided about enacting a CT act to address 
BH activities until BH became a fully-fledged terrorist group (Sampson & Onuoha, 
2011: 38). In fact it was only after the maturity of BH that the Terrorism Protection 
Act 2011 was enacted and then reviewed in 2013. Second, Participant One (a former 
top government official in a Northern Nigerian state) admits that, “there was a was a 
degree of mismanagement of the crisis by Nigerian security”, and that Nigerian 
security forces were confronted with an unconventional war (see page 134). 
Participant Six (involved in the drafting of the National Counter Terrorism Strategy) 
also confirmed that because the fight against BH was “not normal” to them, they had 
to initiate a CT strategy in 2014 which was the first CT strategy designed to counter 
terrorism since the birth of BH (see page 135). Furthermore, there were complications 
for the government in understanding of BH, for instance during his term in office, 
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President Jonathan made three different statements about BH. In January, 2012 he said 
BH supporters were within the government and the security forces (Mark, 2012; Aliyu 
et al., 2015); in June 2012, he noted that the BH leadership was unknown; and in 2015, 
he stated that BH was a global phenomenon not limited to Nigeria alone (Premium 
Times, 2015c). These multiple statements are problematic in understanding how the 
government sees BH. Another confusing statement made by President Buhari, 
President Jonathan’s successor, was his avowal to end BH within seven months and 
then his declaration to have “technically defeated” BH (Nwabughiogu, 2015). These 
statements were made because Nigerian territories were reclaimed, but they did not 
give consideration to the ideological aspects of BH or their asymmetric tactics. There 
were also a number of issues that the Nigerian government official appeared to be 
unaware of such as mismanagement and insufficient knowledge having caused a great 
number of casualties, especially through indiscriminate killings by government forces. 
Nigerian government officials did and do not seem to understand that the trauma, fear 
and grievances resulting from such indiscriminate killings is pushing individuals into 
joining BH (see chapter five). Furthermore, the majority of Nigerian officials do not 
seem to understand the BH propaganda; BH adopts Kanuri ethnicity to increase its 
numbers and expand its territorial influence around the Lake Chad region, but the 
thinking of the majority of Nigerian policy makers remains centred on attributing BH 
to radical Islam. Finally, the majority of Nigerian officials also seem to be unaware of 
the role of communication, and especially the advanced technologies used by BH to 
spread their propaganda (see page 120). 
 This thesis has also provided a multi-level analysis of the evolution and 
behaviour of BH. Chapters four to eight examine individual, group, state, sub-state 
and international explanations for the emergence and development of BH. 
In chapter four, findings about the relationship between leadership and 
followers in BH, as well as the implications of leadership decapitation, suggest that 
individual leaders assume positions of authority because of pre-existing loyalties to a 
vicegerent or hereditary leader. Furthermore, the chapter found that the leadership of 
BH commands loyalty through religious and ideological factors. These factors are 
anchored on the eschatological belief of mujaddid and Mahdiyya. The chapter 
identifies ethnic entrepreneurship by BH leadership as being both a factor in 
mobilising BH members to violence, as well as being part of the cause for the 
splintering of BH. The chapter found that the external influences of both Al-Qaeda 
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and IS have created rivalry among BH leaders as well as internal factions, and that the 
leadership approaches of BH leaders have also contributed to factions within the 
movement. With regards to leadership decapitation, one strand of this thesis states that 
leadership decapitation creates internal turmoil that gradually leads to the collapse of 
a terrorist group. However, even though BH members were divided by both the 
decapitation strategy of the Nigerian government as well as internal dynamics, BH 
factions collaborated with each other in spite of their divisions. This implies that 
regardless of internal and external factors, BH members remain bonded by political 
Islam. The shared goal of BH further confirms the assumption of the unitary model of 
the rational choice theory (RCT) that was used in chapter five to explain common 
preferences of BH members. 
The findings in chapter five are related to organisational structure and goals, 
motivation, membership composition and recruitment. With regards to its 
organisational structure, BH is a hybrid of a cell-like organisation and a hierarchical 
structure. The cells are for the survival and spread of the organisation, and to ensure 
that as the group spreads to different parts of Nigeria, the destruction of any cell will 
not destroy BH as a group. This study found that BH has over 50,000 members 
comprising of a majority membership from the Kanuri tribes, with other members 
from the 19 Northern tribes, who are adherents of radical Salafism. The BH 
interpretation of Islam is guided by the radical beliefs of Ibn Taymiyyah, a 13th century 
Damascene scholar, jurist and Islamic figure. The chapter revealed that the structure 
and spread of BH was reduced as a result of authoritarian leadership within the group, 
internal divisions, decreasing public sympathy, counter-terrorism and a decrease in 
operational capacity. These findings can inform future studies on how violent groups 
can weaken over time. Moreover, the chapter identified additional recruitment patterns 
used by BH other than those noted in more conventional thinking, i.e. that religion and 
poverty are exclusively used by BH for recruitment (Adesoji, 2010 & 2011; Maiangwa 
et al., 2012; Agbiboa, 2013a; Hansen & Musa, 2013). Other methods of recruitment 
identified include abduction, hypnotism, coercion, self-radicalisation/recruitment, 
revenge, fear, marriage and solidarity with other international jihadists. This reveals 
that individuals above Nigeria’s national minimum wage join BH, with the further 
finding that BH’s utilisation of child soldiers and especially of girls, is opportunistic 
and economically cheap. The group needs to use children to carry out attacks because 
most of its skilled operatives are either dead or have been imprisoned by the Nigerian 
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authorities. Additionally, girls are used for suicide bombings following subjection to 
trauma and stigmatisation. Furthermore, recruited girls are also used to attract more 
male recruits through the promise of marriages, with the study additionally finding 
that because girl recruits are considered to have less fortitude in combat, male recruits 
are used for combat and the girls for suicide attacks.  
The findings in chapter six suggest that BH is a strategic actor, and that the 
timing and approach of Nigeria CT influenced the transformation of BH. BH is a 
strategic actor because it uses a sequential approach in pursuing its goals: it started 
with diplomacy and then moved to propaganda, violence, kidnapping with demands 
for ransoms and spying on Nigerian forces. The chapter also identified that BH’s 
transfer of allegiance from Al-Qaeda to IS (Islamic state) was for strategic reasons that 
were in reaction to Nigerian CT efforts. Al-Qaeda and IS share a similar ideology but 
BH switched loyalty to IS because they were growing in strength, whereas Al-Qaeda 
and its affiliates across Africa were being decimated (Zenn, 2014b). These findings 
also suggest that BH initially wanted a peaceful transition from a secular to a Sharia 
state in Nigeria, that it weighs up its options before it acts and that it selects its targets 
strategically to gain optimal effect. In its strategic use of violence against the Nigerian 
state, BH’s logic of attacks reflects Kydd & Walter’s (2006) notion of the costly 
signalling of carrying out attacks for reasons of attrition, intimidation, provocation or 
spoiling. BH in fact attacks to weaken state forces, coerce people into joining them 
and force governments to carry out indiscriminate violence against them so as to 
radicalise and encourage individuals into joining BH. BH does employ a strategic 
approach to enable it to survive the strength of the Nigerian forces and as mentioned 
above, child soldiers are used to address the shortfall of skilled operatives in the 
movement. Moreover, BH attacks prisons to free their members and in a situation 
where they have less military strength available, they adopt a costless approach by 
exchanging some of their civilian captives for their incarcerated skilled operatives.  
The nature of Nigerian CT has facilitated the transformation of BH. This 
chapter posits that its findings point to the failure of the Nigerian government to 
address the prevention and alleviation of early risk factors that may have in fact 
prevented the radicalisation of individuals. The heavy military crackdowns on BH by 
Nigerian forces led to a situational events that exasperated an already radicalised BH. 
Nigerian CT against BH was initially weak and thus allowed BH to transform, bearing 
in mind that BH became prominent in 2009, but Nigeria had no CT laws until 2011 
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and its first CT strategies were not initiated until 2014. The interview data in this 
chapter also reveals that the Nigerian government was not familiar with or suitably 
prepared for BH’s style of terrorism. The chapter found that the intensity of BH 
violence was also determined by increased military action being taken against it, 
especially the declarations of a state of emergency in 2012 and 2013 by the Federal 
Government of Nigeria (FGN). 
Chapter seven’s findings relate to the variations in target frequencies of BH. 
The findings suggest that similar to the majority of terrorists, BH do not target their 
constituents; they instead attack civilians and state officials who are at odds with their 
ideology. This study observed that dogmatic belief determines BH target selection, 
and as such this belief enables BH to categorise individuals into believers, non-
believers (kafirs), and ‘traitors’ within Islam who collude with non-believers. This 
categorisation can be further divided into state forces, government buildings, non-
military officials, people, private property, and educational/religious figures and 
institutions. The findings suggest that BH targeting is more prevalent in territories 
with higher ethnic and religious historical significance because of the group’s quest 
for ethno-religious revival. Additionally, the findings observed that BH’s ability to 
attack determine the variation in the frequencies of attacks on specific target types. 
Chapter eight’s findings relate to the influx of radicalism into Nigeria, the 
factors that have helped in internationalising BH and the spillover of violence out of 
Nigerian territory to countries in the Lake Chad region (i.e. the Republics of Cameroon, 
Chad and Niger). The study observed that Islamic radicalism came to Nigeria at 
different times. The Fula jihad across West Africa was reflected in Nigeria through 
the Usman dan Fodio jihad of the 19th century, with the Mahdiyya movement (from 
Sudan) attempted to continue with the dan Fodio legacy between the 19th and early 
20th century. Another major influence was the Iranian Revolution of 1979, which 
inspired the Islamic Movement of Nigeria (IMN). The transformation of BH from a 
small isolationist movement to a full-blown terrorist group was as a result of local 
grievances combined with the revivalism of a global radical Salafist movement. 
Furthermore, there were three major external factors that influenced the growth and 
internationalisation of BH: international terrorist groups (the Taliban, Al-Qaeda and 
IS), the international war on terror and international politics and major events such as 
the killings of Saddam Hussein and Muammar Ghaddafi. The killing of Saddam 
Hussein contributed to the rise and growth of IS, whereas the killing of Muammar 
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Ghaddafi weakened the Libyan state and therefore allowed for the smooth inflow of 
terrorists and weapons across Africa. This influx of militants and weapons resulted in 
IS creating provinces in West Africa. BH was inspired by the expansionist agenda 
declared by IS in 2014, with this offering a reason as to why BH engaged in seizing 
Nigerian territory in 2014 and then declared allegiance to IS in 2015. Chapter eight 
noted that some BH members who carry out attacks are not Nigerians, but are instead 
from Nigeria’s neighbouring states. It further identified that multiple reasons have 
contributed to the spillover of BH to other countries within the Lake Chad region. 
These factors include historical ties (religion and ethnic affiliation), geographical 
proximity and long periods of political instability around the Lake Chad region that 
have helped create the availability of weapons and trained fighters. Geographical 
features in the Lake Chad region in addition to proximity to Nigeria were also noted 
as providing safe sanctuaries for BH members, for example Mandara Mountain and 
the Sambisa Forest.  
The study identified the advance technology as being instrumental in the 
spread of radical ideology, especially in the Republic of Cameroon. Initially the 
Republics of Cameroon, Chad and Niger considered BH to be an entirely Nigerian 
problem and moreover, allowed BH to carry out activities in their territories because 
of their fear that BH might declare war on them if they opposed them. As a result, BH 
utilised such opportunities to not only further radicalise people in neighbouring 
countries, but to also stockpile weapons, fuel and food in the Diffa region in Niger in 
order to sustain its war with Nigeria. The thesis then observed that international 
intervention became a major factor vis-à-vis BH violence in the Republics of 
Cameroon, Chad and Niger, because in 2014 these nations were concerned about the 
increasing popularity of BH activities. Each declared military action against BH with 
the result that BH saw them as enemies. Furthermore, military cooperation by 
countries in the Lake Chad region through the MNJTF in 2015 dramatically increased 
the severity of BH incidences. 
The frequency of attack variance among these affected nations is related to the 
strength of their military or geographical borders. For example, the Republic of 
Cameroon has been the most affected of these three nations by BH attacks. It has a 
loose border and its border towns are relatively deprived and as such, deprived 
individuals are potential recruits to BH because of perceived economic benefits. The 
targeting of the Republic of Cameroon was also motivated by the additional economic 
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reasons of kidnapping and human trafficking. In contrast, attacks in the Republic of 
Chad were more of a military reprisal as BH encountered more difficulty in attacking 
Chad because of the strength of its forces. 
9.2 Policy implications 
The levels of analysis approach used in this thesis provides a broad perspective for 
policy intervention. The thesis recommends that to address the threat of BH and to 
prevent religious radicalism, both internal and external factors need to be considered. 
Internal factors include the thinking of BH, and this could be addressed by the 
Nigerian government through robust collaboration with religious bodies. Although the 
state and religion need to be kept separate, religious bodies in Nigeria collaborate with 
the government in areas such as conflict management or public orientation about 
specific government policies. In addition, there is collaboration on public health issues 
such as polio, Ebola and other disease outbreaks. External factors are both indirect and 
direct. Indirect factors include relative poverty, corruption, deprivation and grievances. 
External factors affect the Nigerian government’s CT efforts, with these being either 
proactive or nonviolent approaches in an attempt to prevent and ultimately end 
terrorism.   
Theology plays an important role in the radicalisation of individuals. Chapter 
four of this thesis identified the role of eschatological beliefs and scholarly works by 
figures such as Ibn Taymiyyah as being factors that contribute to extremists thinking. 
The counter-violent extremism (CVE) aspect of Nigerian CT could engage with 
influential Islamic organisations such as the Nigerian Supreme Council of Islamic 
Affairs (NSCIA), Jama’atu Nasril Islam (JNI) and the Da’awah Coordination 
Committee of Nigeria (DCCN), with terms of reference both reflecting and countering 
each group’s ideology. Some of the aforementioned scholarly works are outdated and 
not in tune with modern society, for example the radical views of Ibn Taymiyyah are 
contextualised within the resistance to the Mongolian invasion of the writer’s 
Damascene homeland in the 13th century. Moreover, the Emir of Kano, one of the 
most senior Islamic and Hausa leader in Northern Nigeria, suggests that:  
We have adopted an interpretation of our culture and our religion that is rooted 
in a 13th century mind-set that refuses to recognise that the rest of the Muslim 
world has moved on. (Sanusi, 2017).  
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The Emir’s call for general reform in Northern Nigeria with regards to its culture and 
religion reflects his belief that a more liberal society would ensure more development 
in this region. In this context, the Emir was concerned about the adherence to orthodox 
Islam in Northern Nigeria and its knock-on effect on the under-development of the 
Northern region, thereby implying that certain scholarly works used as guides by some 
Northern Muslims need to be discarded. As knowledge is dynamic, certain 
assumptions and facts need to be challenged in order to reflect modern society, and 
findings indicate that numerous ancient Islamic texts have been altered to better align 
with extremist ideologies (Holbrook, 2010). Such literature may be in circulation in 
Nigeria as events indicate that there is growing self-radicalisation in Nigeria. Such 
events include the attack on the Shiites by non-Shiite Muslims in the Northern cities 
of Kaduna, Kano, Katsina and Sokoto (THISDAY, 2016b), and attacks on Christians 
who were eating outside during the month of Ramadan (Cable, 2016).  
Preaching also plays a vital role in spreading radical ideologies, with 
secularism being another aspect that needs more modern Islamic interpretation. This 
encompasses areas such as apostasy, infidel, jihad, Mahdi (rightly-guided one), 
mujaddid (reformer or reviver), takfir (a Muslim who accuses other Muslims of 
apostasy) (see chapter four for more information about these concepts). These 
concepts appear in the majority of radical Islamic rhetoric and are used by radical 
preachers to demarcate society between Islamic and un-Islamic. Similarly, Cole and 
Cole (2009) find that words such as kafir are used to dehumanise individuals who do 
not share the same ideology as that of radical Islamists. In countering such narratives, 
the Nigerian government could collaborate with Islamic bodies to license Islamic 
preachers, in the same way that preacher licencing is currently practised in states such 
as Niger and Sokoto in Northern Nigeria (Punch, 2014; THISDAY, 2013). The 
licencing of preachers could help in reducing propaganda and hate messages being 
spread, and it can be further argued that such engagement in robust actions in order to 
prevent radical and inciting messages from spreading is important when countering 
extremist narratives.    
This research has identified a number of external factors (indirect and direct) 
that have aided BH’s campaign of violence. Indirect factors have contributed in the 
mobilisation of BH members, as argued in the recruitment section of chapter five. BH 
uses deprivation and relative poverty to also motivate its members through for 
example, soft loans and marriages. Hence it is important for the Nigerian Government 
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to enunciate a welfare policy that would lift individual poverty and deprivation, 
especially in the Northern part of Nigeria where Islamism exists. Other aspects of 
intervention include corruption and grievances. There is a need for the Nigerian 
Government to address the issue of corruption because individuals become aggrieved 
and believe funds that should be used to develop society are been siphoned by those 
in power. In addition, this is one of the reasons that BH rejects democracy and 
secularism because it sees it as a corrupt system that facilitates corruption (DCCN, 
2009). As argued in chapter six, the extrajudicial killing of BH leaders and the 
subsequent killings and torturing of moderates (Amnesty International Report (2015a, 
2015b) have contributed to the recruitment and support of BH, as argued in chapter 
six. The Nigerian Government needs to give far more attention to human rights while 
combating BH through CT strategies because of their indirect implications. The direct 
factor refers to the direct CT actions of the government. The Nigerian government’s 
proactive CT identified the Sambisa Forest as BH’s main hideout. In 2016, it 
announced its capture of the Sambisa Forest, yet BH still carried out attacks around 
the Borno axis. Chapter six of this thesis suggests that BH in fact uses several 
geographical areas as sanctuaries including the Burra Forest in the Northwest of 
Nigeria. The Burra Forest connects Sambisa, Dansadau, and Falgore Game Reserve 
to Birnin Gwari, and it is close to Bauchi, Gombe, Yobe, Adamawa, Borno, and 
Jigawa states (Daily Trust, 2016). This sort of geographical proximity facilitates BH’s 
tactical manoeuvring.  
In the aspect of nonviolent CT approach of the Nigerian government, more 
attention needs to be given to the social media as well as technological advances 
because of their continuos contribution to the spreading of radical ideologies. Both 
audio and visual types of media have influenced the spread of radicalism inside and 
outside of Nigeria, with radical preaching of clerics having been publicised (Loimeier, 
2012). Moreover, with the aid of modern media such as Facebook and Twitter, 
information now travels far faster across countries and the recent examples of Gambo 
and Uwais (see chapter five) show how easy it is for individuals to self-radicalise. 
With preaching in local languages being easily accessible on YouTube, extremist 
ideas are being shared in modern and sophisticated ways. This makes it increasingly 
important that the PREVENT approach of NACTEST develops a special unit to 
monitor such uploaded videos or audio materials in order to reduce the influence of 
the media in radicalisation. In addition to this, the role schools can play in 
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radicalisation is also important. Since the Nigerian education system allows religious 
studies in its curriculum in both primary and secondary schools, this part of the 
curriculum should contain elements of Peace Studies. Certain aspects of the Bible such 
as the wars in the Old Testament (Thomas, 2013) and the battles in the Qur’an as well 
as concepts such as jihad, shirk (idolatry; punishable by death) and shahid (martyr or 
one who dies for the sake of Islam; often justified by suicide bombers) that legitimate 
the use of violence (Mitrev, 2012) need to be addressed by introducing topics about 
hermeneutics in order to curb the puzzle of contextual interpretation. Peace Studies 
should be introduced as a compulsory aspect of the school curriculum, or as part of 
the general studies curriculum (GSTs) in Nigerian universities. Peace Clubs should be 
created and fully supported by the Ministry of Education and the National Orientation 
Agency (NOA) of schools and tertiary education in order to promote unity and 
enhance peer-to-peer learning and awareness. The ‘speak out, act right’ (SOAR) 
initiative of Ahmadu Bello University Zaria provides a model for establishing peer-
to-peer enlightenment, with the SOAR initiative being a programme where students 
are sensitised towards all forms of extremism within and outside of their educational 
worlds (Ojo, 2017). 
This study found that the root cause of violent extremism has been mainly as 
a result of the Nigerian government’s neglect of early signs of radicalisation, and then 
heightened radicalisation following their decapitation strategy. Between 2016 and 
2017, the arrests and long detentions before going to trial of the Indigenous People of 
Biafra leaders (IPOB), a separatist movement in eastern Nigeria, emboldened 
members of the group as well as people from the Eastern region to threaten the unity 
and security of Nigeria (Segun, 2017). Another identified area of concern is that war 
on BH might form a new narrative for future conflicts, because people have been 
trapped between the violence of BH and the excessive force of the Nigerian state. 
Added to this is the lack of de-radicalisation of BH-held captives, for example 
approximately 5,000 people held captive by BH were freed by the Nigerian Army in 
June 2016 (Rueters 2016). These captives were released without undergoing any kind 
of  de-radicalisation. Additionally, about 267 non-BH individuals mistakenly detained 
by the army were released without apology or compensation (Fox News, 2016) 
(chapter six). Finally, although the Nigerian government partners with a number of 
non-governmental organisations (NGOs) involved with internally displaced people 
(IDP) camps, such groups are not included in rehabilitation or reintegration processes. 
 220 
9.3 Avenues for future research 
An understudied area related to BH is its utilisation of the social media and internet in 
communication and propaganda, and most especially its use of the internet. Bertram 
and Ellison (2014) suggest that terrorist groups in sub-Saharan Africa, including BH, 
rely on the Internet for propaganda, yet in-depth studies have not been carried out to 
understand how the media has contributed to the growth of BH over time. The 
influence of the media on BH is discussed in chapter five, and it was concluded that 
there is a need for broader research in this area. First, further studies need to be 
conducted on how BH has used media platforms to increase its popularity, as well as 
why reporting on BH is predominately by foreign rather than local media. Second, 
studies need to be carried out on how BH uses the Internet for recruitment either 
through propaganda or direct contact with potential new recruits. Third, more studies 
need to be conducted on how the Internet facilitates connections with international 
terror groups, for example there are indications that BH has connections with 
Afriqiyah media, a jihadist site with a link to Islamic State (IS). The reason for this 
suggested connection is that BH’s application to join IS was announced by Afriqiyah 
media in 2015 (Omojuwa, 2015; Lister, 2015). Thus, there is a room for further 
empirical investigation into how media such as the Internet facilitates the 
transformation and operations of terrorist groups, with findings perhaps being able to 
contribute to the broader field of terrorism studies.  
One aspect that has not been widely discussed in this research but which could 
inform future studies on terrorism, is how the public has helped support the emergence 
and transformation of BH (chapter five), with Participant One noting:  
Let me tell you, at a certain point great numbers of leaders and opinion 
moulders were interested in what Boko Haram was doing because they thought 
it was a fight against the infidels or non-Islamists. A number of them wanted 
to join BH until things changed and they realised the futility of trying to 
support this group. This is why fighting BH is very difficult because they claim 
these people are their children, their brothers and sisters, and they are not 
prepared to disclose any information to help security operatives arrest them. 
Participant One is suggesting that when BH started, a number of locals (including 
community leaders and influential individuals) in the same communities as BH 
members supported them because they thought that they were fighting a just cause for 
the propagation of religion. Other inhabitants considered BH members to be a part of 
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their family or community, and were therefore not willing to assist security operatives 
by divulging any information about BH. Participant One also suggests that such 
support for BH has faded because of the intensity and indiscriminate killings 
orchestrated by the group. 
It can be argued that such public support could be justified by some of the 
writings of ancient Islamic figures that are used to promote Islamic radicalism. As 
such, even though it is difficult to identify the amount of Islamic literature in 
circulation, studies could be conducted about the content of Islamic literature across 
Northern Nigeria, and a comparative study could be conducted on Islamic literature 
between North and South-West Nigeria. Even though there are no statistics on the 
number of Muslims in either of these regions, anecdotal evidence suggests that there 
is a considerable number of Muslims in South-West Nigeria who practise moderate 
forms of Islam. Conducting a study about how public support influences BH would 
contribute to the field of terrorism by exploring how public support facilitates the 
transformation of terrorist groups. 
9.4 Contributions 
The longitudinal approach applied in this thesis highlighted the strategic logic of BH 
behaviour and transformation. Even though the findings of BH cannot be generalised 
but, longtidudinal study of a terrorist group may demonstrate the logic of its strategies 
and evolution.  
 Furthermore, because the behaviour of terrorist groups is complex and needs 
to be studied at a micro unit level, examination of the existence, development and 
dynamics of BH through the levels of analysis offers important perspectives that can 
inform future research. Terrorist groups are dynamic in nature and their behaviour 
varies both internally and externally. This is why using the levels of analysis gives in-
depth explanations about a group and its uniqueness. It also allows for the rigorous 
study of a terrorist group in a comprehensive manner. Moreover, the study of BH over 
time can be used to understand the reasons for the ever-changing nature of a terrorist 
group behaviour. Additionally, it shows that different aspects of terrorist comportment 
are dependent on each other and that without one of these, explanations will be 
incomplete. 
This study suggests that in order to understand how terrorists operate it is 
important to understand different terrorist behaviour in terms of leadership, group 
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structure, goals, targeting, intensity, variation in violence tactics and recruitment. 
These aspects do not work in isolation, but instead they inter-connect with each other 
and also change over time because terrorists want to achieve their goals while 
responding to external factors. Moreover, some of these aspects of behaviour are 
manifestations of internal dynamics within terrorist groups. Therefore, this fact 
underscores the importance of using a levels of analysis approach. Accordingly, the 
individual level highlights the inter-personal relationships of individuals that form the 
building blocks for collective action, and these can be understood through 
leadership/follower relations, leadership dispute, group splintering and how different 
leadership determines the intensity of violence. However, the individual level does not 
work in isolation as the leadership depends on its group for loyalty and the furtherance 
of shared goals. Studying terrorist groups at a group level reveals the goals, thinking, 
internal dynamism and effects of external influences on a group. External influences 
may come from the environment where terrorists live, from state CT, support from 
international terror groups or international military cooperation against the terrorist 
group. A combination of all of these factors explains terrorist tactics, target selection, 
variation in target selection, recruitment and spillover. In turn, because terrorist groups 
are secretive, the nature of terrorist violence can also be used to understand a group’s 
strength and thinking. For instance, a terrorist group’s target type may explain whether 
they are outbidding a rival group or fighting people out of their constituency. The 
variation in target selection helps us to understand whether a group is responding to 
government forces, is more concerned about ideology/ethnicity or if this is a sign of 
weakness. The advantage of the levels of analysis is that each unit complements each 
other and that with the neglect of one, the strength of the study is reduced. Moreover, 
each of these behaviours is better examined under one unit of analysis. 
Studying the development and behaviour of terrorism often challenges existing 
theoretical assumptions or empirical facts, as it suggests that a single theory or 
empirical study is insufficient because of the dynamic nature of terrorism. For example, 
in chapter four numerous accounts about the leadership of violent movements were 
used to explain BH leadership, and in chapter eight a number of empirical arguments 
were incorporated to explain BH spillover of violence to other countries. Another 
contribution of this study is that it can inform future studies about different 
perspectives in terrorism and political violence including the cause, motivation and 
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consequences of terrorism, recruitment and mobilisation, terrorist targeting, CT, 
spillover of violence and conflict process. 
This thesis suggests that a mixed methods case study with multi-level analysis 
allows for a rigorous and systematic investigation of a terrorist group. In other words, 
the multi-level analysis has strong methodological backing in which the weakness of 
one method is addressed by the strength of other. Because investigating terrorist 
groups is a challenging task given the security risks and clansdestine nature of such 
groups, a combination of different explanations and a number of sources is required 
to understand the complex nature of a terrorist group. 
9.6 Concluding remarks 
Understanding the evolution, development and behaviour of terrorists is complex 
because of the ever-changing nature of terrorism. Terrorist behaviour is dynamic: it 
varies both internally and externally. This research could contribute both theoretically 
and empirically in understanding the development, evolution and behaviour of 
terrorist groups. This thesis can also contribute in terms of approaches and 
methodologies in terrorism research. The findings can also be useful in resolving the 
ongoing campaign of violence by BH. 
The approach used in this research has engaged different theories such as 
rational choice theory (both the unitary and strategic models) and the ‘bunch of guys’ 
theories. The empirical facts from this study can also be used to understand different 
aspects of terrorist behaviour in areas such as leadership, groups and their composition, 
targeting and the transnationalisation of terrorist groups.  
The methodology used in this thesis could also be useful in terrorism research 
because of its flexibility, which allows for a number of methods, theories and 
empirical debates to be utilised when investigating a complex group. 
The different aspects of terrorist behaviour examined through the levels of 
analysis could also be important for CT action because it highlights areas in which 
governments can take actions that could end terror groups. In other words, 
understanding the internal dynamics within a terrorist group and the changing 
strategies of terrorists, as well as other aspects that propel the success of terrorist 
groups, could help governments better identify appropriate CT actions in order to 
curtail all the components of terrorist behaviour.  
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The understudied areas on BH such as its growth in communication and 
propaganda through the help of social media and the Internet could give more in-depth 
information about BH if investigated further. Other avenues for further research such 
as public support and Islamic literature in circulation (which this thesis has suggested 
as factors that help support the radicalisation and motivating factors of BH) could be 
investigated in order to gain more inforrmation about BH. 
The researcher hopes that this study contributes in a small way to improving 
the theoretical, empirical and methodological study of terrorism and is of help in 
ending BH.  
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Appendix 1: Interview participants (description, location 
and dates of interviews) 
Below is a table indicating the description of each participant. While the identity of 
the participants remains anonymous, it is important to describe the 
participants in order to highlight their relevance to the research on BH.  
 
 
  
Code Location & Date Description 
Participant One Abuja, 1.7.15 A former top government official in a Northern Nigerian 
state. He was in government during the emergence of BH. 
Participant Two Minna, 14.7.15 A member of the former Presidential Committee on BH and 
knowledgeable in Islamic theology. 
Participant 
Three 
Abuja, 11.8.15 A member of the former Presidential Committee on BH and 
expert in conflict negotiation. 
Participant Four Abuja, 21.7.15 A member of the former Presidential Committee on BH and 
senior government official. 
Participant Five Wamba, 9.815 Member of the erstwhile committee of the drafting of the 
present constitution of Nigeria (1999 Constitution). 
Participant Six Jos, 19.8.15 Involved in the drafting of the National Counter Terrorism 
Strategy (NACTEST). 
Participant 
Seven 
Jos, 13.08.15 A media practitioner and conflict negotiator within Nigeria. 
Participant 
Eight 
Zaria, 18.815 An academic and security consultant who had several 
contacts with BH members. 
 
Participant Nine Kaduna, 23.7.15 A retired General in the Nigerian Army. He served as 
Commandant of several army units during his service days. 
Participant Ten Lafia, 6.7.15 A former lawmaker and attorney general. 
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Appendix 2: A sample of the interview request letter 
        
  
 
          27th June 
2015 
... 
Nigeria. 
Dear Sir, 
   Letter for Interview Request 
 
I am Solomon Anjide, a PhD student in International Relations at the School of Social 
and Political Science, University of Lincoln. My PhD thesis investigates the birth of 
Boko Haram and the path to terror. I am presently in Nigeria to conduct interviews 
and I will be doing fieldwork in Nigeria until August. 
 
This research project is solely for educational purposes and uses Boko Haram as a 
case study in examining the causes and motivations of violence. 
 
You have been selected as a participant in the interviews due to your vast knowledge 
on the Nigerian state, Islamic Theology, and experience in public service. Moreover, 
this research seeks to inquire more information from you as a member of the 
committee of the Federal Government of Nigeria (FGN) which is mandated to 
dialogue with Boko Haram.  
 
In order to preserve confidentiality, your name will not be made public and your 
personal data will be processed with due regard for data security. Anonymity is 
guaranteed by following the University of Lincoln research ethics policy.    
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To ensure data protection, the file containing personal data will be kept in secured 
cabinets, electronic data will also be encrypted and stored in a safe. I will strictly 
adhere to the University of Lincoln ethics guideline in line with the Data Protection 
Act, and the data will only be accessible to me as a researcher. I am very aware of the 
ethics and responsibilities under the Data Protection Act. In case you wish to withdraw 
your participation, your data will be destroyed safely and securely. 
 
For any further enquiries, please do not hesitate to contact me via email at 
sAnjide@lincoln.ac.uk, via mobile on +447448763385 (UK), +2348033897356 
(Nigeria) or by post at; School of Social and Political Sciences, University of Lincoln, 
Brayford Pool, Lincoln, LN6 7TS, United Kingdom. 
Thank you in anticipation for your kind response. 
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Appendix 3: Interview schedule 
Below is a sample of the interview schedule. All participants were asked the same set 
of questions. The participants were also asked similar probing questions. However, 
where the researcher needs more information, the interviewees are asked follow-up 
questions.    
Interview session 
Inteviewer: Solomon Anjide 
Interviewee: (Name) 
Date: 
Interviewer: Good day Mr..., my name is Solomon Anjide, I am a PhD student 
studying International Relations in the School of Social and Political Science at 
University of Lincoln United Kingdom. 
I am presently on a fieldwork research on the topic, "the birth of Boko Haram 
and the path to terror". Given your years of experience in the public sector, your deep 
knowledge as a security expert (negotiator, Islam e.t.c), understanding and dedication 
to the survival of Nigeria, I have come to acquire in-depth understanding on the cause 
and motivation of Boko Haram violence. 
Let me also reiterate my earlier assurances on anonymity and privacy. In 
presenting the findings of this research, you will be given a pseudonym and, any 
electronic material used will be highly encrypted material while written material will 
be locked in secured cabinet. 
While I crave for your esteem indulgence and generous time, may I proceed with my 
questions?      
Interviewee: (reply) 
Interviewer: Thank you very much. Sir, the Interview consists of two sections, 
section 1 focuses on the cause of Boko Haram while section 2 concentrates on its 
motivation to violence. is it fine to discuss on both? 
Interviewee: (reply) 
Interviewer: Thanks 
Part 1: Cause of Boko Haram Violence. 
1. In your view what are the principle causes of Boko Haram 
a. What is the role of poverty?: 
PQ1 (Probing Question) : corruption ? 
PQ2: Climate ? 
 270 
b. What would you suggest is the role of political factors such as exclusion and 
discrimination? 
PQ1: Sir would you think it is politically motivated? 
c. There are confusing versions about the role of religion, how instrumental do 
think religion is to the group's violent disposition? 
d. Some version opine that Boko Haram is influenced by the Salafist ideology, 
can you clarify this notion please? 
e. Another version suggests that BH originated from Izala movement and that 
they both believe in the Salafiyya doctrine, in your opinion can you explain 
the main theological differences between the two? 
f. Another version says Boko Haram is influenced by international radical 
groups. How closely related do you think Boko Haram is to those groups, are 
there ideological similarities? 
PQ1: can you say Boko Haram relates with these international radical groups 
for strategic survival? 
Part 2- Motivations to violence 
1. some groups might use for example religion to justify their campaigns but in 
the end it may have originated from economic and political discrimination 
could this be the case for Boko Haram? 
PQ1: In the course of dialogue with them, what did they say is their choice for 
the violence? (for those who had contact with BH) 
2. What do you think explains the changes in the levels of violence Here is a 
timeline of Boko Haram attacks, what do you think explains the relative highs 
and relative lows? 
PQ1: Some people blame the military on the escalation of violence, in your 
observation, did some military actions such as Baga, Bama massacre explain 
such changes? 
PQ2: What will you say about the Civilian JTF (Joint Military Task Force)?   
3. how do you think/know they recruit members? Why do you think people join?  
PQ1: Who do you think does the recruiting? 
4. Do you think that the leaders have been important in recruitment, mobilization 
and, choice of violence?: 
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5. Have you observed differences in the leadership strategies? if so, how, why 
and what has been the consequence? 
6. Is there other additional information you will want to add? 
Ending the Session: 
Interviewer: Sir it is great and educative listening to you, once more thank 
you very much for your time and willingness to participate in this research I 
remain grateful. 
Interviewee:  
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Appendix 4: Sample of the consent form 
Name of interviewee: 
 
Names of interviewer: Solomon Anjide 
 
 
 
Title of the project: The Birth of Boko Haram and the Path to Terror 
 
I confirm that I am willing to participate in the research project named above.   
 
I understand that my participation is voluntary and that I am free to withdraw at any 
time, or not to answer any individual question posed, without specifying a reason. 
 
I confirm that I am willing to allow the interview to be recorded.  
 
I understand that the transcript of the interview with myself, will be used by the student 
named above as part of a PhD research Project. 
 
I understand that my name and identity remains completely anonymous and 
confidential. 
 
I understand that as the transcript will be submitted as part of PhD thesis, that it will 
be read not only by the student named above but also by his supervisors. I also 
understand that as part of the PhD examination process, an external examiner might 
read the project and transcript.  
 
 
Signature of Participant:     Date: 
 
 
Signature of Researcher:     Date: 
 
 
